

THE PRIME MINISTERS
OF.
AURANGZEB

[A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy]

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P_R_E_F_A_C_E

Dr. R.P. Tripathi, formerly Professor and Head of the Department of History, University of Allahabad, attempted to study the working of Wizarat as an institution in the Turkish period of our history. He has traced its history upto the reign of Akbar. Since then no scholar has taken up the strings from the point where they had been left by him.

While selecting the subject of my dissertation I intended to proceed on the lines laid down by Dr. Tripathi, but on the perusal of relevant material I had to change the line of treatment. I found that under Aurangzeb, as earlier in the time of Iltutmish, Balban, Mohammad Tughlaq or Sher Shah or even Akbar, the position of Wazir did not improve materially. In fact, in spite of his being the highest dignitary of the state he was overshadowed by the domineering figure of the emperor. He was at the best the head of administration and performed routine duties. In these circumstances I was left with no other alternative except that of presenting a biographical account of the Wazirs who served the last of the Great Mughals.

While conceding that the Mughal Wazir cannot be equated with the British Prime Minister and that to designate him Prime Minister is historically misleading. I must

confess that I could not find a better equivalent term in English language and therefore I have called the wazirs of Aurangzeb as Prime minister; and for this misnomer I crave indulgence of scholars.

To elucidate the difference between the British Prime Minister and the Mughal Wazir, it may be pointed out that whereas the former holds his position by virtue of the majority of his followers among the elected representatives in the House of Commons, the latter was no more than a nominee of the emperor holding his post at the sweet will of his master. But it should be remembered that even the sweet will of a despotic Mughal like Aurangzeb was conditioned by a number of relevant political considerations.

It may be interesting to note that whereas the seventeenth century witnessed a cataclysmic change in the politics of England because of the long drawn out struggle between the Stuart Kings and the Parliament, in India the scene was radically different. Here the emperor was not confronted with any widespread and concerted opposition to his power. Neither his ministers nor the people at large had the audacity to question his authority or that of his wazir. No doubt, there were a number of outbreaks in Northern India and in the Deccan, there was a movement for independence, but their character was essentially parochial and political. The Mughal emperor

had hardly any desire to interfere with the religious susceptibilities of non-muslims unless he smelt some political danger emanating from them. And so far as muslims were concerned, the emperor, both in theory and practice, was above the Ulama whom at times he could and did bound to his will.

The present work is an humble attempt to bring into bold relief the activities and role of the wazirs of Aurangzeb; and in this context his functions and duties have been clearly indicated. Besides this, care has been taken to bear in mind the perspective in which each succeeding wazir was called upon to play his part. Undoubtedly the Diwan-e-Wizarat was the hub of the administration, and so far as possible the relations between the wazir and the emperor in this context have also been examined.

To delineate the picture both Persian and non-Persian sources have been laid under contribution. Nor have other works dealing with the reign of Aurangzeb been overlooked. Every effort has been made to utilise them to the best possible advantage.

I am grateful to my revered teacher Dr. B.P.Saksena for his valuable guidance and supervision, and to Prof. G.P. Bhatnagar and Dr. M.A. Ansari for the kindness and the encouragement which they gave me. I am also indebted to Dr. Raghubir Singh (Sitamau) who allowed me free access to

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his rich collection. I also express my sincere thanks to Dr. N.A. Siddiqi, Dr. M.Athar Ali and others of the Department of History, Aligarh Muslim University. I am also much obliged to Dr. Radhey Shyam for helping me in various ways to complete the work. Nor should I omit to acknowledge my indebtedness to Mr. Farrukh and Mr. Massey of Aligarh and Allahabad University respectively who were kind to me while I was working in the research halls of the two Universities.

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(LAÏQ AHMAD)

A_B_B_R_E_V_I_A_T_I_O_N_S

Adab.	Adab-e-Alamgiri.
Akhbarat.	Akhbarat-e-Darbar-e-Mualla.
A.N.	Alamgir Nāmah.
A.S.	Amal-e-Saleh.
BADSHAH NĀMAH	Badshah Nāmah by Abdul Hamid Lahori.
Bernier.	Travels in Mogul Empire.
Catrou.	A history of the Mughal Dynasty in India.
Dil.	Nuskha-e-Dilkusha.
Dow.	History of Hindostan.
Elliot & Dowson.	History of India as told by its own historians.
E.F.I.	The English Factories in India.
F.A.	Futuhāt-e-Ālamgīrī.
Hadīqa.	Hadīqat-us-Salātīn.
Iqbal Nāmah.	Iqbal Nāmah-e-Jahāngīrī.
J.I.H.	Journal of Indian History.
J.P.H.S.	Journal of Pakistan Historical Society, Karachi.
Love.	Vestiges of Old Madras.
M.A.	Maasir-e-Ālamgīrī.
M.L.	Muntakhab-ul-Lubāb.
M.U.	Maasir-ul-Umarā.
O.B.D.	Oriental Biographical Dictionary.
Waris.	Pādshah Nāmah by Waris.
Poem.	Aurang Nāmā (Poem)
P.I.H.C.	Proceeding of Indian History Congress.

Ruq̄qāt	Ruq̄qāt-e-Alangīrī.
R.S.	Riyāz-us-Salātīn.
Storia.	Storia De Mogor by Manucci.
Tavernier.	Travels in India.
Tuzuk.	Tuzuk-e-Jahāngīrī.
T.S.	Tarīkh-e-Shah Shujai.
Z.N.A.	Zafar Nāmah-e-Alangīrī.

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CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTORY

In the administrative set up which gradually developed in the Turkish period of our history 'the wazir' or Prime Minister occupies the central place. His status and responsibilities varied from time to time, being always determined by contemporary environments, the aptitude of the ruler and the exigency of the situation. In fact the wazir was an inseparable adjunct of a monarch. He was his chief counsellor, mouthpiece, and the main instrument for the execution of his policy and orders. The measure of his influence on contemporary affairs depended upon his sagacity, his personal qualifications, his experience and above all on his dexterity to deal with men and movements.

Muslim jurists have variously derived the origin of the institution. Some have traced it from the Pahlavi root-word 'vichier' meaning to judge. Some traced it from 'yazar' meaning bearer of burden;¹ while others have derived it from 'vizr' which means the king's counsellor. Anyway these derivations bring into bold relief the nature and type of duties which a wazir was expected to perform. It was under the Abbasides that the title came into vogue.² In initial stages the duty of the incumbent of this title was to draft royal correspondence, but with the expansion of the

1. Central Structure of the Mughal Empire by Ibn Hasan, p. 111.

2. Mughal Administration by Jadunath Sarkar, p. 23.

empire and the consequent multiplication of administrative problems more and more of responsibility was thrown on his shoulders, till at last he came to occupy a position above that of his other compeers, which impelled the Muslim political thinkers to carefully define his powers, his duties as also the qualities which he was expected to possess.

According to Fakhri the wazir stands midway between the sovereign and the subjects; while Fakhr-e-Mudabbir regards him as "a partaker in sovereignty", without whom no state can be stable and prosperous. We find an echo to have remarked that "sovereignty and dominion cannot attain the pinnacle of their height without the help and cooperation of a wazir, whose wise deliberations result in promoting the welfare of the country and the prosperity of the people". Indeed, there is no dearth of examples where a sovereign owed his success to the fidelity, wisdom, ability and farsightedness of his wazir. Since a wazir enjoyed unique privileges and was expected to perform multitudinous duties, he was required to possess correspondingly distinctive qualities. These have been aptly set forth by Hidayet Ullah Bahari and Haji Khair Ullah in their treatises named "Hidayet-ul-qawaid" and "Dasture-e-Jahankusha",¹ respectively. Hidayet's remarks are deserving of quotation:

"He (wazir) should be well versed with the laws of the country, sweet-tongued, cultured and amicable in his behaviour. He should attend to the grievances of the high and the low. He should

1. "Dastur-e-Jahankusha", by Haji Khair Ullah, ff.49a-b.

always be strict in his words with the zamindars; he should try to maintain cordial relations and should keep an account of the income and expenditure of the empire. He should also have a knowledge of the forts of the empire, so that at the time of forwarding the despatches or presenting an account of the different mahals¹ he could apprise the emperor conveniently about them".²

During the early Sultanat period the name of Junaidi stands out very prominently.³ He was followed by Muhazzabuddin after whose fall the powers of the wazir were usurped by other officers. Balban as a chief adviser of Sultan Nasiruddin Mahmud was styled Nāib-e-Mumlikat'. In the latter part of Alāuddīn's reign Kāfur was styled as Malik Nāib. Khwaja Jahān Ayāz and Khān-e-Jahān Telangānī were very powerful wazīrs under the Tughlaqa. Under the Syed rulers the wazīr became pre-eminently a military officer and at times he played the role of king-maker. In the feudal-despotic regime of the Lodis the position of the wazīr lost its importance. Bahlūl probably had no wazīr. But his son Sikandar who organised the central structure of government appointed Malik Bhuwā as his wazir. He continued to hold this post under Ibrāhīm, but his powers were confined to financial control only. Dr. R.P. Tripathi has aptly remarked that "the Vazir continued to remain in obscurity even in the second ⁴ Afghan empire". In fact, the Afghan period was very unpropitious for wizarat, and though the institution did not entirely disappear, it became weak and insignificant.

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1. Mahal: A section in the revenue sense i.e. 'a parcel or parcels of land separately assessed for revenue'.
 2. Hidayet-ul-Qawaid by Hidayet Ullah Behari, f.7b.
 3. Foundation of Muslim Rule in India by A.B.M. Habibullah, p.117.
 4. Some Aspects of Muslim Administration by R.P. Tripathi, p.193.

The position however changed under the Chaghtai Mughals. Their outlook on politics and administration was different. They were the legatees of a complex tradition and of mixed conventions. The contemporary model for them to imitate was not that of the Abbasides but that of the Safawids. Moreover, being men of learning and erudition they were also familiar with juristic literature. They developed their own theory of kingship. While conceding that the administrative set-up in its final composition, was not completely divorced from the past, in its contents it took into account the new political trends and immediate requirements. It was novel not in the sense that it had not been practised in the past; it was new in the sense that it took into cognizance the existing present.

In his sporadic life of success and failure Babur had perhaps little time to further the process of evolution of the institution of wizarat. In the beginning of Kabul period Baqī Chaghanīani was his right hand man, virtually a wazir; but he was dismissed by his master on eleven charges.¹ Thereafter there is no mention of any one influential minister or officer who may be compared with chief minister. Later on, when Babur visited Sultan Husain Baiqra and came in touch with a properly organised administrative system, he was deeply impressed with it. He writes: "Of the wazirs of Sultan Husain Mirza one was Majdudīn Mohammad, the son of Khwaja Pīr Mohammad Khwāfī, who was the chief counsellor in the Divan of Shāh Rukh Mirzā .

1. Babur Namah, Eng. Tr. Beveridge, I, p. 250.

Before his time, the Diwan of Sultan Husain Mirza was conducted without regularity or method and the greatest disorder prevailed.¹ This statement shows that in the Timurid administrative organisation the word 'Diwan' was used for a department and the individual in its charge was called yazir. Perhaps the diwan indicated the revenue department.

But Baber had no aptitude for organising his administration according to any well-defined plan. He did very little in this direction during his twenty years' regime in Kabul: whereas during his brief sojourn in India he was too preoccupied to give any thought to the problem. But towards the end of his life Khalīfah did rise to the position of chief minister. Very little, however, is known about his antecedents except that he actively participated in the battles of Panipat and Khanwa and accompanied Baber in his Bihar and Chanderī expeditions. It is not clear on what authority Dr. H.P. Tripathi has concluded that "Nizāmuddīn Khalīfah was the political and financial head of the government."² His military talents may be conceded, but there is hardly any evidence of his financial acumen. That he was an influential noble cannot be denied.

In the early part of his reign Humayūn reposed full confidence in Amir Wāis Mohammad and later on in Hindū Beg, who in the words of Abul Fazl was entrusted with the task of "shutting

1. Ibid., p. 281.

2. Some Aspects of Muslim Administration, pp. 113-14.

and opening, binding and loosing of great affairs of officers and wazirs and of all government & clerks etc. After his return from Persia to Kabul the emperor favoured Qarjah Khan who enjoyed the status and power of wazir. But in 1545 A.D., he decided to curtail his powers. He deprived him of control over finances and limited his authority to administrative matters.¹ This step involved far-reaching consequences. Indirectly, it imparted some shape to the institution of wizarat and the position of wazir in the later period. At the moment, however, this measure was undertaken to maintain a balance between two different groups and to keep the wazir under control. In 1546 A.D. Qarjah Khan attempted to recover his lost position, by planning the assassination of Khwajah Sultan Mohammad Rashidi who held the direction of financial affairs. Humayun had no other alternative but to acquiesce with the consequences of the tragedy.² But in 1547 A.D. he made another attempt to curtail the influence of Qarjah Khan by appointing Khwajah Ghazi to the post of Mushrif-e-Diwan who was to be independent of Wakil. Not only this, Humayun himself began superintending the work of these two different departments of administration. This was resented by Qarjah Khan who wanted to replace Khwajah Ghazi by Khwajah Qasim, Diwan-e-Buyutat.³ Finding the sovereign adamant, Qarjah Khan and his supporters abandoned the cause of their master and deserted

1. Iqtidar Alam's paper entitled "Wizarat under Humayun 1545-1555" P.I.H.C. 1960, pp. 248-49.

2. Ibid.

3. Diwan-e-Buyutat: It was the title of an officer who registered the property of deceased persons, in order to secure the payment of the dues of the state as well as to safeguard the property of the heir of the deceased.

For details see, Mughal Administration, pp.52-54.

to Kāmran in Badakhshān. It was after the peace of Tālīqān in 1548 A.D. that Khwājah Qāsim was appointed wazīr, but only for a short period. Smarting under a sense of humiliation Khwājah Ghāzī not attempted to overthrow his rival but Qāsim and Khwājah Mirza Beg, the new Liwan charged him with corrupt practices; and at their instance Humāyūn dismissed him. The dismissal of Khwājah Ghāzī, however, effected no improvement in the situation. Qāsim Khan's affiliation with the pro-Kāmran clique brought about his fall. His place was taken by Khwājah Sultan Aī. But Qarjah Khan and Khwājah Qāsim continued to be active in their designs and it was in 1551 A.D. that Humāyūn inflicted a blow to their soaring ambitions by defeating them at Ushturgrām. He seized them and put them to death.¹ From 1551 A.D. to 1556 A.D. Khwājah Sultan Aī continued to function as wazīr of the Tanfīz type.²

The opening years of the reign of the new emperor Akbar marked a change in the institution of wizarat. The sovereign being a minor, his 'atālīq'³ and 'wakil-us-Saltanat'⁴ Bairam Khan exercised extensive powers and controlled all the affairs of State.⁵

1. Iqtidar Alam's Paper, op. Cit.

2. Wazīr-e-Tanfīz (وزیر تنفیذ) He simply carried out the orders of the sovereign. It was not within his competence to initiate a policy or to do anything on his own responsibility. He was merel the intermediary between the ruler and the people.

3. Atālīq: A tutor or guardian.

4. Wakil-us-Saltanat: The title of the highest ranking officer in Mughal administration.

5. Abul Fazl mentions: "Bairam Khan, who regarding himself as the unique of the age in regard to courage, administrative abilities devotion of sincerity, and who in consequence of a crowd of flatterers had got the belief that the affairs of India could not be managed without him, took, from the bad advance of short-sighted associates, the path of destruction, and did shameful deeds, such as should not have come from him".

See, Akbar Namah, Beveridge, II, p. 138.

His five years dominance brings into bold relief an intensive feature in the constitutional history of Northern India.¹ Indeed he possessed all the powers of a wazir as enumerated in the works of Al Hāwardī. He was wakil as well as wazir. As wazir-e-Tafwīz² he appointed and dismissed high officers according to his will and at times he did not even care to consult the young sovereign.³ He appointed Pīr Mohammad Nāsir-ul-Mulk as his naib (deputy) to look after the revenue and financial matters and Sheikh Ghadal as the head of the ecclesiastical department. He awarded jagirs in his own discretion, and thus gave umbrage to his master who complained that his servants were being neglected by the wakil.⁴ Further, he also began sitting in the 'Dīwan-e-khas' twice a week, giving decisions on civil and military matters. He very often faced his master with the fait accompli. He went to the length of interfering with the personal matters of the Padshah. For instance, he opposed his marriage proposal with the daughter of Mohammad Abdullah Khan Mughal; and it was only when Nāsir-ul-Mulk brought home to his mind that the step was tantamount to indiscretion that he yielded and gave his consent to it.⁵ Undoubtedly he had rendered invaluable

1. Central Structure of the Mughal Empire, p.121.

2. Wazir-e-Tafwīz (وزیر تفویض): He wielded all the sovereign power on his own initiative and was only required to inform his sovereign of all he had done.

3. Islamic Polity, by P.Saran, p.96.

4. Akbar Namah, Beveridge, II, pp.162-63.

5. Ibid; Central Structure of the Mughal Empire, p.123.

services to Humāyūn and Akbar in various ways and on various occasions; but his ambition, shortsightedness, lack of tact and statesmanship and his failure to win the confidence of the sovereign or of the nobility and public not only caused a great apprehension inside the harem but also outside, which ultimately brought about his downfall.

With bitter experience of Bairam Khan's dominance, with the background of the institution of Wizarat during the three hundred years of the Turkish rule Akbar, shrewd as he was, made up his mind to define the powers and functions of the incumbent of this office vis-a-vis his position in the empire. Immediately after ~~the~~ dismissing his regent Bairam Khan, Akbar also separated finance from general administration and placed it under the control of Shihābuddīn, the governor of Delhi.¹ And to put a check upon his authority associated Māham Anga with him. After this he uniformly followed the principle of "checks and balances", and "separation of powers".

When Munīm Khan arrived from Kabul, he was given the title of Khan-e-Khanan and the office of wikalat; but at the same time Shamsuddīn Atka Khan was given the standard, drum and tuman tugh² of Bairam Khan. In this way the powers and the distinctions formerly enjoyed by

1. Akbar Nāmah, Beveridge, II, pp.143-44; Central Structure of the Mughal Empire, p.125.

2. Tuman tugh: A kind of standard.

Bairam Khan were evenly divided and shared by three different persons namely Shihābuddīn Khan, Munim Khan and Shamsuddīn Atka Khan.¹ Munim Khan was disappointed and he joined hands with Maham Anga and began to brew his own designs. A few months later, Atka Khan petitioned the emperor that in consideration of his past services he expected the office of Wikalat along with its ancillary distinctions. Upon this the emperor appointed him wakil as well as wazir. The motive behind this step was to counter the growing influence of Maham's clique. But the latter could ill-afford to swallow the bitter pill, and the impetuous Adham Khan, in a fit of rage and rashness one day, entered the 'Daulat Khanah' along with his followers, attacked Atka Khan and put him to death.² But the blood of Atka Khan brought no advantage to the party. On the contrary, it sounded its death-knell. The dare-devil was thrown down the battlements, his mother Maham Anga died struck with grief and Munim Khan and Shihābuddīn Khan fled from the court.³ All this, in effect, strengthened the hands of the sovereign who could now control the state offices as he liked. He had experimented with many plans and several men but he was not satisfied. He wanted to dictate, he could not brook dictation. Although he pardoned Munim Khan

1. Central Structure of the Mughal Empire, p.125; Some Aspects of Muslim Administration, p.290.

2. Akbar Namah, Beveridge, II, p.269; Central Structure of the Mughal Empire, p.126.

3. Akbar Namah, Beveridge, II, pp.272-73.

and made him Wakil again, the post was now shorn of all dignity or power associated with it. In its new shape the Wakil was reduced to the position of an humble servant of the emperor expected to execute the latter's instructions. But the problem had not yet been fully resolved. It was impossible for the sovereign to perform multifarious duties single-handed. He had to utilise the services of a band of officers, but not without satisfying himself of his bonafides and the worth. Two spheres of work demanded his immediate attention, finances and administration. The basic issue before him was to combine them or separate them. At the same time, he was fully conscious of the risk of allowing a single officer gathering power in his hands. And in this lies the genesis of the evolution of the powers of Diwan and the corresponding decline of the status of Wakil.

In the 8th year of his reign i.e. 1564 A.D. Muzaffar Khan was appointed as Diwan and the revenue and financial matters were taken away from the control of Wakil. Henceforward continuous efforts were made to raise the status of Diwan, perhaps because finance was the key of administration. Therefore, when in 1585 A.D. the emperor was leaving for Malwa expedition he took with him Munim Khan and left the affairs of government in the hands of Muzaffar Khan and ¹ Khwajah Jahan. This gave an opportunity to the Diwan to have

1. Akbar Namah, Beveridge, II, p.229; Central Structure of the Mughal Empire, p.127; some Aspects of Muslim Administration, p.201.

a free hand in performing the duties entrusted to him. Subsequently, when in 11th year of his reign, Akbar went to the Punjab to suppress the rebellion of Mirza Makīm, he left Munim Khan at the capital, but on this occasion he clearly defined the functions of Wakil and Diwan. He did not like that they were to act independently, but to ensure a sense of harmony between them, he associated Khwājah Jahan¹ with them.

But the presence of the three ministers vested with equal powers, created some complications. Khwajah Jahan considered himself to be superior to his other two colleagues. This is evident from the fact that while they were conducting negotiations, for peace with Alī Qulī of Karah,² Muzaffar Khan became suspicious of the double dealings of Khwājah Jahan and Munim Khan. He reported against them to the emperor. This gave another setback to the prestige of Wakil. The partisans of Munim Khan were duly punished and his other colleagues Khwājah Jahan³ faced no trouble. Shortly after the conclusion of Alī Qulī's episode, Munim Khan was given a jagir in Jaunpur and was commanded to look after the affairs of the court. He left the capital in the 12th year of the reign and remained in the eastern region, till the

1. Akbar Namah, Beveridge, II, p.276; Central Structure of the Mughal Empire, pp.127-28.

2. Ibid.

3. Akbar Namah, Beveridge, II, p.401.

end of his life. Although he continued to enjoy his rank and position, his career as the wakil of the empire had come to an end. Being far away from centre, he lost touch with the current affairs virtually he had been reduced to the rank of an ordinary governor.

After the eclipse of Munim Khan, Akbar took some decisive steps to improve the position of Diwan. In effect, the wakil had ceased to exist. During the next seven years revenue and finance remained outside his control and no person from the old school was appointed to look after the affairs of the Diwan-e-Wizarat. In this context the considerations which prompted Akbar to appoint Muzzaffar Khan¹ to the post of Diwan are deserving of attention. He had worked under Bairam Khan, he was for a time a parganah officer and finally as the Diwan-e-Buyūtāt, he had acquired sufficient knowledge of revenue administration and the working of the Central government.² Before being appointed as Diwan he had served under Munim Khan in the same capacity.

In the 12th year of his reign when Munim Khan was finally transferred to Bengal Akbar seized the opportunity of raising the status of Diwan and established his position firmly. Upto this stage the ministry consisted of three persons who enjoyed equal status and powers. But now Muzzaffar

1. 'Khan' was his title which was given by the emperor Akbar.

2. Akbar Namah, Beveridge, II, pp.305-06.

Khan was made an independent minister and Diwan without any wakil over him. But the arrangement lasted only for one year. The growing empire increased the volume of work in corresponding proportion. Therefore, the department of the wizarat was divided into two sections, each under a separate minister. They were respectively designated as Diwan-e-Khalsa¹ and Diwan-e-Tan². While Muzaffar Khan looked after the affairs of the latter, Shihabuddin another noble³ was placed independently incharge of Khalsa land. Such a curtailment of his power and influence naturally annoyed Muzaffar Khan who was hardly given an opportunity to give proof of his talents. So his relations with the emperor were gradually strained and he finally fell out of favour in the 17th year of the reign. But during the period he held his post, he acted as Diwan of the Prime Minister of the empire.⁴ It was at his recommendation that persons were appointed to high posts.⁵ It was at his instance that a

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1. Diwan-e-Khalsa: The Diwan of Crown lands; For his duties see, Mughal Administration, p.35.
 2. Diwan-e-Tan: The Diwan of Salaries; For his duties see, Mughal Administration, p.39.
 3. Akbar Namah, Beveridge, II, p.488; Khalsa land were those "lands held immediately of government and of which the State was the manager or holder". (A Calander of Oriental Records, Ed. by Prof. S.A. Rashid, Govt., Central Records Office, Allahabad, vol. II, p.96).
 4. Central Structure of the Mughal Empire, pp.151-52.
 5. Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh, by Abdul Qadir Badauni, II, p.71.

number of reforms were introduced in the department of revenue. Soon he came to be considered as one of the most influential officers of the empire. His growing popularity irked the emperor, and to bring home to his mind that he was not indispensable, he removed him from his post and sent him away as governor of Lālwa. But in the following year the combined office of Wikalat and Diwani was conferred on him. It is difficult to discover any specific reason for this sudden change in the attitude of the emperor. May be that he had realised his worth. But when he refused to carry out reforms in the jagirdari system specially the branding of horses, he was again compelled to step down.

The post of Diwan remained vacant for the next two years, though for a while Todar Mal looked after the affairs of this department and was designated as Mushrif-e-Diwan.¹ But when, he was transferred to Bengal to afford assistance to Khan-e-Jahan the post again fell vacant. Shihabuddin who was incharge of the khalsa land and was also an experienced officer was not given a chance to hold the post of Wazir. In the 21st year of his reign Akbar appointed Khwajah Mansur Shirazi, an expert financier, as Diwan.² He held the post for next three years (21st to 24th year of the reign).

1. "A post higher than that of Diwan but lower than that of Vakil". See, Some Aspects of Muslim Administration, p.203. But Abul Fazl says that "he (Raja Todar Mal) enjoyed virtually the position of a Vakil". See, Akbar Namah, Beveridge, III, p.561.

2. Akbar Namah, Beveridge, III, pp.273, 431.

When Raja Todar Mal returned from Bengal he was again given the charge of the office of deputy Diwan. Shortly after, Muzzafer Khan was summoned to court and in recognition of his splendid services in the east, was honoured with the office of wikalat.¹ With his arrival at court, it became absolutely necessary to issue fresh regulations defining the jurisdiction and duties of Khwajah Mansur Shirazi and Todar Mal. Muzzafer Khan was directed to look after the general affairs of the empire whereas the other two were separately required to look after the administration of Diwan-e-Tan and Diwan-e-Khalsa. They were required to perform their normal duties in consultation with Muzzafer Khan.² But such an arrangement could hardly be expected to continue for long, because of the assertive nature of Muzzafer Khan and Todar Mal. Add to this the ambition of the former to play the combined role of Wazir and Wakil and his keen desire to exercise control over both the key-branches of administration. Despite their differences, they rendered distinguished service in the field of revenue administration. The position of Wazir or diwan remained unimpaired mainly because of the cool and calculating nature of Khwajah Shah Mansur. Later on, the three members of the

1. Akbar Nama, Beveridge, III, p.94; Central Structure of the Mughal Empire, pp.130, 154.

2. Akbar Nama, Beveridge, III, pp.199-200; Central Structure of the Mughal Empire, p.130; Islamic Polity, p.96.

ministry accompanied the Emperor in his tour to the Punjab, where a council was held and decisions were taken on certain important matters.¹ On this occasion it was decided that (a) the Sarkars of Bihar should be assigned to the officers in jagirs, (b) that the charge of mints should be taken away from the chaudharis² and be placed under the direct control of the ministry. Muzzaaffar Khan was to supervise the Lahore mint, Raja Todar Mal - Bengal mint; Khwajah Mansur - Jaunpur mint; Asaf Khan - Patna mint and Abdul Samad - Fatehpur Sikri mint. This arrangement added considerably to the work of Diwan-e-Wizarat. Besides this, other responsibilities were also thrown on the shoulders of the officers. For instance, Khwajah Mansur was associated with Muzzaaffar Khan, the wakil to enquire into the case of an amal-guzar³ of Delhi against whom the public had submitted a representation.⁴ Raja Todar Mal was sent against the Afghans; while Muzzaaffar Khan and Birbal were deputed to enquire into the condition of the people of Jalandhar.⁵

1. Akbar Namah, Beveridge, III, pp.310-74; Central Structure of the Mughal Empire, pp.154-55.

2. 'Chaudhari' was an important official at the Parganah level and was associated with the local land-revenue administration in more ways than one.

See, Land Revenue Administration under the Mughals, by N.A. Siddiqi, p.90.

3. 'Amal-guzar' was a head of Parganah administration. See, Land Revenue Administration under the Mughals, p.80.

4. Akbar Namah, Beveridge, III, p.360.

5. Ibid., p.357.

The duty entrusted to the Wakil Muzzaffar Khan was considered by him to be below his dignity and he expressed his resentment at the secondary position assigned to him.¹ Consequently in the 22nd year, he was appointed governor of Bengal and a few months later Raja Todar Mal was sent to Bihar. These two postings cleared the way for Khwajah Mansur the Diwan. He was now in a position to exercise his powers effectively and impart financial stability to the Empire. He reduced the allowance of Bihar and Bengal army and ordered payment of arrears. But his reforms provoked much opposition and he was removed from his post. In his place Wazir Khan, the former governor of Gujrat was appointed Diwan, and Khwajah Qazi Ali was associated with him.² But the allegations of corrupt practices against the latter (though on investigation found to be baseless) tarnished his image and he could not be retained in office.³ As to Khwajah Shah Mansur, thanks to machinations of his rivals, he was charged with high treason and put to death. Now Quli Khan was appointed Diwan. He was noted for his administrative ability and his interest in the welfare of the people.⁴ He held the post for two years. He made room for Raja Todar Mal who returned from Bengal in the 27th year of the reign.

1. Akbar Nama, Beveridge, III, pp.427-28.

2. Muntakhabut-Tawarikh, II, p.287; Central Structure of the Mughal Empire, pp.156-57.

3. Akbar Nama, Beveridge, III, p.480.

4. Ibid., pp.504-05.

The Raja was honoured with the title of 'Ashraf-e-Diwan'¹ and he held this post upto the 30th year of the reign. During this period he introduced a large number of revenue reforms. In the 30th year of his reign, however, Akbar effected another change in the Diwani by including Mīr Fathullah Shīrāzī in the ministry. According to the new scheme the Raja was to conduct the financial and administrative affairs in consultation with Mīr Fathullah, and the latter was to dispose off old cases which had been pending since Muzzaffar Khan's time.²

This arrangement very likely was motivated by the desire of the Emperor to enforce his principle of 'checks and balances' and to see his highest officers working in a team spirit coordinating their talents and efforts in the interest of administration. His expectations were fulfilled beyond measure. The joint efforts of the Mīr and the Raja infused a new energy and imparted a new base to the revenue department. The reforms, which they introduced were of far-reaching importance. But death of the Mīr in the 34th year and of the Raja soon after, deprived the Emperor of his ablest wazirs. Abul Fazl's remark³ that, "The market of business lost its briskness" sums up the qualities and achievements of the two great revenue reformers and financier of the age.

1. Ibid., p.561.

2. Central Structure of the Mughal Empire, p.161.

3. Akbar Namah, Beveridge, III, p.862.

During the next sixteen years Akbar tried many officers but found none of them fit enough to shoulder the burden of the high office of Diwan. Khwajah Shamsuddin Khwafi¹ (34th to 43rd regnal year = 9 years), Rai Patra Das² (43rd to 44th regnal year = 1 year), Asaf Khan Gazvini³ (44th to 49th regnal year = 5 years), and Wazir Khan⁴ (49th to 50th regnal year = 1 year) succeeded one after other, but failed to impress the sovereign. Ultimately he directed Prince Salim to supervise the work of this department; the Diwan was to act in accordance with his advice. The seal of the Prince was to be affixed on all grants to the mansabdars.⁵

Thus during half of a century of Akbar's reign various experiments were made to finalise the position and define the responsibilities of Wazir. The Emperor was however, averse to see power concentrating either in the hands of wakil or Diwan. For this reason sometimes, the one and at others, the other came into prominence. Frequently, the device of associate diwans was also tried. But no single individual rose to the high expectations of the Emperor, which fact mainly accounts for quick transfers and successions in the post of Diwan. It is, however, clear

1. In 1589, Khwajah Shamsuddin was raised to the office of Diwan. Akbar Namah, Beveridge, III, p.864.

2. Ibid., p.1108.

3. Ibid., p.1134.

4. This - 1590

that the wazir and Diwan became synonymous terms, though it is doubtful if there had yet emerged into an officer like the Chief Minister. Even so the Diwan came to be elevated to a position of supreme importance, because he controlled the financial strings of the empire.

Jahangir, very much like his father, did not allow any one individual to gather authority into his own hands and to overshadow the sovereign. In this context Ibn Hasan has aptly remarked that "None of the later wakils appears to have regained that power and influence which a Prime Minister under an absolute monarchy is expected to wield".¹ Upon his accession to the throne, Jahangir confirmed Wazir Khan in the post of Wizarat and allowed him to enjoy the same rank and title as he had held in the preceding reign. But soon after Khan Beg was honoured with the title of Wazir-ul-Mulk and was associated with him. As Wazir Khan was not found useful, he was transferred to Bengal;² but the title of Wazir was not taken away from him. Fifteen days after, when Sharif Khan waited upon the Emperor the latter appointed him as Wazir and promoted him to the rank of 5000 Lat 5000 Sawar and conferred upon him the lofty title of Amir-ul-Umara.³

1. Central Structure of the Mughal Empire, p.132.

2. Tuzuk, Eng. Tr. Rogers, I, p.13.

3. Ibid., p.14.

Thus in the early part of Jahangir's reign the Wizarat was held by Amirul Umara Sharif Khan who shared his work with Wazir-ul-Mulk Khan Beg and Itmad-ud-daulah.¹ Had he not fallen ill in the second year of the reign, he would have certainly endeavoured to revive the prestige of the office he held. But, before he could recover his health, Emperor had appointed Asaf Khan to the post of Wazir in 1606 A.D. and promoted him from the rank of 2500 to 5000 and made him the guardian of Prince Parviz.²

It appears that two considerations weighed with the Emperor in appointing Asaf Khan as Wazir. In the first place, he was impressed with his intelligence, and secondly, he could not ignore his brilliant record of service in the preceding reign. He had earned reputation for his administrative acumen and his scholarly pursuits. After he had recovered his normal health, Sharif Khan came to court fondly hoping that the emperor would restore to him his former title and status, but the Emperor saw no valid reason to alter the arrangements he had already made. But in 1609 and 1610 both Asaf Khan and Sharif Khan were deputed to the Deccan where they remained until their death. Thus they were not allowed to return to the capital to become wazirs. According to Ibn Hasan, "One was shifted for reasons of health and other for lack of confidence".³ But there were other and more cogent

1. Iqbalnama, p.55.

2. Tuzuk, Rogers, I, p.16.

3. Central Structure of the Mughal Empire, p.1

reasons which occasioned a radical change in the key-post of the government. Before examining these reasons it is essential to point out that, the year 1609-10 marks the end of first period of Jahangir's reign in more than one respect.

The features of this period vis-à-vis the Wizarat were, firstly, that the Emperor like his predecessor made free use of his discretion while appointing his wazir; and secondly, that he did not confer this post on any high ranking noble. Asaf Khan was an exception, but soon he was sent away to the Deccan and deprived of his status. Nor could it be filled by any noble or military commander who possessed specialised knowledge of revenue administration and had full acquaintance with office routine in addition to literary accomplishment. Jahangir, like his father, continued the practice of joint office holders, but with this difference that, while Akbar had divided the office work between the two colleagues, Jahangir divided the working according to the political divisions of the empire. But due to quick changes in incumbents, none of the wazirs was able to dominate over the emperor and Jahangir had a free hand in every sphere of administration.¹ But the situation changed after 1611 A.D. and the position of wazir or Diwan began gradually taking a new turn.

1. Central Structure of the Mughal Empire, p.162.

In 1611 A.D. Jahangir married Nūr Jahān¹, which event marks the beginning of the glorious period of his reign. It lasted until the end of the year 1621. The matrimonial relationship between the royal family and the family of Itmad-ul-daulah proved very beneficial to either party. It was quite natural for the emperor to make full use of the talents of the relations of the queen. Consequently to make room for Itmad-ul-daulah, Khawājah Abul Hasan, the acting Dewan was sent to the Deccan and the former was appointed as Dewan. But the elevation of Itmad-ud-daulah should not be attributed only to his new relationship with the Emperor; it was also due to his personal qualities, literary accomplishment and the administrative talents. He had gained sufficient experience of the working of the revenue department. Next to Amīr-ul-Umara Sharīf Khan and Asaf Khan, he was the seniormost member in the ministry. Hence the office was conferred upon him. His predecessor Khwājah Abul Hasan had occupied the post of Dewan only in a temporary capacity. But there were two other members of the nobility whose claim could have been considered for the coveted post. They were Abdūl Rahīm Khan-e-Khanan and Khan Jahān Lodī. Both of them had put in many years of service in the imperial cause. They had been recipient of many favours and honours. Khan-e-Khanan was the emperor's old tutor and had held the office of Wikalat

1. Iqbalnāmah, p.56; History of Jahangir by Beni Prasad, p.162.

for some time during the reign of Akbar. From 1605 to 1610 he had served in the Deccan as viceroy. His loyalty and devotion towards the ruling family, his position, rank and status entitled him to high honours. But his failure in the Deccan and the manoeuvring of rival group completely clouded his prospects. Nor was he in the good books of the new queen. As regards Khan Jahan Lodi, though he was a favourite of the emperor, he had picked up a quarrel with the new junta which had come into prominence. Jahangir gave him a chance to prove his worth, but he miserably failed in the Deccan. Moreover, being an Afghan his promotion would have been resented as much by the Persians or by the Timurid Turks. Thus Itmad-ud-daulah remained the only choice for the emperor.

During the following eleven years Itmad-ud-daulah held the main strings of revenue administration and he was repeatedly promoted in recognition of his meritorious record of service. In 1611 A.D. he held the rank of 1500 only, but within a year he got two increments which gave him the rank of 2000/500¹. In 1612 A.D., his rank was raised to 4000/1000², in 1614 A.D. 5000/2000³, 1615 A.D. 6000/3000⁴; further he was given standard and drums and the permission to beat them at the court; in 1616 A.D. his rank was raised to 7000/5000

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1. Tuzuk, Rogers, I, p.199; History of Jahangir, p.172.
 2. Ibid., p.217.
 3. Ibid., p.260.
 4. Ibid., p.260.

and he was accorded the privilege of having his drums beaten after those of Prince Khurram, and he was also given 'Tuman-tugh'.¹ In 1619 his rank was further raised to 7000/7000.²

From the point view of his status he may be compared to Bairam Khan, and it may be presumed that in matters of appointments of generals, equipment of army, transfers, fresh appointment of provincial governors his voice carried weight.

From the few instances which are quoted here, we may form some idea ~~in~~ with regard to the position of Wazir vis-a-vis his powers. In the 10th year of the reign when Nur Jahan's party was at the height of its influence, it was at the request of Itmad-ud-daulah that Diyanat Khan was released from the fort of Gwalior and his property was restored to him.³ Likewise at his request Raja Man Singh was appointed to command an army against the fort of Kangra. In the 12th year of the reign on his request Alahdad Khan, who had fled from the army without permission, was allowed to return to the court. The same year on his request Itiqad Khan was allowed to perform Kornish.⁴ Had he not enjoyed full confidence and real powers, he would have not been able to give either peace or prosperity, which the empire enjoyed during these twelve years.

1. Tuzuk, Rogers, I, p.320.

2. Tuzuk, Rogers, II, p.117; History of Jahangir, p.172.

3. Jahangir writes that "at the request of Itmad-ud-daulah I had sent for Diyanat Khan, who was in the fort of Gwalior, and he had the good fortune to pay his respects; the property which had been confiscated was restored to him". Tuzuk, Rogers, I, p.303.

4. Tuzuk, Rogers, I, p.373.

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That Itmad-ud-daulah had inherited a rich legacy of experience, cannot be denied. By the time he was called upon to fill the much coveted post, wizarat had developed into a well-organised institution. In routine matters normally there was no need for reference to the emperor. As the 'Diwan' was vested with full powers, it had become unnecessary for others to approach the emperor over his head. Nor were there any strains in the wizarat department necessitating royal interference. In short, during the period of his incumbency Itmad-ud-daulah played his role as the sole wazir of the Mughal empire. Jahangir's remark on his death (January 1622)¹ fully illustrates this point. He writes, "though the weight of such a kingdom was on his shoulders and it is not possible for, or within the power of, a mortal to make everyone contented, yet no one ever went to Itmad-ud-daulah with a petition or on business, who turned from him in an injured frame of mind. He showed loyalty to the sovereign and yet left pleased and hopeful him whom was in need".²

On the death of Itmad-ud-daulah in the 16th year of his reign the emperor appointed Abul Hasan as Diwan or Wazir.³ During the following six years occurred most shocking events like the loss of Candhar, rebellions of Shahjahan and Mahabat Khan. Though from the 4th year to the 21st year of his reign

1. History of Jahangir, p.299.

2. Tuzuk, Rogers, II, p.222.

3. Ibid., p.228; History of Jahangir, p.308.

Jahangir did not appoint any one to fill the post of Wakil; but now he conferred this honour on Asaf Khan. What prompted him to do it, is difficult to say. Perhaps, he wanted that Asaf Khan during this critical period of his life should control the affairs of his dominions. Moreover, he was related both to the imperious queen Nūr Jahan and the ambitious Prince Shahjahan and was expected to maintain a balance between the two. He could also pull on well with the Diwan and during the tenure of his office there occurred no conflict between the two. Thus, the post of Wakil was revived with the object of pursuing the policy of 'checks and balances', and also for furthering the interest of the empire ^r though the joint efforts of the two highest officials of the State.

On his ~~an~~ accession to the throne Shahjahan confirmed Asaf Khan and Abul Hasan in their respective posts.¹ But soon relations between the two became strained. Asaf Khan wanted to assert his unique position, he being the Wakil as well as the father-in-law of the sovereign. Whereas Diwan by virtue of his powers as controller of purse strings of the empire paid scant regard to Wakil whom he deemed to be no more than an ornamental head. Indeed, the latter's constitutional position had become of secondary importance since the later part of Akbar's reign. The emperor was called upon to resolve the tangle and he removed Abdul Hasan from his post and appointed in his place Iradat Khan.

1. Badshah Namah, I, pp.113-15; A History of Shahjahan of Dehli, by B.P. Saksena, pp.64-65.

During the latter's tenure of office for about one and a half year i.e. 1628-29 A.D. Āsaf Khan made strenuous efforts to revitalise the position of wakil and make himself as 'Wazir-e-Tafwīz'; but the cautious policy of the emperor did not allow him to gather more power in his hands. No doubt the emperor had all respects for his father-in-law and the Wakil, but he never wanted to be domingered or overshadowed by him. In order to foil the Wakil's plans he removed Āsaf Khan's stooge Iradat Khan by sending him to the Deccan¹ and appointed in his place a comparatively more experienced man Allāma Afzal Khan to the post of wazir.

Afzal Khan held the post for ten years till his death in the 12th year of the reign. As a trusted Diwan and highly respected person he exercised considerable influence on the administration of the empire. He accompanied Shahjahan in all his tours, attended to administrative work.² According to Abdul Hamīd Lahori, the author of Bādshāh Nāmāh, all the important firmans particularly those which were addressed to the other rulers, were drafted by the Wazir. Further, his supreme status and ascendancy over wakil is revealed by the fact that in the 10th regnal year when Shahjahan fell ill and was confined to bed, only Afzal Khan was admitted to the royal presence to apprise the emperor of state of affairs and consult him on important issues.³ Though Chandra Bhan Brahman

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1. 'Iradat Khan, now given the title of Āzam Khan'. See, A History of Shahjahan of Dehli, p.75.
 2. Bādshāh Nāmāh, I, pt. I, pp.465-66, 478; pt.II, pp.203, 209, 234; Bādshāh Nāmāh, II, p.117.
 3. Bādshāh Nāmāh, I, II, p.244.

remained in constant attendance upon Afzal Khan and owed his rise to him, he makes very little reference to the details of the wazir's work in the revenue department. He only says that he introduced certain regulation for administration of revenue and finance bearing in mind the well being of raiyat,¹ which may lead to increasing prayers for the sovereign's prosperity and bringing for himself a good name. Chandra Bhan quotes the remarks of Afzal Khan to elucidate the latter's conception of Wizarat "There are two types of wazirs: one who listens to the king carefully, understands him and acts upon what is told to him; the others are those upon whose words the sovereign acts and whose considered opinion he ponders over. The wazir of this age can neither understand correctly the directions of the king nor can act according to his will and pleasure. How then can we attain the other position?" Again, "A ruler needs a large capital. If there is not sufficient money in the treasury an army cannot be raised; if there be no sufficient army there can be no peace and orderly government in the country and where there is no peace there can be no revenues. The king's treasury becomes full when the country is well governed and prosperous and prosperity comes when the master of affairs i.e. the king understands all matters and attends to him personally". And possibly lamenting the wazir's own position he further remarks "though an army can be raised

1. Raiyat: Subjects.

with money, yet the establishment of peace in the country and the conquest of hearts of the people is never possible without a chief commander i.e., the Wazir, who should be a man of wide outlook, courage and experience, endowed with considerable modesty and pleasant manners; but he should also enjoy implicit confidence of his sovereign and be vested with full powers of increasing and decreasing the ranks of the officers of the state, of giving awards and of retaining or dismissing them from service. He should have a large number of 'Tabinan' (personal troopers) so that he can call to account the highest amirs and nobles of empire". The last statement of Afzal Khan clearly shows that wide powers were not given to 'Wakil' or to 'Wazir'. In fact, the emperor reigned as well as ruled. Like his two immediate predecessors, Shahjahan wanted that both these officers should be subservient to him. Any departure from this tradition was ^rfaught with disastrous consequences.

In the 13th regnal year (1049 A.H./1639 A.D.) Islam Khan Meshhadi governor of Bengal was appointed as Diwan of the empire. ¹ He had started his career as clerk and by sheer dint of merit he rose to this high position. But with him was associated Diyanat Rai who held charge of Khalsa. He was designated as 'acting Diwan'. Orders were issued that all the affairs of diwani should be placed before the emperor

1. Badshah Nāmah, II, p.164; Elliot & Dowson, VII, p.67.

and that Diyanat Rai should deal with revenue matters in detail. This direction, if effect, implied curtailment of the powers of the Diwan. And so from this time onward we find the wazir being gradually reduced to a position of secondary importance. Finding it difficult to work under Islam Khan, who repeatedly claimed his inherent powers as the Diwan, Diyanat Rai resigned and at his own request, he was appointed as Diwan-e-Burūtāt.

Relieved of the undue influence of Diyanat Rai, Islam Khan now assumed full powers and exercised them in the fullest measure.¹ He combined in his person the ability of a wazir, the dignity of an amir and the learning of a scholar. He was rightly called 'Shahib-e-Saif wo qalam' (Master of Pen and Sword). He enjoyed the rank of 7000 and the title of 'Umdat-ul-mulk'. In the 19th year of the reign he quitted his post and made room for Sa'dullah Khan.

It was in the 14th year of his reign when Shahjahan visited Lahore that scholarly talents of Sa'dullah Khan were brought to his notice by Sadr-e-Sudur Musvi Khan² and he was taken on the personal staff of the emperor on daily allowance. Henceforward he continued to rise in the royal estimation till he attained this highest rank. Without going into the details of his career, suffice it to mention that he left his mark

1. Central Structure of the Mughal Empire, p.195.

2. Musvi Khan held the post of Sadr-e-Sudur or Chief ecclesiastical officer for the first 15 years of Shahjahan's reign. (A History of Shahjahan of Dehli, p.275).

on every sphere of life. He toned the revenue administration, increased the prosperity of the raiyyat, displayed his military talent, in the Trans-Indus expedition. Indeed he was not only the best wazir of Shahjahan's time, but the best in the long line of Mughal wazirs. His sudden death in the 30th regnal year deprived the emperor a trusted officer at a very critical juncture. He would certainly have stood him in good stead and would have helped him in solving the most baffling problems of the day. Sadruddin Mohammad, the author of Irshād-ul-Wuzarā', assigns him highest position among the four wazirs of the four great sovereigns.¹ Under him the institution of wizarat attained to its fullest dimensions. Sadullah Khan's death created a vacuum which for some time it became difficult to fill. Rāi Raghunāth, the Diwān-e-Khālsā was given the officiating chance. Four months later (July 1657) Muazzam Khan was appointed as Diwān² but the same year he was sent to the Deccan. His son Mohammad Amīn Khan continued to officiate for some time; and no sooner was the suspicion roused that Muazzam Khan had thrown his lot with Prince Aurangzeb then Mohammad Amīn was removed from the post and Rāi Raghunāth was ordered to sign all the papers. This arrangement continued till the 31st regnal year.³ The same year Ja'far Khan was made Diwān. After

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1. Irshād-ul-Wuzarā' by Sadruddin Mohammad, ff.64a-65b.
 2. M.U., Eng.Tr., II, p.191; Tavernier, I, p.170; Storia, I, p.237; E.F. I, X, pp.66-67.
 3. M.U., Eng.Tr., II, p.722.

sometime Ja'far Khan was transferred to Malwa and Rāi Raghunāth Rāi was again asked to administer this department. He continued to hold this post till the end of Shahjahan's reign.

The foregoing account of the growth and development of the institution of wizarat under the Mughals brings out certain important aspects. During the reign of Akbar, Jahāngīr and Shāhjahān, with a few exceptions, only meritorious persons with excellent record of service of long standing, of high status were appointed to this high office of Wizarat. Persians were almost invariably given preference to others. Muzaffar Khan, Shihābuddīn Khan, Khwājah Mansūr Shīrāzī, Wazir Khan, Qulij Khan, Mīr Fathullah Shīrāzī, Khwājah Shamsuddin Khwafī, Āsaf Khan Qazwīnī of Akbar's reign; Itmad-ud-daulah of the reign of Jahangir; Iradat Khan, Afzal Khan Allamī, Islam Khan, Sadullah Khan, Muazzam Khan and Jafar Khan of the reign of Shahjahan were all Persians. Thus it had been widely recognised in the pre-Aurangzeb period that the office should go only to a Persian. Whenever for an interim period such a person was not available, officiating chance was given to others. Another important feature which developed into a tradition in due course of time was that the Wazir should not be allowed to become too powerful. Therefore, the incumbents of the high post were transferred from time to time to distant provinces and they were never allowed to remain in capital for long. Though this practice

was not healthy there was no other alternative. But, because of frequency of transfers, the wazirs could not pay due attention to agrarian problems, specially during the reigns of Jahāngīr and Shahjahan.

Contemporary historians have in general terms referred to the prosperity of the raiya in the context of the duties of Wazir; but with the introduction of liara system during the later part of the reign of Shahjahan exploitation by local zamindars must have occurred on a large scale. The wazir could do little to alleviate the sufferings of the producing classes. Moreover not infrequently the energies of capable wazirs was diverted into wrong channels. During the latter part of the reign of Shahjahan we find that Sadullah Khan was deputed to the Balkh expedition and two sieges of Candhar. He was also sent to the Mewar front. Had he been allowed to remain at the centre perhaps, he would have successfully controlled the court politics and checked the high handed behaviour of the local zamindars, towards the raiya. The aftermath of the policy of keeping the wazirs away from their legitimate duty became more apparent during the reign of Aurangzeb.

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1. Liara: "It constituted a sort of contract and implied the farming out of the revenues of a mahal or more than one mahal and the Ijardar was required to pay the fixed amount as stipulated in the agreement without any reference to increase or decrease in the collection". (For details see, Land Revenue Administration under the Mughals, p.92).

The inner working of the institution of Wizarat indicates that there was less tension amongst the nobles during the reign of Jahāngīr and Shāhjahān as compared to the earlier period, a period which could be described as the age of transition and experimentation. Once the revenue and finance had been separated from administration and the work of the dēpartment was split into more than two branches, it became difficult for one person to play a vital role and overshadow others. Thus the Wazir had a very high political status but correspondingly enjoyed much less effective powers. This was but natural, the rulers were reluctant to share their glory with any other individual, however efficient he might be. In fact Akbar like Sher Shah arrogated to himself all credit for administrative reforms.

Moreover, in the light of known facts, it is difficult to assert with any degree of certainty if at any time during the Turkish period there was any officer like Chief Minister or Prime Minister as we envisage him in modern times. At the least we can say that a ruler appointed or selected from among high ranking nobles any one to repose his confidence in him. Such an officer was not uniformly designated as Wazir. He may be a 'Naib Sultan', 'Naib Mumalik' 'Diwan', or otherwise recipient of any other suitable title like 'Wakil', 'Jandāt-ul-Mulk', 'Yamīn-ud-daulat', etc.

In fact, there was no correspondence between a title and the powers which its incumbent was expected or required to discharge. Even so the role of the wazirs of Aurangzeb is interesting from the political and administrative points of view.

By the time Aurangzeb ascended the throne the experimental period of the institution of wizārat had come to an end. The office of wazīr had then emerged as a full fledged institution. The head of this office was described¹ as wazir, wazir-e-Azam, wazir-e-Muazzam or the Diwan-e-Ala. The wazir in the reign of Aurangzeb as we shall see in the following pages enjoyed a high position in administrative hierarchy. He touched all the departments at the central and provincial level. In other words, his authority extended over a wide range. He used to recommend the names for promotions and appointments to the high offices of the empire. He was also responsible for the supervision and control of various assignments and the grant of madadnash² lands.³ He was the chief executive of revenue and finance. For this reason in the official documents he is generally described as 'madar-ul-mahana' and 'jumdat-ul-mulki'. He

1. M.L., II, p.235; A.N., pp.832-37; Farhang-e-Kardani by Jagat Rai Shujai, f.27b; Land Revenue Administration under the Mughals, p.61.

2. Madadnash land: It was a grant of land made in recognition of the need, piety, learning or family (especially Shaikh or Saiyed) of the recipient.

3. Farhang-e-Kardani, f.27b.

also looked after religious and secular affairs and was responsible for executing royal orders and enforcing imperial regulations.¹ With the help of his subordinate staff he was expected to protect the raiyat from the exploitation by the other semi-governmental agencies such as zamindar and iqardars. Besides, he used to receive foreign ambassadors and present them before the emperor in the audience hall. He was also required to be in touch with the affairs of the local states² and the neighbouring countries.

It is related that all the officers - civil or military used to be under him. In the manner the wazir had to perform the multifarious functions. As the head of the finance department all revenue papers were properly scrutinized and signed by him. All the appointments in the revenue department were made by him. He used to look after the general administration, listen to the complaints of the people and dispose of the petitions submitted by the mansabdars³ and other officers. Outside his office he was required to lead campaign against the refractory chiefs and to be with the king during the course of a campaign.

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1. Khulasat-us-Siyaq, f.15a.
 2. Midayet-ul-Qawaid, ff. 7b-9b; Khulasat-us-Siyaq, ff. 15a-b; Land Revenue Administration under the Mughals, p.61.
 3. Mansabdar: The holder of a mansab or a rank in the imperial service denoting his obligation to maintain a fixed number of horsemen.

CHAPTER - II

M_U'A_Z_Z_A_M K_H_A_N

Mir Mohammad Said, better known as Mir Jumla¹ was born in Ardistan about 1591 A.D. His father Syed Mirza hazarū was a poor oil merchant of Isfahan, the old capital of Iran. Due to the pecuniary difficulties of his parents, he joined school for a very short period; and later, circumstances compelled him to secure a job under a diamond merchant. As a sales representative of his master he came into contact with some of the merchants of Golkonda,² one of the richest and prosperous kingdom of the Deccan.

When he reached the age of discretion he found himself surrounded with economic hardship and the oppression of the Persian Shaikh-ul-Islam. In search of his bread and better prospects, he, like many other Shiah, migrated from Persia to the kingdom of Golkonda. The exact date of Mir's arrival in Golkonda is not known; but most probably he came in 1625

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1. M.U., Eng. Tr., II, p.188; Life of Mir Jumla by Jagdish Narayan Sarkar, p.1; Sherwani, H.K., "Reign of 'Abdullah Qutb Shah", J.I.H., vol. XLV, part I, April, 1967; Tavernier, I, p.165; Prince Aurangzeb by S.Moinul Haq, p.58.
 2. Storia I, pp.231-32; Bernier, p.16; M.U., Eng.Tr., II, p.188; Dow, III, p.182; History of the Deccan by Gribble, I, pp.269-70; Thevenot, p.102.

A.D. sometime before the accession of 'Abdullah Qutb Shah'¹. On the basis of his previous experience he was appointed as an apprentice to a diamond merchant. But, soon he left his service and started his own business of diamonds. Within no time, by his shrewdness and sagacity, he accumulated immense wealth and owned a number of ships. His extensive trade with the countries far and near raised him to the status of "a great merchant of much fame in the kingdom"². Being ambitious he began to look for prospects at the court of 'Abdullah Qutb Shah'³.

Being a well known trader and man of wisdom and generosity, he gained for himself a large number of friends at the royal court. They promoted his interests at the king's audiences.⁴ Anxious to raise his status, the Mir presented to 'Abdullah Qutb Shah some fine elephants and a number of pieces of cloths of Europe and China make.⁵ His initiative, his innate energy, his spirit of adventure, his organising capacity

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1. Tavernier informs us that Mir Mohammad Said helped 'Abdullah Qutb Shah in his accession (1626 A.D.). From this it is evident that the former arrived before this date. Tavernier, I, p.165. But according to Gribble, he arrived at Golkundah about the year 1630 A.D. which is hardly acceptable. (History of the Deccan, I, p.270).
 2. Storia, I, p.232; Bernier, p.16; Thevenot, p.98; History of the Deccan, I, p.270.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Storia, I, p.232; Dow, III, p.182.
 5. Ibid.

attracted the attention of 'Abdullah Qutb Shah, who appointed him to the post of 'Sardastardar' or the Keeper of the royal records, which he held upto 1635-36 A.D.¹ In the meantime, his remarkable talents gained him the patronage of Mīr Jumlaḥ Allānī Fahmī Shaikh Mohammad, the Peshwa, the highest office in the administrative machinery of the kingdom of Golkundah. Abdullah Qutb Shah fully conscious of his own limitations, made the least interferences² in the work of his ministers. So, it was but natural for the highest minister like Peshwa to gather more authority and exercise unlimited powers.

Mīr Mohammad Saīd ingratiated himself into the favours of the Peshwa, who elevated him to the post of 'Nayaladar' of Masūlipatam³ which was an important centre of trade and commerce. It had extensive intercourse with the countries of far East, Middle East and Europe; but its administration of having not been properly looked after, corruption prevailed there. The officers had become selfish and greedy; they cared little for the economic interests of the kingdom. It was in this atmosphere that the Nayaladar was expected to give proof of his administrative talents. He gave a good account of himself, soon gained control of the situation, rooted out the prevailing evils and set the affairs in their proper gear. Thus he fully

1. Hadiqa, 374; Sherwani, H.K., "Administration, International Conduct and Social Conditions under Abdullah Qutb Shah (1626-72)". JIH, vol. XLIV, part I, April, 1966, p.7; Life of Mir Jumla, p.3.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

justified the confidence reposed in him and four months later the Naivaladari of Kondapalli-Mustafanagar¹ was added to his charge (1637). He very skillfully managed its administration and was able to develop its resources. His reforms were applauded by the officers and praised by the Sultan.

From the post of 'Naivaladar', he was promoted to the post of 'Sarkhail'. The term 'Sarkhail' literally means 'leader of a group'; but in practice it meant Chief Revenue Officer at the capital with extensive jurisdiction over the districts and provinces.² Besides, like Mīr Jumlah, he had to discharge civil and military duties also. It was a very important post and to a large extent the welfare of the kingdom depended on the ability and skill of its incumbent. The Mīr was summoned to the Court where he arrived on the 21st June, 1637. He brought some fine elephants and pieces³ of European and China cloth. Sultan Abdullah Qutb Shah, received him with open arms and appointed him 'Sarkhail' in succession to Syed Abdullah Mazandrani.

As Sarkhail the Mīr discharged his duties with great discretion and prudence; and within a short span of time he obtained the foremost place in the administration of the

1. Ibid.

2. Sherwani, H.K., "Administration, International Conduct and Social Conditions under Abdullah Qutb Shah (1626-72), JIH, vol. XLIV, part I, April, 1966, p.7.

3. Storia, I, p.232.

kingdom.¹ When he assumed his new charge, the administration was full of corruption and depravity. Nizamuddin Ahmad, the author of Hadiqat-us-Salatīn writes, "He removed all the sources of oppression and illicit profit on the part of the revenue collectors. He realised a huge sum of money from the subordinates and the Brahmins, and deposited it in the royal treasury". His quick despatch of business and his methodical approach to the problems deeply impressed the Sultan who presented him a jewelled pen-case and granted him a parganah² having income of 30,000 huns³ for his maintenance.⁴

Mir Mohammad Said now became a favourite of the Sultan's mother Hayat Bakshi Begum⁵ and according to her wishes he built a four-storied place — Hayat Mahal, after her name. This 'mahal' was constructed under the personal supervision of Mir, who, employed master artisans and craftsmen of that time. Working incessantly day and night, they successfully completed (in 1638) the building in a short period of a year. Inside the 'mahal' there was provision of a summer apartment together with a 'Ghusalkhanah' and the top storey was crowned with lofty minarets. The building was decorated by expert designers and the painters of India and Iran, who very beautifully

1. Storia, I, p.232.

2. Parganah: A number of villages formed a Parganah.

3. Huns: Plural of 'hun', a Deccan coin.

4. Hadiqa, pp. 448-50.

5. Bernier, p.18.

depicted the court life, hunting and war scenes. The architecture of 'Hayat Mahal' is a fine piece of Indo-Iranian or in other words Hindu-Muslim Style. Nizamuddin Ahmad the author of Hadiqat-us-Salatīn compares it with the 'Eden'.¹

When the Sultan visited this mahal, Mīr Mohammad Saīd displayed his tact by according to him a magnificent reception. It was beautifully decorated throughout. From its entrance to the main building of the mahal altogether eight lofty gateways were erected and velvet carpets and gold brocade were spread over the entire approach. A number of men were posted in front of the mahal holding in their hands beautiful trays of gold full of jewels and cloths which added grandeur to the show. The Sarnaubats were asked to play in honour of the royal visit. A 'langar Khanah' (free kitchen) was also set up to distribute charity. On the arrival of the Sultan, Mīr presented him a number of gold utensils, a gold beadstead, fine pieces of cloth and many other costly articles. In recognition of these services the Mīr was honoured with special presents by the Queen-mother.²

Mīr's talents and his growing intimacy with the Sultan roused the jealousy of the Dabīr or Munshī-ul-Mumalik,³

1. Hadiqa, pp. 503-8.

2. Ibid., pp. 510-13.

3. Dabīr or Munshī-ul-Mumalik: (Chief Secretary): his office was called 'Diwan-e-Insha', and one of the main duties of this officer was noting on the petitions and drafting the firmans. He had some judicial work to perform as well.

Mulla U Wais who began to interfere with the affairs of the Sarkhail and even of the Peshwa. This proved intolerable to the Mīr, who was now favourite of the Sultan. In his resentment he pressed the allegation of disloyalty against him.¹ In the end, Sultan 'Abdullah Qutb Shah dismissed the Dabir (July 1638) and asked the Mīr to deal with retainers of Mulla U Wais. On the 20th February 1639, Mirza Taqī Nishāpurī was appointed as the Dabir in place of Mulla U Wais, and Mirza Rustam, who was summoned from Qasimkota, was given the wizarat. Soon after, Mīr Mohammad Saīd was granted a 'Khilat Khāsa'² and his high post of Sarkhail was combined with the dignified office of Wizarat.³

When the Sultan, Abdullah Qutb Shah visited the seacoast, in October-December 1639, he was much impressed with the work of Mīr Mohammad Saīd who made befitting arrangements for the Sultan's tour.⁴ He sent out directions to the officers on the highways asking them to be vigilant and to keep food ready. The retinue of the Sultan included the ambassadors of Iran, Delhi and other countries. Particular mention should be made of Imām Qulī Beg, the Hājib of Iran who had already left the capital, but was summoned to accompany the Sultan to Masulipatan.

1. Hadiqa, pp. 516-30.

2. Khilat Khāsa: special robe of honour.

3. Hadiqa, p.531; he got this promotion before 19th July, 1639 - Love, I, p.14.

4. For this journey, see Hadiqa, pp. 533-80.

Sultan 'Abdullah Qutb Shah arrived at Hayāt-nagar, on November 1, 1639, amid scenes of pomp and splendour. From Hayāt-nagar, in company of Mīr he proceeded to the hill fort of Anantgirī and then to Kondapalli-Mustafanagar. He reached Kondapalli-Mustafanagar on November 19, 1639. At Mustafanagar, he appreciated Mīr's services, who had posted his trustworthy officers round the fort to guard against the attacks of carnivorous animals.

Resuming his journey, the Sultan reached Bezwadā on November 23 where he was met by the captains of the English, Dutch and Danish companies, who had come from Masulipatam. From Bezwadā, the Sultan went to Weyūr and from there to Masulipatam. On his arrival at Masulipatam the Sultan found every house and shop of the traders beautifully decorated with fine cloths and other articles. Mounted on elephant the Sultan had a view of the environs of the port. He then marched towards bankshell with Mīr by his side. On the way to bankshell the Mīr answered to all the queries made by the Sultan. In the bankshell building a ¹mailia was held in honour of the Sultan.

During Sultan's stay at Muslipatam Mīr Mohammed Saīd acquainted him with the condition of the port and its people. Then both of them visited the companies of the different

1. Mailia: An assembly or a meeting.

countries, met their representatives and showed them great favours by remitting the zakaat¹, which was payable on every article at the port entrance, by the merchants and on the brokerage realised from traders in jewellery. On this occasion many Syeds, Ālims and other deserving inhabitants of the port received grants in cash and kind.

Mīr Mohammad Saīd's administrative capacity and bubbling energy made a deep impression on Abdullah Qutb Shāh, who on the day of departure (on 7th December 1639) from the port, honoured him with many costly presents consisting of a chadar which he was having on his shoulders and a dress of honour befitting the respectable post of 'Sarkhail'. On the Mīr's recommendation a number of European captains, who had waited upon the Sultan during his stay were duly honoured.

Thus step by step Mīr Mohammad Saīd rose to eminence till he was promoted to the post of Mīr Jumlah. It is difficult to give the exact date on which he was appointed to this post but it is certain that he was the immediate successor of Shaikh Muhammad. His elevation threw into shade the formal incumbents. Now onwards the epithet 'Mīr Jumlah'² became synonymous with Mīr Mohammad Saīd. There were few

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1. Zakaat: A prescribed Muslim charity of 2½ per cent on income, including income possible from unused capital.
 2. Sherwani, H.K., "Administration, International Conduct and Social Conditions under Abdullah Qutb Shah (1626-72)", JIH, vol. XLIV, part I, April 1966, p.7.

in the kingdom who equalled him in authority.¹ Nothing could be done without his knowledge and consent. He became the golden link between Sultan and the Europeans. It was imperative for a merchant to see Mīr Jumlah first and to obtain his approval before waiting upon the Sultan, because any paper that he had not seen or which had not been approved by him, was not laid before the Qutb Shah. Even the latter bought nothing and received no presents, except on the advice of his Prime Minister. It is related that when Tavernier wanted to sell some 'pear-shaped pearls' and other jewels to the Sultan at Golkonda, he had to go from Masulipatan to the Mīr at Gandīkota to obtain his approval.² Thus Mīr Jumlah because of his widespread commercial contact and his free hand in administration, became the most influential man in the kingdom. According to the English factory records December 1639 "he governeth the whole kingdom". Later on governed "the king and consequently the country".³

The Karnatak upland which extended to 150 Kos in length and 20-30 kos in breadth, yielded a revenue of 40 lacs of rupees a year.⁴ It possessed several diamonds mines and several very strong fortresses like Kanchīkot and Siddhout.⁵

1. Ibid.

2. Tavernier, I, p.259.

3. B.F.I., VII, pp. 88, 207-8.

4. M.U., Eng. Tr., II, p.188.

5. Ibid.

Wāris, the author of Padshahnamah says that "No Nāyak of the Qutb-ul-Mulk could capture even a tiny fort of that region, but Mīr Jumlah conquered it along with a few big fortresses"¹. At this time civil war was raging there. The Rayal and the Nāyaks of Tanjore, Madura and Jinji were at daggers drawn with each other. The Nāyaks defeated the Rayal's forces in December, 1645 and so the latter sent 4000 soldiers to blockade the Pulicat fort.² In the meantime the Rayal received a severe blow at the hands of Khan Khana Muzaffaruddīn, who was achieving victory after victory in the Karnātak Bālaghat and had captured Mandiyāl and eight other strong forts in the beginning of 1646 A.D.

It was in the midst this crisis that Mīr Jumlah made his appearance on the Karnātak scene. His efficient and disciplined army-consisted of a number of European gunners and cannon founders. He opened his campaign from the north-east, and by the middle of February 1646, captured three strongholds. Then by his diplomacy he won over to his side the treacherous Mallaiyā, who betrayed his master by surrendering the famous fortress of Udaygirī without offering any resistance. After this Mīr Jumlah captured the fortress of Siddhout,³ east of Guddapah district.

Mīr Jumlah's crowning feat in the Karnatak was the capture of the rock fortress of Gandikota, hitherto deemed

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1. Padshahnamah by Wāris, 102a; EPI, VII, pp.193-94.
 2. EPI, VIII, pp.24-26; Love, I, p.73.
 3. Ibid; Bernier, p.17n.

impregnable. Tavernier writes: "Gandikot is one of the fortified town which are in the kingdom of Carnatak. It is built on the summit of a high mountain, and the sole means of access of it is by a very difficult road, which is only 20 or 25 feet wide, and its certain parts only 7 or 8;..... On the right of the road, which is cut in the mountain, there is a fearful precipice, at the base of which runs a long river"¹. On the top of the mountain there stretched a small plan² which was sown with rice and millet, and was watered by many small springs. "At the level of the plain to the south, where the town is built on a point, the limits are formed by precipices, with two rivers which bound the point at the base;.....there is but one gate on the plain side, and it is fortified in this direction with three good walls of cut stone, with the ditches at their bases faced with the same stone"². So, at the time of the siege the defenders had only to guard a 'space of 400 or 500 paces wide'. They had only two guns - one being a 12 pounder placed on the gate and the other being a 7 to 8 pounder placed on the point of a kind of bastion.³ The Raja, Trimma Nayar, was considered to be one of the best and the bravest generals among the Hindus. But, the Raja was no match to the strategy of Mir Jumlah, who by his diplomacy won over to side

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1. EFI, VIII, pp.24-26; Love, I, 73; A History of Ginjee and its Rulers by C.S. Srinivasachari, p.164.
 2. Tavernier, I, p.284.
 3. Ibid.

the French gunners by promising to each of them four month's wages more than their ordinary pay.¹ He also took in his employ a number of English and Dutch gunners and two or three Italians.² Thus, four guns were mounted, with which they bombarded the fort and when half of the gate of the town had been battered down, the gunners capitulated; evacuating the fort under the honourable conditions. For the successful campaign against Gandīkot,³ the Mīr was honoured with a 'Nauroz Khilat' by Abdullāh Qutb Shah.

The reduction of Gandīkota was quickly followed by that of Chandragiri and Tirupati. On the 26th August 1652, Tavernier observed "several companies of military passing, some with handpikes, others with guns, and other with sticks, who were going to join one of the principal captains of the Mīr Jumlah's army, on a hill near Courua, where he had pitched his tents.....We set out in order to go to salute him, and we found him in his tent with many nobles who were chiefs of the country, all being idolaters".⁴ It is evident that the Hindu chiefs of this region had acknowledged his sway; and they presented themselves before the Mīr to tender their submission.

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1. According to Tavernier, these French Gunners gave up Dutch service on account of the treatment which they had received.
 2. Tavernier, I, pp.284-85; Bernier, p.17n; Thevenot, p. 102; EPI, IX, pp.22-23.
 3. Nauroz Khilat: A robe of honour given on New Year's day.
 4. Tavernier, I, p.273.

Thus Mīr Jumlah with his ceaseless activity and determined efforts annexed a large tract to his master's kingdom. Manucci writes: "during the time of his government in the Karnatak, Mīr Jumlah gathere together the great treasure¹s which then existed in the ancient temples of the Hindu idol". Bernier confirms this statement. He says that Mīr Jumlah 'seized upon all precious stones with which the statues were ornamented'. He compelled the inhabitants of the Karnatak to surrender to him all the gold and jewels which they possessed. Besides, the diamond mines, considerably added to his wealth, and he became recognised as one of the 'richest private man in the South'.

Mīr Jumlah's wealth and his growing power in the Karnatak naturally roused the cupidity of Abdullah Qutb Shah. The envious Deccani nobles at court pointed out to the Sultan the danger lurking to his own security. His riches were represented to overshadow the grandeur of the Sultan himself.² The Sultan was persuaded to regard the other no better than any other employees. He thus claimed a lion's share in his wazir's conquests, because the success in the Karnatak had been achieved with the resources of the state. On the other hand Mīr Jumlah was fully aware of the weakness and worthlessness of his master. He considered the conquest to be the

1. Storia, I, p.232; Bernier, p.17.

2. Bernier, pp.17-18; Tavernier, I, pp.165-66; Storia, I, pp. 232-33; M.U. Eng. Tr., II, p.128; A.S., III, p.213; Shahjahan-Namah, (Elliot & Dowson), VII, p.108; History of the Deccan, I, p.273; Sherwani, H.K., "Reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah (1626-1672) Political and Military Aspects", J.I.H., XLV, Pt.I, April, 1967, p.128.

handwork of his own and he wanted to establish an independent kingdom there. Tavernier remarks: "They (courtiers) told that the power of Mīr Jumlah should cause him to be suspected; that all his actions tended towards dethrowing him and securing the kingdom of Golkonda for his son; that he ought not to wait till the evil was without remedy; and that in order to rid himself of an enemy — the more dangerous because he concealed himself — the shortest way was to poison him".¹ Being thus pressed and persuaded, the Sultan began to harbour evil designs against his Wazir.²

When the report of rift between the Sultan and the Mīr Jumlah was communicated to Prince Aurangzeb by the Mughal agent at Golkonda, he wrote to the latter that "he (Mughal agent) should try to guide him (Mīr Jumlah) to the noble court",³ (Mughal Court), as he had often expressed his devotion to the emperor. Meantime Abdullāh Qutb Shāh, in pursuance of the pre-concerted plan, summoned Mīr Jumlah to court in order to seize and blind him.⁴ But Mīr Jumlah's son Amīn Khan who was at the court got an inkling of the plot and he warned his father of the impending danger. Upon this Mīr Jumlah who had actually started for the court, returned to ⁵ Karnatak. He directed Amīn Khan that he should also leave

1. Tavernier, I, p.165.

2. Ibid., Bernier, p.18; Storia, I, pp.232-33.

3. Adab, 39b.

4. Ruasat.

5. Bernier, p.18; Storia, I, p.233.

the court under any plausible pretext. But it proved difficult for the latter (Amīn Khan) to elude the vigilance with which he was guarded.¹

With his inborn discretion and far-sightedness Mīr Jumlaḥ looked around for protection against his master who had now turned 'as the greatest of his enemies'. Counting upon his previous attachment to the Persian court he addressed a petition to Shah Abbas II informing him that he was keen to return to his motherland with all of his hoarded treasure because his stay in the Karnatak had become difficult. In his reply, the Shah, while appreciating his past services and promising his help 'at the right moment' advised him to establish friendly relations with his master² because both of them professed the same faith. But Mīr Jumlaḥ was not satisfied with this half hearted assurance and he began to cast his eye on other sides. He approached the Adil Shāh and promised to hold the Karnatak on his behalf. He presented to him some costly lockets richly set with diamonds³ and gems. To better his position in the Karnatak, he began to cultivate cordial relations with the Raja of Chandragiri by holding out to him the assurance of safety. But the Adil Shah had little faith in the Mīr's integrity;

1. Ibid.

2. Adab, 30a; Tavernier, I, p.166; Life of Mir Jumla, p.65; Sherwani, H.K., "Reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah (1626-1672) Political and Military Aspects", XLV, part I, April, 1967, pp. 128-29.

3. Ibid.

he regarded his presents no more than tricks of diplomacy. On the top of it all, he began to intrigue with the ruler of Golkonda, which threatened Mīr Jumlah's safety. In these circumstances, Mīr Jumlah began to widen the net of his diplomacy. To counteract the latent hostility of the Ādil Shah, he began to court friendship of Ikhlas Khan Habashi, the governor of the Bijapurī Karnatak who, probably, very much like him wanted to establish an independent kingdom in that region. Besides Ikhlas Khan, he also endeavoured to win over Shahjī Bhonsla.¹

In addition to overtures in other directions, Mir Jumlah continued his secret correspondence with Abdullah's deadly enemy Prince Aurangzeb, who was an excellent judge of men and was equally keen to secure the services of such an able supporter to make him a fit instrument for the prosecution of his ambitions² in the Deccan. Hence the Mughal prince persuaded his father to offer all assistance to Mīr Jumlah against his wrathful master. He commended his qualities to Shahjahan, saying that he was fit to become the wazir of the empire. In reply the emperor directed the prince to send the Mir to court and to do whatever was in his and his family's interest.³ It is curious that the emperor did not

1. Life of Mīr M Jumlah, p.72.

2. About the strength of Mīr Jumlah's forces, Aurangzeb wrote: he had 9000 horsemen, 5000 servants and 4000 of the Sultan's men, in addition to 20,000 infantry. (Ruqqat, No.2:88).

3. Adab, 48b.

specify what favours he would grant to the Mīr and his son. The Mīr dallied with the offers and waited to see what turn his fortunes would take.

The emperor directed his agent Mohammad Momin who was near the Karnatak to assure Mīr Jumlah of royal favours and assistance. Instructions were also issued to Aurangzeb to spare no effort to persuade the Mīr to enter the imperial service. When Mohammad Momin arrived in the Karnatak, he found that Mīr Jumlah was anxious to know precisely the terms and conditions of his new employment and the honour which would be shown to him in the Mughal court. In fact, he addressed a secret representation to the emperor made to have a clear picture of his future prospects. But the delay in the emperor's response made the Mīr suspicious of the royal intentions, though Aurangzeb constantly assured him of the greatest favours and protection, if he came to the court.¹ But the Mīr, being a man of patience and not haste begged of Aurangzeb to grant him respite for a year or two or enable him to collect his goods scattered in the various parts and to keep up appearances towards 'Abdullah Qutb Shah. He further stressed that he was very much anxious that strict secrecy should be maintained, otherwise the harm done to him would be beyond repair.

When Mohammad Momin, the Mughal agent came to Aurangzeb from Golkonda, he reported the whole affairs relating to Mīr

1. Adab, 48b.

Jumlah. The prince wrote to the emperor that, "Mir Jumlah outwardly professes that he has no shelter except the Imperial court and that he, after collecting his wealth, would start for it; but his actions and demeanour show that he is not sincere in his pretensions. As he has got hold of a large kingdom containing a number of fortresses, ports and mines, he cannot reconcile himself with his old master. He has scorned the offer of the Sultan of Bijapur to enter his service. His professed submission to the Imperial court is just a trick to stave off an open rupture with the two Sultans. He will not leave that country (the Karnatak) for any other place.....He has won over the Zamindars of the Karnatak with courtesy and munificence; he is making friend with Ikhlas Khan Habashi.....¹ Mir Jumlah is passing his time with much care and caution".

But somehow Abdullah Qutb Shah got an inkling of secret correspondence which was going between Mir Jumlah and the Mughal court, and so he ordered that strict watch be kept upon his son Amin Khan who was then at Golkonda. When Mir Jumlah found that his family in Golkonda was in grave danger, he wrote to Aurangzeb, "I am Shahjahan's servant and beg to be saved by him". Aurangzeb at once sent a report to the emperor and tried to persuade him not to miss the opportunity by stating that, "Golkonda together

1. Adab, 39a.

with what Mir Jumla had occupied in the Karnatak..... together with the choicest, and rare things in abundance... would fall into the hands of the emperor".

On receipt of Mīr Jumla's appeal and Aurangzeb's recommendation, Shāhjahān sent to him a gracious firman appointing him to the rank of 5000 *zāt* ¹ *Q. sawār* (پنج ہزاری ذات و سوار) and his son Mohammad Amīn to that of 2000 *zāt* *Q. 1000 sawār* (دو ہزاری ہزار سوار). He also sent through Qāzī Mohammad Arif of Kashmir an order to Abdullah Qutb Shāh asking him not to interfere with Mir Jumla and his family. As soon as Abdullah Qutb Shāh received this information he threw into prison Mohammad Amīn and his dependents on 21st November 1655 A.D. and confiscated all his movable and immovable properties. The arrest of Muazzam Khan's family was against the fourth article of the 'Inqiyād Namah' (or Deeds of Submission) concluded in between the Mughal Emperor Shāhjahān and Abdullah Qutb Shāh the ruler of Golkonda, on 23rd May 1636. According to this Abdullah Qutb Shāh had promised to consider His Majesty's friends as his friends and His Majesty's enemies as his enemies.

1. M.U. Eng. Tr., II, p.189; Amal-e-Shālah, III, p.213; Waris 109(a); Tavernier, I, p.166; Shāhjahān-namah (Elliot and Dowson), vol. VII, p.108. Prof. Jagdish Narayan Sarkar, wrongly states that Muhammad Amīn was given the rank of 2000/2000. See, Life of Mir Jumla, p.74.
2. A.S., III, p.213; M.U., Eng.Tr., II, p.189; Waris, 109a; Tavernier, I, p.166; Shāhjahān-Namah (Elliot & Dowson), VII, p.108; Adab, 45a.
3. Ibid.
4. For details see, Badshāh-Namah, II, pp.177-81; Sherwani, H.K., The Reign of Abdullah Qutb Shāh (1626-1672) Political and Military Aspects, J.I.H., vol. XLV, pt.I, April 1967, pp.121-22.

This incident of Mohammad Amin's arrest has been inaccurately interpreted by Jadunath Sarkar and others. They say that the Sultan arrested him for his insolvent behaviour. Jadunath Sarkar writes, "One day Muhammad Amin came to court reeling with drunkenness, fell asleep on the king's own carpet, and soiled it in crop sickness. The long suffering king could not bear this crowning act of insult. His anger boiled over, and he threw Muhammad Amin and his family into prison and attached their property".¹ But a question arises that it was Mohammad Amin who had misbehaved, then why was the entire family of Mir Jumlah thrown into prison? Mohammad Amin alone should have been punished. This shows that at the time of the arrest of the entire family of Mir Jumlah, only Amin's conduct was not in question. Shah Nawaz Khan, the author of Maasir-ul-Umara writes that, "A number of his enemies under cover of loyalty but with a view to creating trouble, made untrue reports to Qutb Khan, and aroused his suspicions. Mir Jumlah's son Mir Mohammad Amin, who was at the court, suffered from the dual intoxication of youth and prosperity, and being puffed up by the brilliant victories of his father behaved presumptuously and exceeded all bounds. For example, he came drunk one day to the Darbar, and went to sleep on the royal masnad,² and added to his offence by vomiting there (Istifragh Namudah).

1. History of Aurangzeb, I, p.279.

2. Masnad: 'A cushion or carpet raised above the floor'..

As a result the signs of annoyance became apparent. Mīr Jumlah had high expectations of favour on account of his victories, but when he found the results to the contrary making their appearance, he became disheartened and in the 29th year (Shahjahani) sought an alliance with Prince Mohammad Aurangzeb, who was the viceroy of the Deccan and begged that he might be sent for¹. The author further adds that "On the request of the Prince, the emperor sent a letter announcing the grant of a mansab of five thousand zat and sawar (to Mīr Jumlah) and of two thousand zat and one thousand sawar to his son Mohammad Amīn, and dispatched an order to Qutb Shah through Qazī Mohammad Arif Kashmirī not to interfere with the two men and their relations. On hearing this news Qutb Shah imprisoned Mohammad Amīn with his family and forfeited all his belongings"². This statement is confirmed by contemporary European travellers. Manucci writes that, "the king of Golkonda, finding that Mīr Jumlah did not mean to obey the repeated orders issued for his return to court, directed the arrest of Mohammad Amin Khan".

Thus, the arrest of Amīn Khan and his family was made not because of his misconduct, but it was directly connected with his father's machinations. Even after Mīr Jumlah's retirement to the Karnatak, Abdullah had not adopted stern

1. M.U., Eng. Tr., II, pp. 188-89.

2. فردوس آشتیانی طبیب استعلاء شاہزادہ منہور غنایت متغین مرحمت منصب پنج ہزاری ذات و حواری ہزاری ہزار سوار بہ میر محمد امین پسرش و دربان در باب عدم مخالفت و لغزش برد و متعلقان او بہ قطب شاہ صاحب قاضی محمد عارف کشمیری روانہ فرمود۔ قطب شاہ بجز آصفائے این خبر محمد امین را قید نمود۔
M.U., III, pp. 531-32.

attitude towards him and he continued to write to him letters asking him to return to the capital. So long as there was a ray of hope of the Mir's return, he avoided to take any drastic step against Amīn Khan. But when he found that his wazir who was fully conversant with the ins and outs of his kingdom had decided to go over to the Mughals,¹ the Sultan was left ^{with} no other alternative. But the anxiety of Qutb Shah did not end here. He was apprehensive of alliance between his treacherous wazir and his mortal foe Aurangzeb, the two together would prove a veritable danger to the security of his kingdom. This view is also confirmed by Sudharī Lal, the author of 'Tuhfa-e-Shahjahanī' who writes: "On hearing of Mir Jumlah's mansab (given by Shahjahan), Qutbul Mulk due to his jealousy and enmity arrested his son Mir Mohammad Amīn."²

The emperor, on hearing the news of the arrest of Mir Jumlah's son and his family, wrote to Aurangzeb (24th December, 1655) that "an order should be sent to Abdullah Qutb Shah that the imprisonment of his son was disrespectful, particularly after his entry into the imperial service and he must either release his son or be prepared for war". The emperor also sent orders of Shaysta Khan, Iftikhar Khan, Prithvī Rāj and others to present themselves before Prince

1. A.S., III, p.213.

2. It is also corroborated by Mohammad Saleh Kambū:

چون پیش از رسیدن قاضی عارف بدولت آباد طلب الملک از ناعاقبت بینی میر امین را با متعلقان قریب بوده -

A.S., III, p.221.

¹
Aurangzeb. On receipt of this command Aurangzeb sent Hādīdā Khan to Golkonda and instructed him to wait there. He also sent Mir Abdul Qasim and Syed Ali with a 'nīshan' to Abdullah Qutb Shah (20th December) stressing the disrespect shown by the latter in arresting Mohammad Amin and asking him to release him and his family, restore their confiscated properties, and to send them to the imperial court along with the bearers of 'Nīshan'.² The Sultan was also warned that if he delayed or disobeyed the orders, the prince Aurangzeb would send his son against him.³

But Abdullah Qutb Shah paid no heed to Aurangzeb's repeated warnings and also to Shāhjahān's previous letter dated the 3rd December, 1655, sent through Qazī Arif Kashmīrī. So Aurangzeb anticipating the Emperor's sanction, directed his son Mohd. Sultan on 26th December to march to Nander and wait there till further orders.⁴ He then wrote to Shāhjahān, "As previously related, I had sent a letter to Qutb-ul-Mulk before the arrival of Your Majesty's order. As I learn from my agent at Golkonda that Qutb-ul-Mulk is not willing to release Mīr Jumlah's son, for the sake of final discussion I sent Abul Qasim to Qutb-ul-Mulk. On the

1. A.S., III, p.222.

2. Nīshan: An instruction, order, or communication issued by a member of the royal family to any one except the emperor.

3. Ruqqat, 10:96.

4. Adab, 60b; M.U., Eng.Tr., II, p.189; Aurangzeb and his Times by Faruqi, p.284.

8th of the current month (Rabiul Awwal 1066 A.H/26th Dec., 1655) I gave leave to Mohd. Sultan and asked him to reach ¹ Nander and stop there.

On the receipt of Aurangzeb's letter the emperor sanctioned the invasion of Golkonda if Abdullah Qutb Shah defied the imperial orders to release Amin Khan and his family and failed to restore his confiscated property. Aurangzeb in response to Shahjahan's letter wrote, "Qurb-ul-Mulk even after receiving Your Majesty's order and knowing of my son's (Mohd. Sultan's) arrival at Nander, has not set ² Mir Jumlah's son free". Now Mohammad Sultan was ordered (10th January 1656) to enter Golkonda. While Mohammad Sultan was marching towards Golkonda, Aurangzeb informed the emperor that "Mohammad Sultan is approaching Maidrabad and in spite of my letter to Abdullah Qutb Shah (based on) Your Majesty's instructions, he has not yet released ³ Mir Jumlah's family".

As soon as Abdullah Qutb Shah received the news of the approach of the imperial army, he released Mohammad Amin Khan and his mother and they waited upon Mohammad Sultan at a distance of 12 kos (24 miles) from Maidrabad. But the ⁴ Qutb Shah did not restore his confiscated property. Therefore,

1. Ibid.

2. Adab, 63b.

3. Ibid., 65b.

4. A.S., III, p.228; M.U. Eng.Tr., II, p.189; Storia, I, p.234; Shahjahan-Namah (Elliot & Dowson), VII, pp.110-11.

Sultan Mohammad continued his march towards the city. While he was encamping near Husain Sagar tank, the Qutb Shahi troops made their appearance and threatened to open offensive. Upon this Mohammad Sultan attacked them and drove them to the city wall. Next day, 24th January, 1656, he entered the city of Haidrabad and enormous booty fell into his hands. So, under pressure of the military impact Abdullah Qutb Shah not only fled to the fort of Golkonda (6 miles from the city of Haidrabad) but also restored Mir Jumlah's property and begged for peace, on the 29th January 1656.¹ Being a devoted son and loyal officer, Sultan Mohammad declined to entertain such a proposal in his father's absence and without his permission. On the other hand, though Abdullah continued to send presents and repeat his proposal of peace, he was sparing no efforts in collecting war materials. He even solicited help from the Adil Shah.²

When Aurangzeb arrived (6th February 1656) within one Kos (2 miles) of the fort, 15000 strong Qutb Shahi soldiers opened the volley of fire. Thus Abdullah Qutb Shah accentuated the situation further. Aurangzeb being an able general and master of strategy opened the siege of the fort. It lasted from 7th February 1656 to 30th March, 1656.³ Finding

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1. A.S., III, p.223; M.U., Eng.Tr., II, p.189; Storia, I, p.234; Shahjahan-Namah (Elliot & Dowson), VII, pp.110-11.
 2. M.U., Eng. Tr., II, p.190; Adab, 66b; Aurangzeb and His Times, p.287.
 3. Aurangzeb and his Times, p.291.

himself in most precarious position Abdullah Qutb Shah solicited peace through the mediation of Prince Dara Shikoh and Jahan Ara Begum, who were growing afraid of the rising power and influence of Aurangzeb lest he should in future on that basis claim the throne. On the other hand he sent his son-in-law Mir Ahmad and Mir Fasih with tribute to Aurangzeb,¹ who wrote to Mir Jumlah that, "Qutbul Mulk is now craving pardon, has sent his son-in-law Mir Ahmad to me, and has promised that his mother would wait on me and that his daughter would be married to my son. But I wish to send him to the wilderness of destruction". But Mir Jumlah, who still retained some regard for his erstwhile master, did not want to allow Aurangzeb to proceed to extremities. After crossing the river Krishna on the 8th March 1656, he came to Aurangzeb's camp at Golkonda on the 20th March, 'more as a prince than as a noble' with 6000 cavalry, 15000 infantry, 150 elephants and enormous wealth". When Abdullah's mother,² 'the chaste lady', visited Aurangzeb for peace-terms, the latter expressed his readiness to restore the kingdom on the condition of payment of one crore rupees as a tribute and of giving Abdullah's daughter in marriage to Prince Mohammad Sultan, who would be nominated successor to the throne.

While these negotiations were going on, Aurangzeb received his father's instructions asking him to raise the

1. A.S., III, p.227.

2. Ibid., p.228; M.U., II, Eng. Tr., II, p.190..

siege and quit the territory. Therefore, on the 30th March 1656, Aurangzeb concluded peace¹ with Abdullah Qutb Shah on payment of an indemnity of one crore of rupees and arrears of tribute and the marriage of his (Abdullah Qutb Shah's) daughter to Mohammad Sultan. The bride along with ten lacs as a marriage gift was brought with all respects to the quarter of Mohammad Sultan.² Thus both peace and marriage were celebrated at one and the same time and with much pomp and show.

During his stay at Golkonda Aurangzeb tried to win over Mīr Jumlah with soft words and alluring promises. He was keen for his friendship because he was a brave leader and a wealthy man. He was convinced that the Mīr would prove very helpful to him in the successful prosecution of his ambitious designs. In his talk with Mīr Jumlah he often complained against his father's attitude and remarked that Shāhjahān was the father of Dārā, while he, on his side could never find a more kind father than him. Thus Aurangzeb centred

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1. In his letter to Shah Abbas II of Iran, Abdullah Qutb Shah has made a mention about the circumstances in which he was forced to conclude peace with the Mughals. He also tells us that it was due to the complicity of Mohd. Sa'id with Aurangzeb that he had to face such a situation.

For the contents of this letter see, Makatib Sultan Abdullah Qutb Shah, Salar Jung, ^{Lib} Nast Farsi, No. 295; Also quoted by Prof. H.K. Sherwani in his article, "Reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah (1626-1672) Political and Military Aspects", J.I.H., XLV, Part I, April 1967, p.133.

2. A.S., III, p.229; M.U., II, Eng. Tr., II, p.191.

all his hope in Mīr Jumlah and called him his philosopher and guide. It is said that the prince gave his word of honour to the Mīr that if he became the expercor he would raise him to the highest position in the court and his son Mohammad Amīn Khan would occupy the second place and would receive princely privileges. He entreated him not enter into friendly relations with Darā. Mīr Jumlah, on his part,¹ promised that he would support him with his entire strength, whenever there would be any occasion for the same.

Mīr Jumlah accompanied Aurangzeb upto Indūr² (2nd May 1656) where he was allowed to leave for the court. He was escorted by Qazī'Arif Kāshmīrī. On his way to the court Mīr Jumlah received an imperial firman³ dated 10th April 1656, brought by Mohd. Beg., conferring on him the Mughal title of Muazzam Khan,⁴ the gift of a standard and drums.⁵ The emperor was keenly desirous of making use of Muazzam Khan's diplomatic and military skill in recovering the fortress of Candhar. When Aurangzeb learnt of the imperial favour to Mir, he became highly delighted and he wrote to him that, "I am ever desirous of

1. Ibid.

2. Present Nizamabad.

3. Firman: A royal order bearing the Seal of the Emperor.

4. Henceforward he is referred as Muazzam Khan though some of the modern historians continue to call him as Mir Jumlah which is incorrect.

5. میر محمد معظم خاں را رخسار درگاه والا نموده قاضی عارف را همراه دادند درین مکان فرمان عنایت عنوان تنظیم خطاب مستطاب معظم خاں و خلعت خاصه جده مرتبه با پهلکتاره و علم نقاره محبوب محمدی بیک گرز داد پرتو رود بر ساخته سرفراز و کامیاب اختصاص ساخت -

seeing your plans fulfilled, I am not fully satisfied at your present comparatively lower status. I would try for conferment of further favours on you and I hope it will materialise in no time, even if it will be the cause of jealousy of the enemies".¹

During his journey to the court, Muazzam Khan was duly honoured at the places en route. Manucci writes that, "Where ever he passed the governors of the places came out to greet him, doing him great honour and giving him presents, all by orders of the king. Upon his arrival close to Delhi the greatest commanders were sent out to greet and escort him. Instructions were issued that all along his route the streets and shops should be well decorated in the same manner as in done at the time of royal procession passing".² On the 25th Ramzan 8th July 1656, the emperor ordered Qasim Khan and Danishmand Khan, the Mir Atish³ and the Mir Bakhshi⁴ respectively, to go to the out-skirts of

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1. Adab, 82a-b; Waris, 110b; M.U. (Persian) III, pp.534-36 and Eng.Tr. II, p.191; Storia, I, pp.236-37.
 2. Storia, I, p.237.
 3. Mir Atish (Lord of fire): He was the head of the artillery and was also known as 'Darogha-e-Tonkhanah' (Superintendent of the Cannon department). See, The Army of the Indian Moghuls by W.Irvine, pp.152-56.
 4. Mir Bakhshi (Paymaster-General): He was the head of the military department. The salary bills of all officers had to be calculated and passed by him. For details see, Ibid., p.38.

the city and escort him.¹ On that lucky day he was received with great pomp and was given the highest place in the royal audience.²

Muazzam Khan made a valuable peshkash (presentation) of 1000 muhars and some other precious stones to the emperor Shahjahan. It is said that on this occasion he presented 'Kohinoor' to the Mughal emperor. In return, the emperor gave him a special robe, a jewelled inkpot, an ornamented sword, 5 lacs of rupees in cash, a mansab of 6 hazari zat³ 0 sawar, horses and elephants and appointed him Wazir, in place of his favourite Sa'dullah Khan who had died on 7th April, 1656. Not only this, the emperor was so pleased with him that he bestowed on him the territory of Karnatak as rent-free land for seven years.

Shortly after, the emperor (Shahjahan) asked Muazzam Khan to recruit an army for a campaign against the Shah of Persia to recover the fortress of Landhar.⁴ But Muazzam Khan was reluctant to undertake the adventure, he was more

1. A.S., III, 231; Adab, 83a; Storia, I, p.237; M.U. (Persian) III, p.535 and Eng. Tr., II, p.191.

2. Ibid. چوں لبرض رسید که معلم خان در لواجی دار الخلافه رسیده حسب الحکم اشرف قاسم خان میرانش و دانشمند خان بخشی دوم تاکنار شهر نیریز شده بدرگاه علم نباه رسانیدند = A.S., III, p.231

3. لغات خلعت خاصه و شمشیر مرصع و منصب شش هزاری شش هزار سوار و خدمت و اولاد مرتبت وزارت کل و مرصع قلدران مرصع و درواستف یکی از آن میان عربی باریک نزدیکی عراقی و میل خاصه بایراق لفره و ماده میل پنج لک روپیه نهایت مرتبه سرفرازی و کامرانی رسید =

A.S., III, p.231; M.U. (Persian) III, p.535 and Eng. Tr., II, p.191.

4. Storia, I, p.237.

interested in the Deccan, where he had passed golden days¹ of his life. So he appeared before the emperor with some costly presents and a few precious jewels. During the course of the interview he represented that if Candhar produced such precious stones, His Majesty may undertake the labour of going there, or could despatch some loyal vassal to take, but in his opinion, His Majesty had better send some trusty person to conquer the lands, where a rich variety of such stones are to be found.² He further assured the emperor that he within a short time would deliver to his hands the two Deccan kingdoms which would make him the lord of all the coast of Coromandal and Gerzelin (Ginjili).³ Meanwhile, it was reported that Ibrāhīm Ādil Shah, the ruler of Bījāpur, had died on 4th November 1656 and his officers have selected a man of obscure origin as his successor and designated him as Allī Ādil Shah II.⁴ Shāhjahān expressed much satisfaction and happiness at the representation of Muazzam Khan whom he considered to be an expert

1. M.U., Eng. Tr., II, p.191.

2. Storia, I, pp.237-38; Bernier, P.22; M.U. Eng.Tr., II, p.192.

3. Ibid.

4. The author of Basatin-us-Salatin devotes a paragraph to his birth, and his words indicate that he was the son of Mohammad Shah by a woman of questionable position. The historian has cleverly avoided to mention her name or status. He only adds, however, that the Sultan was "happy to receive this great gift and kindness". Aurangzeb's envoy at the court of Bijapur, Mohammad Zaman Khan, calls him "adopted son of obscure origin". (pīsar-e-Khwandah-majhūl alnash). Basatin, pp.361-62; Introduction of Ruq-qat by Sayyid Najib Ashraf, p.319.

in the Deccan affairs. Therefore, he decided to send an¹ army under his command to the Deccan.

But Dārā was much upset with the decision of his father because from the very outset he was against Muazzam Khan. Manucci writes that "Not content with having affronted so many, he must needs ridicule the great soldier Mir Jumla (Mīr Jumlah), when he arrived at his father's court. He ordered the noble's sword, that he was wearing at his waist, to be stolen as soon as he entered the royal palace by active fellows, of whom he kept a number for the execution of such like tricks. In addition, he ordered his buffoons several times to initiate the gait and the gesture of the said Mīr Jumla, making mock of him"². So he tried his best to obstruct the execution of this undertaking. He was suspicious of Muazzam Khan's integrity and apprehended that his arrival in the Deccan would further strengthen Aurangzeb's position there. But Aurangzeb had already requested the emperor to send Muazzam Khan which was very essential for his success in that region. In a letter to Muazzam Khan, Aurangzeb writes, "I have read your letter, and all that you have written to me on His Majesty's behalf. I have reported the actual facts to His Majesty, and I am recounting the same to you. I am busy collecting troops, about the paucity of which in this province you know so well. I have given instructions to the

1. Ibid.

2. Storia, I, pp.225-26.

commanders of forts on the frontier to be vigilant because the suppression of this disturbance is absolutely necessary. If the reports from Bījāpur are confirmed and the news of the death of its ruler, is confirmed, we shall have to turn our attention in that direction as well. In this also, adequate preparations are necessary. I hope you will acquaint^a His Majesty with these facts. Considering any delay inadvisable you start immediately and not let the opportunity to slip away"¹. Accordingly, Shahjahan at the request of his son Prince Aurangzeb deputed Muazzam Khan who was very eager to go to the Deccan. His son Mohammad Amin Khan was given an increment of 1000 zat in his mansab of 2000 zat and 1000 sahar, and was ordered to officiate till the return of his father. In December 1656 Muazzam Khan left the capital along with famous generals such as Mahabat Khan, Rao Chatrasal, Najabat Khan and others. He arrived at Aurangabad on January 18th, 1657, where he joined his friend and future master Aurangzeb. The Prince after holding consultations with Muazzam Khan set out for the invasion of Bijapur.

Both Prince Aurangzeb and Muazzam Khan reached Bidar² (28th February) and opened the siege of the fort, which was one of the strongest in the Deccan. It was defended by Siddi³ Marjan, a veteran general. The invaders distributed entrenchments and planted out posts round the fort. The officers

1. Adab, 118a; M.U. Eng.Tr., II, p.192.

2. Adab, 109b.

3. Ibid., 110a-b.

were ordered to be vigilant round the clock. The enemy opened an attack on the imperialists but was repulsed with heavy losses. On 29th March, 1657 the invaders directed their fire on the walls of the fort and they succeeded in breaching it. Eventually they were successful in capturing the fort (30th March) which was the key for the conquest of the Deccan.¹

After capturing the fort of Bīdar, Muazzam Khan and Prince Aurangzeb left for Kalyānī on 27th April 1657. They reached there on 3rd May 1657. The same day they completed their plan of investing the fort. They started digging trenches and establishing outposts to bring the target within the range of cannon fire. The enemy delivered a heavy attack on Muazzam Khan's side, but had to retire with heavy losses. One day when the Bijapurīs with 30000 troops fell on the Mughals, Aurangzeb moved forward to repulse them. Meantime Muazzam Khan with selected generals like Shah Nawās Khan, Mahābat Khan, Rāo Chhatrasal and Shamsuddin Khesgī attacked the enemy from other sides and broke their ranks. A large number of them were slain and the remaining were put to flight. A few days later, the enemy according to their usual practice ventured forth and made hostile demonstrations. So, on 22nd July 1657, Aurangzeb directed Muazzam Khan, Prince Mohammad Sultan and other generals

1. Being a strong and well defended fort, it took the Mughals almost a full month to capture it.

such as Mahābat Khan, Rāo Chhatrasāl and Dilīr Khan to deal with the enemy. The Bijapurīs were defeated and they suffered heavy casualties. In the end Dilāwar Khan Mabashi, the qiladar,¹ delivered the keys of the fort to the imperialists on 1st August, 1657.

The success immensely pleased and satisfied the emperor who conferred rewards on his son Prince Mohammad Aurangzeb and other generals. Muazzam Khan was honoured with a special robe and some mahals of the Karnatak territory, yielding a revenue of 4 crores of ~~dans~~², were confirmed in his possession. The tract had been seized by Mīr Jumla before he had entered royal service.³

Now the road of Bijapur was virtually open and it was only a question of time. But Aurangzeb's success roused Darā's jealousy,⁴ and the Bijapurīs intrigued at the court to prevent Aurangzeb's progress in their territory. So at the intercession of Darā, Shāhjahān ordered Aurangzeb to conclude peace with 'Alī Adil Shah.

1. Qiladar: Commandant of a fort, castle or garrison.

2. Dans: Plural of dan, a small coin of which 40 made a rupee.

3. بمظلم خان خلعت خاصه و محال و دلایت کرناتک بجمع چهار کروڑ دام کہ پیش از ملازمت اشرف از مرزبان آن جاگیر گرفته -

A.S., III, p.261.

4. "Two years earlier Aurangzeb had complained to his elder sister, Jahan Arā Begum, that Darā... has sent his servant, Mulla Shawqi, with some Isharat (messages) to accept the requests of the ruler of Bijapur....."
See, Ruqqat, 27:159.

Shahjahan fell ill on the 7th Zilhijsa 1067 A.H/6th September 1657 A.D. Its report occasioned disturbances in some parts of the empire.¹ Dārā Shikoh, who considered himself to be the real heir-apparent and had the reins of government in his hands, even when his father was in good health. Now he assumed control of entire administration.² Being jealous of Muazzam Khan, who was a close friend of his rival Prince Aurangzeb, he dismissed him from the post of Wazir on the charge of disobedience. To reduce Aurangzeb's power, he issued urgent orders recalling high generals like Mahābat Khan, Rāo Chhatrasāl³ etc. who left the Deccan with their contingents without obtaining due permission from the Viceroy.⁴ Muazzam Khan was also ordered to return to the court after capturing Parenda.⁵

Aurangzeb had sent Muazzam Khan to capture the fort of Parenda towards the end of September 1657 and he himself had set out for Bīdar, where he reached on the 9th of October. But, with the departure of Mahābat Khan, Rāo Chhatrasāl and others for the Court, the army of Muazzam Khan had been

1. M.L., II, p.4, M.A., p.3; A.N., p.28.

2. M.L., II, p.5, M.A., p.3.

3. A.S., III, p.266; A.N., p.29; M.U., Eng.Tr., II, p.192.

4. A.S., III, pp.263, 266, 267; A.N., p.29; L.N.A., p.16.

5. Ibid.

considerably depleted. The political situation in the empire in general and in the Deccan in particular had become fluid because of vague reports of the emperor's illness, the high-handedness of Dārā and consequently prospects of a civil war. This led Aurangzeb to think that the Paranda affair would not be an easy task and that it could not be promptly settled. Therefore, he directed Muazzam Khan to try to effect conciliation. He wrote to Muazzam Khan "Give up all ideas of collecting peshkash and conquering territories. Only with good treatment the enemy might be won over". He further stressed that there was no time to achieve the object by force. His concluding remark was "in this extreme situation you should try to press sincere¹ friendship; whatever is possible without loss of time". Accordingly, Muazzam Khan tried to win over Ikhlas Khan the chief minister of Bijapur. But his efforts ended in smoke owing to the murder of Ikhlas Khan on 11th of November 1657. Upon this Aurangzeb asked Muazzam Khan to return to Bir without wasting any more time. When he reached there, he received a communication from the Prince that he should encamp there with Prince Muazzam and make fresh efforts to bring the Bijapuris to senses.

While Muazzam Khan and Prince Muazzam were staying at Bir the former received a letter from his son informing

1. Adab, 162b-63a, 200b-02b.

him of the current politics at the Mughal court. Muazzam Khan communicated the contents of his son's letter to Aurangzeb and sought his advice with regard to the reply he should send to his son. In reply Aurangzeb wrote to him: "It is futile to teach wisdom to Lukman. Whatever strikes would be according to the cannons of wisdom..... write whatever seems desirable".

On his part Muazzam Khan had failed to convince Dārā of his fidelity. The situation had become intriguing and alarming. On the other hand, he was reluctant to come out boldly to say that he was committed to Aurangzeb and cannot leave him alone. On his failure in the Parenda campaign, Dārā recalled Muazzam Khan was justified to the court because he wanted to separate him from Aurangzeb. Accordingly, he issued an urgent order on behalf of the emperor asking Muazzam Khan to leave the Deccan for the capital. This order was communicated to Muazzam Khan through Aurangzeb who sent along with it a covering letter of his own. Muazzam Khan received both the letters on November 22, 1657. In his letter Aurangzeb wrote: "Friend! May God help you! What shall I write about my own troubled state or describe how my days are passing. I have no remedy save patience".

But high ambition was surging in Aurangzeb's heart. As a bitter conflict lay ahead he rightly thought that the

departure of such an astute politician and a resourceful general who had so much wealth and army at his command would be injurious to his interests.¹ To safeguard his own interests he sent a message to Muazzam Khan, saying that as he regarded him as his well-wisher, he would like that he should see him before his departure to the court.¹ But Muazzam Khan tried to avoid this meeting and replied "As I have received a royal order summoning me to the court, as an officer and a loyal servant I have no other alternative but to comply with it".² He was clear in his mind that any further stay in the Deccan would expose his family to great hazard at the hands of Dārā Shikoh at the capital. It might even lead to a bloody grave for his kith and kins. But Prince Aurangzeb sent a second message to Muazzam Khan through his son Prince Muazzam saying that even though he was going to the court, he (Aurangzeb) was quite confident of his loyalty; but as he had certain important matters to discuss with him, he wanted him to come to him and thereafter he could proceed to the court.³ Muazzam Khan's mind was set at rest by Prince Muazzam's flattering words and he came to Aurangzeb about 1st January 1658 A.D. But as soon as he entered the private apartments of the Prince, he was arrested and was sent as prisoner to the fort of Daulatabad. All his treasures and property were also

1. A.S., III, p.282; M.U., Eng.Tr., II, p.193.

2. Storia, I, p.249; M.U., Eng.Tr., II, p.193.

3. M.U., Eng.Tr., II, p.193; Storia, I, p.249.

confiscated and his attendants were taken by the Prince in his own service. Thus, Aurangzeb acquired means to carrying out his plan.

The arrest of Muazzam Khan had been misinterpreted by Manucci who writes: "These were forgeries. They were in very cordial terms. They showed him to be affectionate and friendly that Mīr Jumlah declared it impossible to refuse to go.... Upon Mīr Jumlah's arrival Prince Aurangzeb made false display of affection, using him phrases of the greatest possible endearment, styling him Bābā and Bābājī that is to say 'Father' and 'Lord Father' embracing him repeatedly"¹. He adds that "Mīr Jumlah appeared to be much incensed, and said that he was a most loyal subject of King Shāhjahān"². But contradicting this statement he further remarks that "In public he reprimanded him (Aurangzeb); all this being a comedy"³ to deceive the royal spies, so that they might report about his loyalty to Shahjahan and Dara".

But we cannot give implicit credence to the account of a foreign traveller, though some modern historians like Sir Jadunath Sarkar⁴ and others have believed it in toto. Before coming to any definite conclusion it is necessary

1. Storia, I, p.250.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. See, History of Aurangzeb, I, pp.361-62.

to assess the authenticity of Manucci's version in the context of the account given by court historians and other of contemporary writers.

Describing the arrest of Muazzam Khan, the author of Amal-e-Saleh, Mohammad Saleh Kambū writes: "Muazzam Khan, the best of officers and the head of this affair, through some evil manner, which was inconsistent with wise conduct and knowledge wanted, without permission of Aurangzeb, to go to the emperor.....When the directions were carried out, and the Khan came to his (Aurangzeb's) presence by the order of Aurangzeb, he was sent prisoner to the fort of Daulatabād".¹ Mohammad Saleh informs us further that Aurangzeb seized all his treasure, elephants and other property and put them in the charge of State treasurers".²

The above statement is borne out by other contemporary historians. Mohammad Kāzin, the author of 'Ālamsīr Nāmah' writes: "In obedience to this order, the Khan marched with the army under his command to Aurangzeb, intending to proceed from there to the capital.....(Aurangzeb) as a matter of prudence and of state policy made him prisoner and detained him in the Deccan".³ Āqil Khan Rāsī, the author of 'Wāqī'at-e-Ālamsīrī' echoes the same version: "As soon as Muazzam Khan

1. A.S., III, p. 262.

2. خزانہ و فیلان و دیگر اموال البقیہ ضبط در آورده تحویل داران سرکار عالی نمودند۔

A.S., III, p. 262.

3. A.H., p. 84.

entered the private apartments of Aurangzeb, he was arrested. All his treasure and property were also confiscated and his attendants were taken by the Prince in his own service".¹

Muazzam Khan's own wavering nature had caused suspicion in the mind of Prince Aurangzeb. Consequently he had him arrested. The prince was well aware of the Mir's treachery against his erstwhile master, the ruler of Golkonda whom he had betrayed without any compunction. Prince Aurangzeb being a far-sighted politician imprisoned the opportunist Muazzam Khan, so that he might not betray him also.

When Shahjahan received the report of Muazzam Khan's imprisonment, he condemned the unjustified action as also the confiscation of the property of an innocent Syed - who was coming to the court in compliance with the royal firman and he ordered the release of the helpless Syed, "bidding Aurangzeb be aware of the day of retribution".² But, Aurangzeb much before the receipt of this order had represented that he had suspicions about the fidelity of Muazzam Khan and therefore he had imprisoned him, otherwise he would have joined the Deccanis.³ So long as reports of continued illness of Shahjahan and supremacy of Dara Shikoh were in circulation in India, Aurangzeb kept Muazzam Khan under his surveillance in the fort of Daulatabad.⁴

1. Z.M.A., p.20.

2. M.U., Eng.Tr., II, p.193.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

After defeating Dara, "on Friday the 1st Zilqad 1068 A.H./22nd July, 1658, after offering Friday prayers, at a auspicious hour and a lucky moment, when the Sun was in the tenth sign of Zodiac he started the celebration of his coronation.....and took his seat on the throne of the extensive heaven-like empire of Hindustan"¹. Now he thought that any further confinement of Muazzam Khan would be useless and purposeless, and that it would be good to release him because he could be usefully employed in the war against Shuja. Therefore, he issued orders for his release² and in his letter, he apologised for his past conduct. He wrote, "I detained you for some reason..... The time has come when I should apologise to you.....It is highly imperative that a sincere well-wisher, versed in business like yourself, should remain in my court". In an other letter to Muazzam Khan, Aurangzeb wrote, "I imprisoned you not due to any disloyalty on your part. Only you showed carelessness in exertion and insisted on going back to the court at an inconvenient time and it was inadvisable to allow you to do so. However, much I tried to make you realise that, I failed. So I was obliged to detain you, much against my will. Now, by God's grace my wish has been fulfilled³ and life has come in the garden of kingdom of

1. M.L., II, pp.39-40.

2. Ibid., p.44.

3. Now he became the Emperor of Hindustan.

religion. My enemies have been humiliated. It is inhuman to detain you any longer. I don't want to keep an intelligent man like you unnecessarily without work". But this apology was nothing more than a trick of diplomacy and skill of pen-manship on the part of Aurangzeb.

The emperor directed Muazzam Khan to come to court¹ after rainy season. By the end of the month of October 1658, he was restored to his previous position. His confiscated properties were given back and he was appointed Subahdar² of Khandesh (بصوبہ داری خاندیش مہابہی ساف) vice Wazir Khan who was transferred to Aurangabad.³

After hounding out Dara and pursuing him from place to place in the Punjab, Aurangzeb returned to the capital to check the rapid advance of his brother Shuja who was coming from Bengal to capture the throne of Hindustan. To utilize the services of Muazzam Khan, he sent an urgent order summoning him to his presence, leaving the affairs of Khandesh under the charge of some trust-worthy person.⁴ Meanwhile he had despatched his son Prince Mohd. Sultan by the end of November 1658, to bar the path of Shah Shuja. On 21st Dec. 1658, Aurangzeb himself marched for the east and at Korrah,

1. Adab, 95a-b.

2. Subahdar: One holding a Subah (province) or provincial governor.

3. A.N., pp.218-19.

4. Ibid.

eight miles west of Khajwā on 2nd January 1659, Prince Mohammad Sultan earned the honour of presenting himself before the emperor.¹ It was at this auspicious place that Muazzam Khan, who had covered the long distance very rapidly, had the audience of the new emperor two days before the fateful battle. He was recipient of many honours and numerous favours.² He now became the right hand man of Aurangzeb. Two days before the battle the imperial army was arranged in the field according to the advice of Muazzam Khan so that owing to vastness of numbers "nothing was visible except the banners on the line-breaking elephants and the enemy-killing spears, shining like lightning". Ninety thousand horsemen stood ready in columns after columns on the dreary plain of Khajwā.³ But the guns of Shujā were so placed that they had clear advantage over the death emitting artillery of his rival. But Muazzam Khan was a good tactician and an expert strategist. Having surveyed the situation carefully, he shifted the disposition of his artillery in the darkness of the night and placed 40 of his guns right in front of the enemy. Khwāfī Khan, the author of 'Muntakhab-ul-Lubāb', informs us that "With a view to arranging his men and look after them, he (Muazzam Khan) took no rest during the night".⁴ But about the fourth watch of the night a great tumult arose

1. M.L., II, p.48.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p.49.

4. Ibid., p.51.

in his army owing to the treacherous conduct of Raja Jaswant Singh.¹

Describing this episode, Khwafi writes that, "Raja Jaswant Singh's support of Aurangzeb was based on hypocrisy. He had been covered with it from the very day of creation. He wore the illfamed garb of flight. His sordid nature always led him to his ultimate ruin. With stupid thinking and evil intentions, he sent a friendly message to Shah Shujā saying that "towards the end of the night I would make a surprise attack on the imperial army and after plundering the camp would flee from there. When this happens the emperor would naturally order his men to pursue the defectors. At that moment your few brave soldiers should make a sudden charge on the imperial army".² Accordingly, when three or four hours (gharis) of the night still remained that wretched fellow in league with other Rajputs such as Rām Singh Rāthor, Mahesh Dās with their contingents of soldiers plundered the imperial camp, the equipment and baggages of ~~amirs~~ and princes and whatever came in his way. "The plundering hands of the Rajputs, the vagabonds and the looters, who had been waiting for such an opportunity even reached the stables and stores of the imperial camp. There was complete panic throughout the camp". Khwafi Khan writes further that, "even

1. M.L., II, p.51.

2. Ibid.

the most sincere of his (emperor's) followers began to waver, what could be said about the cowards and traitors?" But in spite of this disturbance not the slightest change occurred in the firm attitude of Aurangzeb. He maintained his dignity and his equilibrium. He had by his side a general like Muazzam Khan as his adviser, and so not the least sign of anxiety was visible on his face and he engaged himself in preparations for the impending battle according to the pre-arranged plan. In place of Raja Jaswant Singh, Islam Khan was appointed commander of right wing. Muazzam Khan was given discretionary powers to make such alterations in the disposition of the troops as he deemed necessary according to the time and situation. According to Manucci it was on Muazzam Khan's instance that Aurangzeb wrote a brief letter to Allavardi Khan, then the chief adviser of Shah Shujā saying: "Allavardi Khan! If this day you wish to make me king of Hindustan, it would suffice to induce Shah Shujā to get down from his elephant during the battle, and I pledge you my word to reward you and all your family, who are on my side. I have the strongest hope that you will not fail me".

On the day of battle Muazzam Khan's elephant was stationed next to the royal elephant to enable him to tender his help and advice in critical moments. Shujā's right wing led by Syed Alam routed the imperial left wing and then the enemy attacked the centre which was under the command of

the emperor. During the conflict the latter's elephant driver received a fatal blow and was killed. According to Manucci the emperor was about to dismount, but it was Muazzam Khan "who was quite near, doing his duty as a good leader (and from him nothing else could be expected).....He shouted in a loud voice: "Kaem! Kaem ((ain! (ain)"¹ Steady! Steady. Thus Muazzam Khan saved the situation, when the battle was passing through a critical phase. Meanwhile some of the generals of Shah Shujā like Mukarram Khan Safavī, Abdūl Rahmān and Sanjar Beg had abandoned their master and come over to Aurangzeb. This decided the course of the conflict. Shujā suffered a crushing defeat. And for this success much credit goes to Muazzam Khan.

After his defeat at Khajwā Shujā fled towards the east in great haste and depression. Aurangzeb considered it imperative that he should not be allowed to make a halt anywhere, and so he asked Prince Mohammad Sultan to pursue him with much speed. A large number of troops was placed under his command. The emperor stayed at Khajwā and held a darbar for conferring honours in the shape of promotions, cash, jewels, titles and permission to use drums according to the status and performance of each noble in the field of battle. Muazzam Khan, who had played an important role was confirmed in his former post and was awarded distinctions

1. Storia, II, p.329.

exceeding those of all others; he got the mansab of hafi nazari (7000 zat/7000 sawar) and a reward of 1,00,000 rupees in cash.

Before his departure for the capital on 14th January Aurangzeb appointed Muazzam Khan as ataliq of Mohammad Sultan, and he ordered other nobles to join him. Muazzam Khan immediately marched to the east and joined Prince Mohammad Sultan at Allahabad. Here they learnt of Shujā's entrenchment at Benares. They crossed the flooded Ganges and reached Chunar. When the unfortunate Shujā, who had an intention of raising an army to meet the imperialists, heard of this, he lost heart and fled from Bahādurpūr towards Patna. When the imperial army arrived at Benares, they found nothing but the deserted camp of the fugitive prince. They halted there for two days and then under the leadership of Muazzam Khan left for Patna.

After arriving at Patna Shujā wasted a few valuable days of his life in marrying his son Zainul Ābidīn with the daughter of an old officer named Zulfiqār Khan Qakānālū. Meanwhile, Muazzam Khan had arrived within 20 miles west of Patna. In sheer fright, Shujā marched towards Monghyr which

1. A.N., p.267; Life of Mir Juma, p.151; But according to Khwafi Khan, "Muazzam Khan was given a distinction over all others; he got an additional mansab 7000/7000 and his rank was thus raised to 12000" (See M.L., II, p.59), which seems to be rather improbable for no other historian either contemporary or later has mentioned this.

he reached on 19th February. The imperialists captured Patna on 22nd February and were joined by Fidaī Khan.¹

At Monghyr Shujā mounted the guns on the walls, posted the soldiers in the trenches and ordered Raja Bahrūz, the Zamindar of Kharagpur to guard the southern hills, so that the imperialists might not come through the difficult road which runs through it to Rājmaḥal. He also posted as pickets European gunners at some strategic points. Finding the road from Patna to Munghyr completely blocked, Muazzam Khan without loss of time decided to cut Shujā's communication in the rear. He won over Raja Bahrūz and under his guidance marched through the hills and jungles of Kharagpur making a detour round Monghyr.³ Thus betrayed by Raja Bahrūz and outflanked by the imperialists, Shujā was forced to leave Monghyr on March 6, and he halted beyond Telliāgarhī (Ranganatī mentioned in Alamgīr Nāmah)⁴ for 15 days from 10th March to 24th March. Here he spent his time in blocking the roads which runs through the plain. The Ganges protected his right while the hills of Rājmaḥal, stretching from the Ganges to Bīrbhūm blocked the left. He also sent one

1. A.N., p.493; Z.N.A., pp.91-92; E.F., I, X, p.280.

2. A.N., p.493; History of Aurangzeb, II, p.568.

3. A.N., p.492; Z.N.A., p.92; T.S., f.113b, Poem, 143-45; History of Aurangzeb, II, p.569.

4. A.N., p.495.

of his generals, named Isfandiār Khan Mamūrī to Khwājah Kamāl Afghan, the zamindar of Bīrbhūm and Chotanāgar asking him to prevent Muazzam Khan from making another detour, thus enabling him to fall on his left flank.¹

When Muazzam Khan was apprised of the defensive measure of Shujā, he very tactfully won over Khwājah Kamāl Afghan, the zamindar who showed the way as well as provided food and fodder while passing through his territory. On 28th March they passed through Suri, the chief town of Bīrbhūm.² But on the way to Akbar-nagar (Rajmahal) at Pālāpur when a rumour of Dārā's victory had reached there, some of the treacherous Rajputs like Kunwar Rām Singh, Rāo Bhād Singh and others deserted Muazzam Khan. Muazzam Khan did not waste his valuable time in dissuading or punishing the deserters because he had still about 25000 soldiers at his disposal. He advanced swiftly and steadily cutting off Shujā's retreat towards Dacca.³ On receipt of the report of the treachery of the Zamindar of Bīrbhūm and the advance of imperialists through his lands Shujā was completely upset. He x evacuated Ranganatī for Akbarnagar (Rajmahal) where he reached on 27th March. Meanwhile, the imperialists had turned to the north-east in order to cut off Shujā's passage to Dacca

1. A.N., p.496; Storia, I, p.334.

2. A.N., p. 497; Poem, 148-51; Tavernier, I, pp.272-73; T.S., 113b.

3. A.N., p.498; Poem, 151-53; T.S.; ff.115b-16b; Z.N.A., p.93.

through Ganges near Murshidābād, and reached Belghāta, 30¹ miles from Shujā's position.

On hearing that the imperialists had pitched their camp on the bank of the Ganges under the command of Muazzam Khan, Shujā called a council of war to consider new developments. On the advice of his supporters led by Mirza Jān Beg, Shujā decided to shift his family and headquarters to Tānda (4 miles west to the fort of Gaur) and to continue the struggle with the help of his powerful flotilla. So, he planned to cross the Ganges at Daghāchī,² but when he reached at the ferry on 1st April 1659, a sudden storm prevented his embarkation for three days. He stayed at Rajmahal and on 4th April, crossed the Ganges at Daghāchī and arrived at Fīrūzpūr with his family.

As soon as Muazzam Khan heard of the evacuation of Rajmahal by Shujā, he rushed to occupy the deserted city which the imperialists occupied on 13th April. Zulfiqār Khan was appointed its governor with an army of 5000 men. About 4000 of Shujā's soldiers failed to cross the river, and they returned to Rajmahal. They were induced by Zulfiqār Khan to join the imperial service. Thus, the whole country on the bank of the Ganges from Rajmahal to Hugli fell into the hands³ of the imperialists.

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1. Belghāta is about 2 miles west of Jānigpūr.
 2. A.N., pp.498-99; Z.N.A., p.94; T.S., f.116a; Poem, 153; E.F.I., I, p.281.
 3. A.N., p.501; T.S., ff.116a-b; Z.N.A., p.95; EPI, X, pp.281-83.

With the arrival of Shujā on the eastern bank of the Ganges and the capture of Rajmahal by the imperialists the war now entered ~~new~~ a new phase. The Ganges separated the rival armies and the conflict became a naval contest in which Shujā with his flotilla appeared to have the upper hand. His position was like that of an alligator while his opponent resembled a tiger.¹ The progress of the imperialists was impeded by the swift flowing river and they could not advance even an inch without a 'nawwara' or flotilla. Hence Muazzam Khan was in a fix. But he did not lose heart and faced the situation with courage and resourcefulness. Thanks to his untiring efforts within the brief interval of a fortnight he was able to assemble a few boats. Taking Prince Mohammad Sultan with him, he left for Daghāchī on April 14.

At Bāqarpūr, opposite bank of Daghāchī, Shujā's general Syed Qulī Khan, had entrenched his artillery, while Shujā himself was in the rear, keeping his flotilla ready to strike in front. There lay an island in the mid-stream; it commanded a strategic position. Muazzam Khan with his innate common sense grasped the importance of the island from the military point of view and he decided to capture it by night. With about 2000 men, some generals like Zulfiqar Khan, Fath Jung Lodī Khan, Sujān Singh Bundela crossed the river and captured the island. When in the morning Shujā heard of dare-devil

1. T.S., ff.116a-17b; L.N.A., p.95; E.F.I., X, pp.282-84.

venture of the imperialists, he ordered his soldiers to board the boats and force the enemy out of the island. But the attempt failed.¹

Muazzam Khan's next plan was to cross the river and to deliver a surprise attack on Shujā, but it was not possible with half a dozen of boats. So, he changed his plan and decided to post his entire army all along the western bank of Rajmahal upto Sūtī. Accordingly he posted Mohammad Murād Beg at Rajmahal in the extreme north, Prince Mohammad Sultan accompanied by Zulfiqār Khan and Islām Khan remained at Daghāchī, Alī Qulī Khan at Dunāpūr, 8 miles south of Daghāchī and he himself took his post at Sūtī at the head of six or seven thousand troops.

Muazzam Khan selected Sūtī because he was informed by some local men that there the river was narrow and easily fordable. Here he halted to prevent the crossing over of any boat or enemy to Shujā. He closed entirely all passages and ferries. Relying on the information which he had already received, Muazzam Khan attempted to cross the river, but failed due to sudden rise of water in the Ganges.²

During his stay at Sūtī, Muazzam Khan sent his officers even upto Hugli and Kasimbazar to collect boats and within a fortnight he was able to collect about a hundred

1. A.N., pp.501-03; T.S., f.118a; Poem, 154-62.

2. A.N., p.504; Poem, 165; Z.N.A., p.95; E.F.I., I, p.283.

boats of different types. On the first night Muazzam's men were unsuccessful in their attempt to cross the river, but better luck was in store for them when a strong wind began to blow and Shujā's men were off their guard. Muazzam Khan seized the opportunity. He despatched twenty imperial troopers and a party of his own retainers to cross the river. Shujā was dismayed at this surprise move of the imperialists. He sent for Nūrul Hasan from his post of duty because his negligence was mainly responsible for it.¹

Muazzam Khan relying on the reports of local men had underestimated the strength of Shujā who was more vigilant this time. He had appointed Syed Ālam Bārḥā (Khan-e-Ālam) with Montashim Khan in place of Nūrul Hasan. When in the night of 2nd May Muazzam Khan's men attacked Syed Ālam, they were repulsed. At dawn on 3rd May 73 boats of Muazzam Khan carrying about 2000 men started ferrying to the opposite bank of the river. But Shujā's men emerged from the ambush and launched a heavy attack on them. The imperialists suffered heavy casualties, about half of them were either drowned or slain and about 500 of them made prisoners. Some of them were afterwards put to death by order of Shujā.²

1. A.N., pp.504-05; T.S., 118; Poem, 165-66; E.F.I., X, pp. 283-84.

2. T.S., 119a-b; but according to Foster's letter from Kasimbazar dated May 8, 1659, "nearly 1000 of enemies were killed and the Jellers or large boats of Shuja helped him to win the war against the small boats of the enemies. (See E.F.I., II, p.284).

The cause of Muazzam Khan's failure has been wrongly indicated by some modern historians, who consider this attack as a fatal mistake on his part. They charge him with negligence and lack of foresight. But the author of 'Tarikh-e-Shahshahi' rightly observes that "this (move) was an act of wisdom and courage". Moreover, before taking this step Muazzam Khan had made local enquiries about his rival's resources. Mohammad Kazim rightly observes that Shujā was in an advantageous position with many of his fast moving boats while Muazzam Khan had only a few large boats. This statement is confirmed by the English Factory Records which say that the jellores or large boats of Shujā helped him to win the war¹ against the small boats of his enemy.

Muazzam Khan now decided to launch a fresh and more powerful attack on Shujā. But paucity of large boats was still a hurdle before him. He had become wiser after the last tragedy. So, he tried his best to collect as many boats as possible. He sent his agents in search of boatmen and carpenters to build new boats. And all big boats coming down the river were seized. Besides, he also wrote a letter to Daud Khan to recruit soldiers, collect boats and to march towards Bengal as speedily as possible. He further advised him to instruct Roxbhanī troops to cross the river Kosi

1. E.F.I., X, p.284.

under the command of Rashīd Khan and Chirāgh Bahādur.¹ Accordingly, Dāud Khan started from Patna on 13th May, at the head of 1500 cavalry and 2000 infantry.²

While Muazzam Khan was preoccupied with the preparations, Prince Mohammad Sultan deserted him in the dark and rainy night of 8th June 1659 A.D. and joined his uncle Shujā. There were various reasons for this volte face. Firstly, the prince was resentful of his secondary position, Muazzam Khan enjoyed vast powers and overshadowed and overruled him. Secondly, he was instigated by his youthful flatterers and his uncle to join him. Shujā sent him letters and presents and offered the hand of his daughter Gulrukh Bāno Begum. Lastly, Prince Mohammad Sultan had been thrown off his wits because of the receipt of letter from his father in which he had directed Muazzam Khan "that having heard that Sultan Mohammad had some secret communications with his uncle, Sultan Shujā, it was advisable that he should arrest his son and send him to court".³

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1. Poem, 172-74; A.N., 513. According to English Factory records Dāud Khan was commanded by Aurangzeb to cross the river at Patna and he marched along the northern bank in order to assail Shujā's right wing. EFI, X, p.285.
 2. Poem, 179; Pickering in his letter from Patna dated 16th May, writes that Daud Khan started at the head of 5000 horses; and Chamberlen in his letter dated 17th May states the date of departure as 17th May, EFI, X, p.285.
 3. Tavernier, I, p.361. Khwāfī Khan blaming Shujā for the bitter relations between Prince and Mir Jumlah, says; that Shujā conceived the idea of winning the Prince over his side by means of tricks and treachery which gain the feeling of young. M.L., II, p.90; J.P.H.S., XIII, pt.II, p.184.

The desertion of Prince Mohammad Sultan created a great uproar in the imperial camp at Daghāchī. But Muazzam Khan's skill as a leader and his presence of mind saved the imperial army from almost fatal consequences. As soon as he heard of the terrible incident, he rode from Sūtī to Daghāchī. He found the camp in utter disorder and despair. But he was not unnerved. It was not the first time that he had to face such a situation. He had before this, witnessed the treacherous conduct of Raja Jaswant Singh who not only abandoned the cause of his master but also looted and plundered the imperial camp. Without wasting any time, he summoned a council of war, created new hopes in the heart of his colleagues and all of them agreed to obey him. Leaving Fidaī Khan and Islam Khan at Daghāchī and Zulfiqār Khan at Rajmahal, he himself returned to Sūtī.

But outbreak of monsoon completely paralysed his military activity. So he ordered his men to go into cantonments. He also ordered his men to withdraw from the outposts of Daghāchī, Dūnāpur and Sūtī. He pitched his camp at Masūnbazar (Murshidabad) on a high tract of land having abundance of provisions. Zulfiqār Khan, Islam Khan and many others were posted at Rajmahal.

1. A.N., pp.512-13; Foen, 194-95; Z.N.A., pp.96-97.

With a view to starving out the imperialists Shujā sealed all means of communication with the city. He kept a strict watch on water with his flotilla mounted with artillery, so that no provisions could be sent by Muazzam Khan from Murshidābād, to Rajmahal. Besides, he threatened the traders and gave a free hand to freebooters to intercept all kinds of provisions and messages to the city. Edmond Foster in his letter to Davis dated 5th July 1659, says that Shujā had given a free hand to all zamindars of the country to rob merchants or soldiers of his money, good horses on condition that they would side with him. "Only what elephant they take they must return to him. The zamindars have begun already to stop the way between us and you, so that no merchants dare to pass with goods for fear of being taken from him, nor a peon can pass with a letter".¹ Thus as a consequence of such blockade, serious scarcity of food and fodder arose in the city of Rajmahal. Masūm, the Shujaite historian who was an eye witness gives a graphic description of this situation. He says:

"The flame of famine rose in such a way as if smoke came out of the earth and time.....and grain rose to the price of gold, coarse, red, bad smelling rice and daal sold at nine seers a rupee.....The difficulties of work

1. E.F.I., X, p.280.

and food have reached such a point that men, in search of rice are cutting their chests, but don't get it.....In the agony of hunger, men take morsels of poison.....price of rice seed is higher than that of a gem and a dish of seed is more use to me than a pearl in hand.....butchers sell meat at a rupee per seer and if the poor want to take meat, they have to take their (own) meat. If the mouth has seen any meat, it is the flesh of his lips.....In the shops dogs and cats are shrieking and cries of hungry men come out of mosques. The places of worships are deserted. The wine shops are without wine. There is no freshness in the garden of beauty, fire of love has lost its warmth. Worship yields¹ no fruit; sin results in nothing.

Both Aqil Khan and the Rozbihānī followers of Muazzam Khan have used similar expressions to point out the tragic state of affairs at Rajmahal. Scarcity of food and fodder created tremendous distress and disorder in the army of Muazzam Khan and it had no alternative but to evacuate the city of² Rajmahal.

Taking the advantage of the critical position of his enemy Shujā on 22nd August delivered a surprise attack on Rajmahal with his war boats. Zulfīqar Khan, due to his

1. T.S., ff.126a-30b.

2. A.N., pp.515-16; T.S. ff.126a-39a; Z.N.A., p.98; E.F.I., X, p.289.

illness could not resist it and though other generals like Islam Khan fought bravely, eventually all of them had to withdraw and retreat to Muazzam Khan. In this way Shujā recaptured Rajmahal and re-established his position on the western bank of the Ganges.¹ But during this heart-rendering crisis Muazzam Khan did not sit silent at his cars. He incessantly strove to clear the southern routes of Mugli and even the south west of Bengal.

Success at Rajmahal spurred the ambition of Shujā and he now decided to take the field against Muazzam Khan. He despatched Itibār Khan and Fidaī Khan against Daud Khan. Then he left Rajmahal via Dūnāpur, Daghāchi and Sūtī at the head of 12000 men and a strong flotilla. He reached Balāghat in two months and encamped very close to the camp of Muazzam Khan. The rival armies were separated from each other by a ² nalah. The battle started at about 1½ ³ prahars of the day. At first Muazzam Khan forced Shujā to retreat towards Rajmahal, but soon Prince Mohammad Sultan arrived to help Shujā. Upon this Muazzam Khan being a master strategist planned to encircle the enemy. He crossed the 'nalah' by the left bridge and thus arriving at the bank of Bhagirathi

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1. A.N., pp.516-19; T.S., 125b; Poem, 201-2; Tavernier, I, p. 275; E.F.I., X, pp. 289-90.
 2. A.N., pp.519-20; Z.N.A., p.99; T.S., f.131a; Poem, 326-31; E.F.I., X, p.298.
 3. Prahar or Pahar: A fourth part of the day and of the night.

(near the village Gheria) he surrounded enemy's rear command by Mir Isfandiyār ¹Maṣūmī. He opened his cannonade and rockets. Hearing of Muazzam's attack, Shujā and Mohammad Sultan hastened to the assistance of Maṣūmī. The battle lasted till one prahar of the night. Both sides were exhausted and reduced to sad plight. Shujā's general Isfandiyār was badly wounded. At last the rivals returned to their respective camps in a great distress and disorder.

Muazzam Khan did not think it advisable to destroy his men in fruitless skirmishes. So without wasting any more time he retired towards Murshidābād to wait for the reinforcement from the emperor. Near Nashipur (12 miles North of Murshidabad) for several days Muazzam Khan faced ~~the~~ Shuja's men. They wanted to cut off his line of retreat to Murshidabad. Meanwhile, as Muazzam Khan had anticipated, on the night of 26th December 1659, Shujā received the heart-breaking report from Itibār Khan in which he informed him of his inability to resist Dāud Khan.² Hence Shujā retreated towards Sūtī³ to cross the Bhagīrathī and thus reach Tanda.

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1. A.N., p.525; ~~Maṣūmī~~, the Shujaite historian says that if Shujā had charged forthwith Muazzam's position would have become worse (T.S., 133a-b). But Aqil Khan contradicting this statement says that Muazzam Khan surrounded Shuja in the village of Gheria and could have captured him if he had boldly attacked in the night. Z.N.A., pp. 99-103.
 2. A.N., pp. 524-26; T.S., ff.133b-34a; Poem, 347-48.
 3. A.N., p.526; Z.N.A., p.101; T.S., f.134a; Poem, 342.

Muazzam Khan had been waiting for this opportune moment. He dashed in the pursuit of Shujā. Covering a distance of three miles, he overtook Shujā on December 27 near a nalah. From morning till evening there was a continuous discharge of cannons and muskets from either side. Fortunately, for Muazzam Khan and unfortunately for Shujā, reinforcements came from the emperor which strengthened imperialists. On 28th December Shujā fled towards Sūtī. Muazzam Khan was close at his heels. He encamped half a mile beyond Sūtī facing Shah Shujā's men who were at Chilmārī.¹ For four days there was exchange of fire between the two parties. Meanwhile Mūrul Hasan deserted Shujā's side and came over to Muazzam Khan. Finding himself in a hopeless position and unable to cross the river in the night of January 1, 1660, Shujā fled towards Dūnāpur and then to Daghāchī in a great haste.² But Muazzam Khan gave him a hot pursuit, though in the way he was delayed by bad roads, nalah and damaged bridges.

Reaching Daghāchī Muazzam Khan entrenched his light guns and ordered his generals to wait till the arrival of heavy artillery. Meanwhile, Shah Shujā's men turned round behind the nalah of Daghāchī and opened a fire from their heavy artillery against the enemy. But Muazzam Khan was

1. A.N., pp.526-28; Poem, 359-60.

2. A.N., pp.528-30.

determined not to allow the enemy a chance to escape. He kept them pre-occupied. Shortly after, the expected heavy artillery arrived. It was put into action at once. About mid-night both the armies retired to their camps. Next day on 2nd January, Muazzam Khan marched towards Rajmahal while Shujā was marching parallel to him on the other side of the river. But Muazzam Khan according to his pre-conceived plan, reached the city of Rajmahal on 11th January 1660 A.D. and thus the entire country west of the Ganges was lost to Shujā¹ for ever. Now Muazzam Khan had to crush Shujā's power on the eastern side of the Ganges.

During his stay at Rajmahal Muazzam Khan posted officers in every paraganah and Chaklah² and set up new thanas³ between Daghachi and Suti⁴. In the meantime Diler Khan with 2500 Afghans and Daud Khan with a large number of troops joined him. In addition, he also received seventeen lacs of rupees from the emperor. Now he planned to cross the Ganges 10 miles above Rajmahal and to encircle the Shujāits. After crossing the narrow stream on 15th January by a bridge of boats which had been brought by Daud Khan's

1. A.N., pp. 831-32; Z.N.A., p.103; T.S., f.134a; E.F.I., X, p.298.

2. Chaklah: A territorial sub-division.

3. Thanas: Military Stations.

4. A.N., pp. 832-34; T.S., ff.134a-b.

son Sheikh ¹Ḥamid, and there crossing the second stream on 17th January, he reached Sandah.

At Sandah Shujā was waiting with a large army to give battle to Muazzam Khan. He planned to send Mohammad Sultan against Diler Khan and Dāud Khan across the Mahānanda river. But rapid movement of Muazzam Khan and his arrival at Sandah on 17th January, upset his plan and he had to recall his troops. Even then he found it difficult to fight imperialists in the open, and so he decided to decentralise resistance all along with the Mahānanda river under the leadership of Syed Taj and Khwajah Miskī.¹ But they failed to bar the passage of the imperialists and the latter succeeded in crossing the Mahānanda river in three days (1st February to 3rd February).²

Shuja was waiting for the rainy season. But Muazzam Khan was not prepared to give respite to the enemy. He crossed Sandah on an elephant on February 4 and next day he despatched Syed Salār Khan towards Mālda to encircle Shujā and block his retreat towards south, because west and north were already blocked. Upon this Shujā ordered his nephew Prince Mohammad Sultan to go to Tanda from where he slipped off to his father's side.

1. A.N., pp.534-37; Poem, 380-84.

2. When Syed Taj and Khwajah Miskī went to Shujā and informed him about their failure, Shujā said, "Never have I been successful against Mir Jumla even when the latter had a numerically inferior force. What success have I won before, that now I may hope to drive him out of any country? Now the entire force of Aurangzeb is with him" (Poem, 388).

The desertion was the result of Muazzam Khan's trick. He wrote a fictitious letter to the prince, a device often used by his master Aurangzeb. This letter forced Mohammad Sultan to rejoin the imperial side. Manucci writes that "Meanwhile Mir Jumla employed a stratagem. He prepared a letter to Sultan Mohammad in which he desired him to continue as he was doing until occasion arose to fulfil his promise to his father. As intended by Muazzam Khan, the letter fell into the hands of Shah Shujā, it shocked and frightened him. He forbade the Prince to enter the palace though Prince Mohammad Sultan tried hard to remove the suspicion from Shujā's mind, and 'ratified fresh oath to serve him faithfully'". But he failed to secure Shujā's confidence who apprehended that Mohammad Sultan would betray him at a critical moment and would return to his father's camp. Thus, finding himself out of favour, Prince Mohammad Sultan secretly opened negotiation with Islam Khan who was entrenched on the other side of Tanda. Meantime, Syed Alam returned from Dacca and the drums which were sounded in his honour, offended the prestige of the Prince who felt it humiliating to stay there any more.¹ Eventually in the evening of 8th February,

1. He angrily remarked: "From the time of Timur till now, drums have not been sounded for anyone (except for the members of royal blood); my heart rages with fury; let me go to my father; better even if he slays me than cherish anger amongst such generals". (Poem, 407).

he took a boat on a pretext of fishing and in the darkness of night he slipped to the camp of Islam Khan at Daghachi.¹

As soon as Muazzam Khan heard news of prince's arrival, at the imperial camp, he forthwith returned from the eastern bank of the Mahananda river to Sandah on 12th Feb. and summoned the prince to his presence. On his arrival, Muazzam Khan welcomed the unfortunate prince by offering presents, ordering the drums to be beaten in his honour and also consoled him by promising that he will write to his father (Aurangzeb) requesting him to overlook his past conduct and he acted up to his words. When the emperor learnt of the whole affair he expressed his pleasure and praised the faithfulness and loyalty of his commander-in-chief and commended his tact in bringing back the prince to the imperial camp. Orders were issued to send the prince to court escorted by Fida'i Khan.² Muazzam Khan acted accordingly and on 29th February sent the prince to the capital.

1. A.N., pp.542-43; Poem, 407-8; Tavernier, I, 361; A.S., III, p.328; M.U., Eng.Tr., II, 196. On hearing the prince's desertion Shuja said, "A prince does not flee away, even if he is under a sharp sword; this does not befit a prince; if me? I myself would have arranged for his going with stores, treasures, and materials. I think that Sultan has fled because of fear of imprisonment at my hands, but have I not given my daughter to him, there is no one to help me. Even whom I benefit turns into my foe.....how he deceives me". (Poem, 414-15).

2. A.N., pp.544, 546; A.S., III, p.328; M.A., pp.30, 33; Poem, 407-9; 416-23, 427-34; Z.N.A., pp.103-4; Storia, I, 337-38; Bernier, p.83; Tavernier, I, p.363; M.U., Eng.Tr., II, p.196; Elliot & Dowson, VII, p.251.

Now Muazzam Khan planned to encircle Shujā from all sides and to block the latter's retreat to the south. He decided to force a passage across the Mahānanda river, while Buland Akhtar and Syed Alam were guarding the right bank of the river. He came to know from the local zamindars that the river was fordable in its lower course near Baghlāghā which commanded the direct route of supply to Shujā's camp. He decided to cut it off and he (Muazzam Khan) appointed Diler Khan, who on 27th February 1660 A.D. at the head of 15000 soldiers, advanced towards Baghlāghāt. When the latter reached there, Shah Shujā's troops opened fire on him, but they were repulsed. Buland Akhtar and Syed Alam were witnessing the contest from the other side of the river and the former reported to his father that Diler Khan after defeating his men had captured the place. Hearing this a sad news, Shujā ordered his men to keep a strict watch over Diler Khan's movements so that he might not cross the river and capture Sandah because it would mean the annihilation of his army and the loss of his kingdom.²

Seeing Shujā's forces had concentrated near Sandah, Muazzam Khan made a detour to the eastern bank of the river (Mahānanda). He crossed it on 29th February and proceeded towards Mālā (2nd March) where Diler Khan was encamping

1. A.N., p.544; T.S., f.160b.

2. A.N., pp.545-47; Poem, 435-39.

while Buland Akhtar was guarding the other side of the river.¹ On 6th March Muazzam Khan reached Mahmudābād. He kept the enemy busy and ordered Daud Khan to find a passage to cross the Kalindī in the face of Shujā's entrenchment. While, Shujā was prolonging the conflict till rainy season, the imperialists were keen to finish it before its advent. But Shujā was frustrating the attempts of the latter.² Meanwhile, Diler Khan with the help of a local chief discovered an obscure ill-guarded ford about four miles below Baghlāghāt, and immediately sent information about it to the Commander-in-Chief (Muazzam Khan). On 5th April Muazzam Khan at the head of ten to twelve thousand troops started from Mahmudābād and picked up Diler Khan from Baghlāghāt and reached the ford at dawn. Shujā was unaware of the movements of 'the great strategist' (Muazzam Khan) but his men moved forward and positioned their guns against the imperialists, but they failed to check the enemy. Thus, Muazzam Khan and his men were able to ford the river in spite of the opposition of Buland Akhtar and Syed.³ Buland Akhtar fled to Tanda and Syed Alam marched to the outpost of Mirdāpur to join ill-starred master Shah Shujā who was facing Daud Khan on the opposite bank. Thus finding himself

1. A.N., pp.547-48; Poem, 435-39.

2. A.N., p.548; T.S., ff.160a-b; Z.N.A., p.103.

3. A.N., pp.548-51; F.A., ff.47a-b; T.S., f.161a.

surrounded¹ him from three sides and being left with no other way to escape, except crossing the river, Shujā hurriedly called Mirza Jan Beg for consultation. He was advised to take to precipitate flight to avoid humiliation and capture. Accordingly, having set out for his camp after the dusk, he started for Tanda where his family was staying.¹ At the dawn of 6th April, he reached Tanda in a great hurry and without tarrying there started on his last journey with his family and a few followers.

Hearing that Shujā was on flight towards Dacca Muazzam Khan attempted to bar his path and seized some of loaded boats of the prince who narrowly escaped capture. He was hotly chased by the enemy. At Tartipur, they captured two gharabs loaded with treasure and at Sherpur and Nazarahati, Lodi Khan captured 30 boats of Shujā's flotilla. Thus, Shujā arrived at Dacca "bankrupt in fame and fortune". But Muazzam Khan with his famous generals like Diler Khan, Daud Khan, Rashid Khan and many others was speedily moving to capture him.² Thus, even Dacca could not provide him a haven of safety and so Shujā decided to cross into Arakan from where he intended to go to Persia via Arabia in the hope of getting every kind of aid from the Shia ruler against his Sunni brother

1. A.N., p.552; T.S., ff.161a; Poem, 472.

2. A.N., pp.554-55; Z.N.A., p.104; Poem, 475-77.

Aurangzeb. He sent his messenger to the ruler of Arakan requesting him to provide him shelter. But the swift movement of Muazzam Khan who determined not to allow a moment's rest to Shujā, left no other alternative for him except that of taking boat for Arakan,¹ without waiting for the reply of his letter. Consequently, on 6th May 1660 he bade farewell to his eastern capital, where he had ruled nearly twenty springs and passed the golden days of his life and he sailed for Arakan. When Muazzam Khan reached (on 9th May) the outskirts of Decca, he found some war materials and stores which had been left there by the fugitives. They were sent to the emperor. Thus, Muazzam Khan whom his master had assigned the task of Shujā's pursuit, very successfully completed it by driving² out Shujā³ from Bengal for all time to come.

On receipt of this happy news on 24th May the emperor ordered festivities in celebration of the event. Later on, on Sunday 16th Zilqad 1070 A.H./15th July 1660 the 44th lunar birthday the emperor issued a firman appointing

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1. Storia, I, p.370; Tavernier, I, p.367; Careri, p.229; Catrou, p.272; Z.N.A., p.104.
 2. A.N., p.561; M.U., Eng.Tr., II, p.197; M.A., p.18.
 3. Mohammad Saleh Kambū writing in 1671 states that, "Upto this time none knows anything about Shujā's fate in Arakan. It is utterly unknown in what country he is and what he is doing, or whether he has been sent to the realm of dead". (A.S., III, p.328). And later, Khwafi Khan writes: "In Arakan all traces of Shujā disappeared, none (in India) gets any sign of him".

Muazzam Khan governor of Bengal which had a different climate.....and was without administrative control'. The appointment was made with a purpose as is evident from the following extract from the firman:

".....Praise be to God, that the expedition to Bengal has been successfully completed according to the emperor's wishes through your exertion and management.... His Majesty has learnt that Bengal is without government and control, and that therefore, a man capable of regulating the country should be appointed its viceroy. The fact of the absence of administration, carelessness and incapacity of the man ignorant of truth who was so many years in that kingdom, is not concealed (from His Majesty). In the circumstances how could the country be governed especially as disorder increased the misfortune and in every district, a lawless man raised his head in tumult.....¹ At the time of giving you leave for the uprooting of that luckless man (Shuja) there was a talk of entrusting the viceroyalty of Bengal to you and you had, out of your devotion to me, said that if the viceroyalty of that place were entrusted to you, the men deputed with you would not co-operate with you and obey you and would imagine that your efforts to wrest the country (from Shuja) were due to your self interest. Therefore, this matter had been kept in abeyance. Now that,

through God's grace, the whole of that kingdom; which is one of the largest provinces of the protected empire and the residence of famous princes has come into the possession of the imperial government none but you can govern it properly. Therefore, I graciously entrust the governorship of Bengal to you. Your character which is an evident proof of your peaceful nature, your love of cherishing the peasantry, your tact dealing with the people and love of justice¹".

On this occasion the high title of Khan-e-Khanan and Sipah-salar was conferred on Muazzam Khan and his mansab was raised to 7000 zat and 7000 sawar, out of which 5000 troopers are made 'do asnah' and 'seh asnah'.² All the mahals which were assigned to the former governors of the Bengal as jagir picked and productive — were likewise given to him. In addition, the emperor fixed one Crore of dam as his pay and sent to him a gorgeous robe of honour, 10 Iraqi and Arab horses each of which had been picked from amongst horses in the imperial stables. Besides horses, two elephants - one male and other female was also given to

1. F.A., 49a.

2. A.N., p.563; M.A., p.32; M.U., Eng.Tr., II, p.197. But according to Isardas Nagar only 3000 troopers were made.

Do asnah: A trooper with two horses.

Seh asnah: A trooper with three horses.

him. He was told that if he found the mahals of his jagir to be unsatisfactory, he might ask for any other parzanah which he would like to have in lieu thereof. Besides, he was given a jewelled waist-band and a dagger with a handle¹ of jasper. Aurangzeb asked Muazzam Khan to devote himself to the happiness of the inhabitants, security of travellers and safety of the frontiers which were disturbed by lawless-men and freebooters. He was directed to equip his artillery, and to arrange a nauhara which was an absolute necessity for punishing the lawless zamindars especially those of Assam and Magh.²

The illness of the emperor Shahjahan and consequent race for power among his sons necessitated the absence of Shuja from his province at frequent intervals. In the circumstances Bengal became a scene of anarchy and confusion. Its administration was on the brink of collapse. Taking advantage of such a situation the Koch Raja Pran Narayan³ stopped payment of tribute. He not only declared himself independent but made a series of raids into Ghoraghat region. He plundered it and carried away a large number

1. Ibid.

2. F.A., 50a; E.F.I., XI, p.79.

3. In the Alamgir Namah, he is called "Bhim Narain" (See A.N., p.676). Blochmann, in his analysis of the 'Fathiyah-i-Ibriva', calls this king Bhim Narayan, but he notes that some manuscripts have also Pem Narayan (Pem Narayan). There can be no doubt that the

of prisoners. He then sent his wazir Bhavanāth¹ with a large army with the object of conquering Kāmrūp, including Nājo and Gauhātī.² Jaidhava, the raja of Assam, advanced towards Kāmrūp. The Mughal faujdār³ of Kāmrūp, Mir Lutfullah Shīrāzī finding himself exposed to attack from two sides and not hopeful of getting timely succour hurriedly boarded a boat and retired to Jahāngīr Nagar (Decca).⁴ Kāmrūp now became the apple of discord between the Koches and Ahoms. The Ahoms attacked the Koches at Nājū and Akrungkusī and at both the places the latter were defeated. Thus Ahoms captured Kāmrūp and also Mausa⁵ Kārībārī which is only five stages from Jahāngīr Nagar.⁶ They established a garrison at the village Matsilah,⁷ near Kārībārī and from there they opened raids. They pulled down edifices, destroyed cultivation and ruined the entire kingdom.⁸

It was the state of affairs in which Muazzam Khan ~~Khan-e-Khanan~~, the newly appointed governor of Bengal was

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1. It is Bhola-nath in Alangīr Nāmāh (See A.N., p.678).
 2. A.N., pp.676-78; R.S., pp.222-23; M.U., Eng.Tr., II, p.197.
 3. Faujdār: The military commander of a sub-division of the province or the military governor of a district.
 4. A.N., pp.676-78; R.S., pp.222-23; M.U., Eng.Tr., II, p.197.
 5. Mausa: Village.
 6. A.N., p.678.
 7. It is Mastisilah in Alangīr Nāmāh (p.679) and Matsilah in Riyāz-us-Salātin (p.223).
 8. A.N., p.679; R.S., p.223.

asked by the emperor Aurangzeb to punish the daring raiders and restore peace and order. But before undertaking his campaign to Kūch Bihar and Assam, the Khan-e-Khanan made a number of administrative arrangements in Bengal. He continued Mukhlis Khan as the governor of Akbarnagar (Rajmahal); Mhtishām Khan was placed incharge of Bengal administration at Jahāngīr Nagar (Dacca) with Bhagawatī Dass as his diwan, Mohammad Muqīm was deputed to supervise the nawāra (at Dacca) and Mīr Ghāzī¹ was appointed paymaster and news-writer (Waqya nawīs).

On the 1st November 1661, the Khan-e-Khanan started from Jahāngīr Nagar, with ten to twelve thousand cavalry, a huge infantry and a powerful flotilla of war boats.² Here, he showed his strategical talents in selecting the march-route through an obscure and neglected highway avoiding the two better known roads. The author of 'Ālamgīr Nāmah' records that at the time three land routes lay to Kūch Bihar, the first was via Murang, the second via Doars and the third was via Ghoraghāt, or Rangpur.³ But before taking any hasty and risky decision the Khan-e-Khanan sent his men to ascertain which route would be best. Then, he chose the Ghoraghat

1. A.N., p.679; R.S., p.223.

2. A.N., p.683; Besides navy, Muazzam Khan had 20,000 efficient cavalry and numerous infantry. (See R.S., p.224). He employed many Europeans in his navy. (E.F.I., X, 193, XI, p.70).

3. Ibid.

route through which he pushed on his forces by land, sending out another force by the water on war-vessels, so that these two forces may afford cover to each other.¹

On 13th December 1661, the imperial army reached the foot of al.² Disembarking there they commenced a difficult march through jungles. Reaching a place three stages from the capital, the Khan-e-Khanan heard the news of the Raja's flight to the Bhutan hills, and of his wazir Bhavanāth seeking shelter in the dense forests of Murang.³ On the 19th December 1661, the Khan-e-Khanan reached the capital and occupied it without any opposition. Though the city was captured, the Khan-e-Khanan forbade the usual practice of plundering and ravagery of the conquered territory. He assured the people protection of their honour and property. This politic and generous move of the Khan-e-Khanan created a place for him in the hearts of Kuch Behar people including Bishan Narāyan, the fugitive raja's son. He came to the royal camp and was honoured with a Khilat.⁴

Before his departure from the place, the Khan-e-Khanan made elaborate arrangements for the administration of the conquered territory. He set aside the administrative

1. Ibid.

2. Al: Embankment.

3. A.N., pp.693-94; R.S., pp.224-25.

4. Ibid; A History of the Mughal North Eastern Frontier Policy by S.N. Bhattacharyya, p.306.

set up of the Raja and introduced there the Mughal system because now the country had become a part of the Mughal empire. Isfandiyyār Beg, now entitled Khan, was appointed officiating fauldar of the region, with 400 cavalry and 1000 match-lockmen till the arrival of the permanent incumbent Askar Khan, Qāzī Samū was appointed diwan and many other similar appointments were made. The Capital was renamed as Ālāmgīrnagar after the honoured name of Ālāmgīr Padshah. He also had the Khutha read and the coins struck¹ in the name of the emperor.

After his signal success in Kūch Bihar, Muazzam Khan Khan-e-Khanan decided to march against the king of Assam Jaidhvaj, who had challenged the Mughal prestige and power by crossing the western boundary of Assam into the Mughal Kāmṛūp and plundering the neighbouring Mughal territories. On the 4th January 1662, the Khan-e-Khanan advanced towards the bank of the Brahmaputra, where he reached five days later. He ordered the army to march slowly by clearing with the help of elephants, jungles along the bank of the river, remaining in close contact with the fleet. In this way the progress was not more than 2½ kos (5 miles) per day.² Diler Khan, his eldest general commanded the van, Mīr Murtazā was the darogha of the artillery, while

1. A.N., p.694; R.S., p.225.

2. A.N., pp.694-96; M.U., Eng.Tr., II, p.199.

the fleet was incharge of Ibn Musain, assisted by Jamāl Khan, Munawwar Khan and others. When they reached at Rangamati, Rashīd Khan who had been sent earlier with a detachment, joined them. Then the whole army advanced and halted 5 miles west of Jogighopa, 40 kos from Gauhati, on 17th January 1662. Describing the fort of Jogighopa, the author of Fathiyah-e-Ibriya writes: "It is a large and high fort on the Brahmaputra. Near it the enemy had dug many holes for the horses to fall into, and pointed pieces of bamboo (panjis) had been stuck in the holes. Behind the holes for about half a shot's distance, an even ground, they had made a ditch and behind this ditch, near the fort, another one, three yards deep. The latter was also full of bamboos. This is how the Ahom fortify all their position. They make their forts of mud. The Brahmaputra is in the South of the fort and in the east of the Monas". Even then, the Assamese failed to offer any stubborn resistance and they beat a hasty retreat to Srīghāt. The fort of Jogighopa, and the fort of Panch Ratan were occupied by the Mughals.

Leaving Ataulah as the fauldar of Jogighopa, the Khan-e-Khanan continued his march, and on the 4th February, 1662 entered the environs of Srīghāt. The Ahom King attempted to check the further advance of the imperial army, but

1. A.N., pp.694-96; M.U., Eng.Tr., II, p.199; Purani Assam Buranjī, p.121.

he was defeated,¹ and fled across the Brahmaputra to fort of Kajli. After capturing Srīghāt, the Khan-e-Khanan moved a Kos (2 miles) south and reoccupied Gauhati, the capital of the Mughal Kamrup and halted there for two days. Meantime, the imperialists moving along the south bank of Brahmaputra, captured the fort of Pāndu² which lay opposite to Srīghāt. From there, they advanced towards Kajli which lay 7 Kos (4 miles) east of Pāndu, and occupied it. After giving the charge of the place to Hasan Beg, the thanahdar,³ they returned and joined the main army at Gauhati.

Thus, Muazzam Khan Khan-e-Khanan succeeded in recovering the whole of Kamrup from the hands of the Ahoms and restored the Mughal authority there. After this the Raja of Barrang offered submission to the Khan-e-Khanan. Leaving Mohammed Beg as the fauldar of Gauhati, the Khan-e-Khanan set out for Garhgaon, the Ahom capital. Half way of Sandhara⁴ the whole army crossed the river (Brahmaputra) and moved towards Simlāgarh. In the way Raja of Dimarua sent his nephew with tribute to attend upon the Khan-e-Khanan and to apologise for his absence on account of sickness.

1. Ibid.

2. Purani Assam Duranji, p.121.

3. Thanahdar: Incharge of the 'thanah'.

4. A.N., pp.704-28; M.U., Eng.Tr., II, p.200.

Having suffered repeated defeats at the hands of the Khan-e-Khanan, the Ahom king (Jaidhvaj) gathered all his officers and soldiers at Sandhara, the key of his kingdom. He fully garrisoned the forts of Sandhara and Simlāgarh (which lay opposite to Sandhara) to defend his dominion. On the 20th February 1662 A.D., the Khan-e-Khanan, reached the vicinity of Simlāgarh and pitched his camp on the bank of a nahā. After five days halt in which they made strenuous attempts, the imperialists eventually succeeded in reaching the fort-wall. On 25th February, they delivered their final thrust. The Assamese fled precipitately without taking their guns and other war materials, which fell into the hands of the victors. Next day, on the 26th February the victorious Khan-e-Khanan entered the fort of Simlāgarh.¹ Hearing the news of the fall of Simlāgarh, the Assamese at Sandhara lost heart and fled without offering any resistance. The Khan-e-Khanan occupied the fort of Sandhara and appointed Syed Mirza Shahzawari as the 'thanahdar'. He was to be assisted by Syed Tātār and Raja Kishin Singh. From Sandhara, he reached to Kālībār and there too, he strictly forbade plunder, and the villagers brought supplies freely. After three days halt he resumed his march, leaving Syed Nāsiruddīn as the lanidār of Kālībār. From there, the Moghal army had to

1. Ibid; M.U., Eng. Tr., II, p.200.

move away from the bank on account of the hills skirting the river Brahmaputra. This was a golden opportunity for the Assamese and they attempted to destroy the imperialists. But their attempt failed and they fled for life. The Khan-e-Khanan's men succeeded in capturing over 400 Assamese war-vessels with numerous guns, armaments and stores. It was the most decisive battle in the whole campaign of Muazzam Khan. The Ahom's navy had been captured in full and now he could easily reach the Ahom capital.¹

With the defeat of Kālīabār, the Assamese lost courage and gave up the idea of meeting the Mughals in an open fight. Therefore, the Khan-e-Khanan reached Salagarh and captured the fortress without any opposition. Here, he received the overtures of peace from Jaidhvaj Singh, the Ahom Raja. But all of them were rejected on suspicion of their being tricks for causing delay and gaining time as well as for throwing him off his guard.

From Salagarh, the Khan-e-Khanan marched to Lakhua-garh arriving there on 9th March, 1662 A.D. Leaving Ibn Hasan there, he started his triumphant march further passing Debargaon (reached on 13th March), Gajpūr (on 15th March), Trimuhānī (on 16th March). Finally on 6th Sha'ban 1072² A.H/17th March 1662 A.D., he entered Garhgaon, the capital

1. A.N., pp.711-15; Storia, II, pp.98-99; Assam Buranji, p.20; Purani Assam Buranji, p.122.

2. A.N., pp.719-28; M.U., Eng.Tr., II, p.200; M.A., p.40; Purani Assam Buranji, pp.123-24; History of Assam, p.134.

of Assam and captured 82 elephants, about 3 lacs of specie in gold and silver, 675 big guns, more than 9100 matchlocks and small guns, a large quantity of gun powder and raw materials, 1000 war vessels, 173 store houses of rice, each containing 10 to 1000 maunds of rice. The Khutba was recited¹ and the coins struck in the name of the emperor.

Hearing about this great victory of Muazzam Khan, Aurangzeb graciously issued a firman full of praises, awarding him a special khilat, the tuman tugh and reward of one crore dam (Rs. 2½ lacs).² In fact, it was a unique success of Muazzam Khan Khan-e-Khanan. Never before "had it been possible for the keys of the genius of the Indian princes to unlock that bewitched land, and whenever previously an army had penetrated there it had been captured or slain at the hands of these rebels, but the Khan-e-Khanan by virtue of his skill and courage succeeded in occupying the distant and vast country fortified with so many strong fort and fortresses".

The rainy season was fast approaching. The Khan-e-Khanan at first intended to spend it at Lakhanu but three days continuous downpour indicated early commencement of

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1. Fathiya-e-Ibriya, p.75; Alangirnāmah gives slightly different figures, e.g., 100 elephants, 208 battering guns etc. (See A.N., pp.727-28).
 2. A.N., pp.740-41; M.A., p.40; M.U., Eng. Tr., II, p.201.

the monsoon and it became impossible to transport the booty in time. Therefore, he resolved to encamp at Mathurāpūr, a village at the foot of hills, $3\frac{1}{2}$ kos (7 miles) south-east of Garghaon and proposed to spend the rainy season there. Before leaving the Ahom capital of Garghaon, he made certain administrative arrangements. He gave the charge of Garghaon to Mir Murtazā (with Raja Amar Singh and others) with instructions to despatch the captured cannon and booty to Jahāngīr Nagar. Syed Mohammad was appointed as diwan. He also established many outposts for the protection of the borders.¹

Reaching Mathurāpūr, the Khan-e-Khanan established many outposts around the region. He posted Mīna Khan at Salpānī, Ghazi Khan at Deopānī and Jalāl Khan to protect the banks of Dihing river.² Thus he set up a chain of fortified posts from Gauhati upwards, all along the Brahmaputra.³ When the rains set in the rivers over-flowed their banks and the whole area became flooded. The Assamese who lay concealed and were waiting for the opportunity became active especially at night. As the Mughal outposts were isolated and the movement of land forces had become impossible, the Khan-e-Khanan had no other alternative than to wait patiently for the end of rainy season.

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1. A.N., p.736; Fathiya-e-Ibriya, pp.75-86; H.S., p.226; History of Assam, p.135; A History of the Mughal North Eastern Frontier Policy, p.333.
 2. Ibid.
 3. The whole Dakhinkul and portions of Uttarkul were subdued by the imperialists. (A.N., p.736).

In the middle of the month the rains began to decrease, the flood subsided and the long-lost contact with the fleet was now re-established. By the end of Rabi-ul-Awwal 1073 A.H./October 1662 A.D., the boats of provisions also arrived at the Mughal camp. The Khān-e-Khānān now resumed the offensive and decided to retaliate on his enemy; he sent out detachments to all sides. They drove away the Assamese before them like sheep before the wolf. The Ahom Raja Jaidhavaaj Singh with a few nobles again fled to the hills of Nāmārūp and made overtures for peace. But the Khān-e-Khānān did not accede to his request and marched towards Nāmārūp.

Meanwhile, the Khān-e-Khānān, fell seriously ill and his health began to decline fast. His soldiers were tired, their courage was waning. Some of them even contemplated to go away to Bengal should the Khān-e-Khānān decide to prolong his stay for extirpating the Rājā. They were reluctant to wait any further in the pestilential climate of Nāmārūp. When the Khān-e-Khānān learned of their intentions, he was much grieved. Meanwhile the Rājā renewed his peace overtures and requested Diler Khan to mediate on his behalf. Finding himself in a critical situation and his men on the point of deserting him, the Khān-e-Khānān thought it discreet to accept peace with honour on the following terms:

1. There is a controversy regarding the exact terms of this treaty. Kathiyava-e-Ibriva and Alonair Namah only gives us details of the peace terms. It is corroborated by some of the Assame Chronicles. Bernier and Manucci are silent about the terms.

- 1) That the Ahom Raja and the Tipan Raja would each send a daughter to the imperial haram.
- 2) That the Ahom Raja would deliver immediately a war indemnity of 20000 tolas of gold, 120000 tolas of silver (six times of gold), 20 elephants for the emperor, 15 for the Khan-e-Khanan and 5 for Diler Khan.
- 3) That the Raja would send 300,000 tolas of silver and 90 elephants within 12 months as the balance of indemnity.
- 4) That the Raja would send six sons of the chief nobles as hostages, pending compliance with the above mentioned conditions.
- 5) That the Raja would send 20 elephants annually.
- 6) That the Darrang in Uttarkul bounded by Gauhati on the west and the Bharali river on the east and in Dakhinkul Beltala and Damarua, were to be ceded to the Mughals.
- 7) Finally, that the Raja would release all prisoners including the family of Baduli Pukhan.

The treaty was concluded and on the 10th Jamādī-us-Sanī 1073 A.H./10th January, 1663 A.D. and the Khan-e-Khanan ordered his men to return to Bengal. On Thursday 22nd Jamādī-us-Sanī 1073 A.H./the 22nd January, he arrived at

Lakhna in a palanquin. From Lakhau, he went to Kālīmbār by boat, and thenceby palanquin reached Kajlī and had a rest for few days. On 13th Rajab 1073 A.H./Wednesday 11th February, he left Kajlī and arrived at Pandu opposite Gauhātī. From there he sent Rashīd Khan as the fauldar of Gauhātī. At this time his condition became hopeless. Though a number of physicians were in attendance upon him none of them was able to give him any relief. So, he was compelled to give up his projected expedition to Kuch Bihar (which the Raja had recovered). He deputed Askar Khan to reconquer it and he himself started for Khizarpur. His ailment worsened and before his boat could reach there, he breathed his last within 2 kos (4 miles) of Khizarpur on 2nd Ramzan, 1073 A.H./30th March 1663 A.D. (Masnad Ara-e-Bahisht).¹

All his life Muazzam Khan had to contend with the enemies of the emperor Aurangzeb in the eastern region and he passed his time in camps and finished his career as a general. He could never get an opportunity to extract himself from the difficult campaigns nor did the emperor ever give an opportunity to him to display his talents as Wazir. Though he was Wazir he never returned to the capital to sit in the Dīwan. During his absence the work of Dīwan-e-

1. M.A., p.44; A.H., p.812; R.S., p.226.

Alzarat was looked after by Rai Raghunath. And yet his achievements were of no mean order. He was cast in the same mould as his master, the emperor. He was thoroughly loyal to him and was ever ready to sacrifice everything in the service of the emperor. Unlike other officers of that time, he was never charged or suspected of making money by foul means and in this respect his character was spotless. True, he had played foul with the Qutb Shah but he did it to preserve his own self. And this is the only blot on his otherwise spotless character. There is no doubt that he was an excellent general and a successful administrator.

CHAPTER - III

J A ' F A R K H A N

Ja'far Khan was the son of Mir Bakshi Sadiq Khan¹ and the grandson of Āqā Tāhir Wasī from his father-side and Itmād-ud-daulah from his mother-side. Nothing is known about his date of birth and early life except that he was related to the royal family. From his infancy he was a special object of royal favours and was liked for his devotion and faithful service. When he attained the age of maturity he was married to Farzāna Begum (Muntāz's sister) commonly known Bibī Jiu, one of the daughters of Yamīn-ud-daulah Āsaf Khan. This matrimonial relationship with the royal family proved very beneficial to him and he came to be regarded as a prince of blue blood.

He constantly enjoyed favour of the emperor Shah-jahan, who raised his status and position by paying frequent visits to his house. When Ja'far Khan's father (Sadiq Khan, the Mīr Bakshi) died on the 9th Rabī-us-Sānī 1040 A.H/7th

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1. He was the son of Āqā Tāhir (whose poetical name was Wasī) a grandson of Mohammad Sarif Hajrī, and nephew and son-in-law of Itmad-ul-daulah Tehrani. He held a high rank in the time of Akbar, Jahangir and early years of Shahjahan, and died on the 9th Rabī-us-Sānī 1040 A.H/7th October 1630 A.D. (M.U., II, pp.729-31; O.B.D., p.188).

October 1630 A.D.¹ the emperor sent prince Aurangzeb to condole with him. After this, when he was brought into royal audience he received an increment of 1000 zat + 500 sawar in his mansab which was now raised to 4000 zat + 200 sawar.² In the 7th regnal year, Shāhjahān honoured Ja'far Khan by visiting his house. In the 10th regnal year he was promoted to the rank of 5000 zat + 3000 sawar.³ After this, for a while, he was under a cloud of suspicion but soon after he became the recipient of boundless favours. In the 19th year he was appointed governor of the Punjab. At the end of 20th regnal year he was appointed Mir Bakshi in succession of Khalīl Ullah Khan. When Makramat Khan the governor of Shāhjahānābād (Delhi) died in 23rd regnal year, Ja'far Khan was given the governorship of that place and his mansab was raised to 5000 zat + 5000 sawar with 1000 do aspah and sen aspah.⁴ But within a year he was transferred to the Subahdārī of Thatta (Sindh) in succession to Saīd Khan Khān Bahādur Zafar Jung.⁵

When Shāhjahān fell ill on 7th Zil.H. 1067 A.H./ 6th September 1658 A.D., his eldest and favourite son Dārā

1. M.U., II, pp.729-31.

2. M.U., Eng.Tr., II, p.722.

3. Ibid.

4. A.S., III, p.104; M.U., Eng.Tr., II, p.722.

5. A.S., III, p.120.

Shikon who was present at the court assumed the entire control of administration.¹ Being jealous of Muazzam Khan who was a close friend and favourite of Prince Aurangzeb, he could ill-afford to see him occupying a high post of Wazir. Therefore, towards the end of September 1657 A.D., he dismissed Muazzam Khan,² and summoned Ja'far Khan and appointed him Wazir.³ On this occasion he was given an ornamented inkpot.

After his first coronation, Aurangzeb summoned Muazzam Khan from Daulatabad to appoint his his Wazir and councillor and Ja'far Khan was transferred to Malwa⁴ as Subahdar. But he remained in the good books of the new emperor who increased his rank by 1000 sawars 'do asnah and seh asnah'. Thus he now became a mansabdar of 6000 zat + 6000 sawars of which 4000 sawars were 'do asnah and seh asnah'. He was also given a special robe (Khilat Khas), a female elephant, an ornamented dagger, a special sword and two fleet horses of which one was covered with ornamented

1. M.L., II, p.4.

2. A.S., III, p.265.

3. A.S., III, p.281; M.U., Eng. Tr., p.722; U.B.D., p.188.

4. According to Khwafi Khan, Jafar Khan continued to enjoy the privilege of Wazir and Subahdar both. But this seems to be improbable because in the subsequent pages the historian contradicts his own statements and says that after the death of Fazil Khan, Jafar Khan was appointed as Wazir.

¹ saddle. He held the governorship of Malwa upto the 6th Julūs (regnal year) of the emperor Aurangzeb. During his tenure, he tried to increase the revenue of the province and establish peace and order there. He also devoted his attention to the prosperity of raiyat who were suffering from the exploitations of the local zamindars ever since the later years of Shāhjahān's reign.

In Jamādī I 1070 A.H./January 1660 A.D. Amīr-ul-Umarā Shāyista Khan was sent to the Deccan to put down Shivaji and to recover his strong fortresses which he had captured and which served as places of his abode and security.² The Amīr-ul-Umarā after punishing the Maratha rebels, captured Pūna, Supa and then Chaknā; then he established outposts in these places to protect the life and property of the inhabitants of the Mughal territory from the raids of the Marathas. He renamed Chakna as Islāmābād. When he arrived at Islāmābād (Chakna) he called Ja'far Khan from Malwa to assist him in the prosecution of the rest of the campaign.³

1. A.N., p.162; M.L., II, p.41; M.U., Eng.Tr., II, p. 722.

2. M.L., II, p.122.

3. Ibid.

When Fāzil Khan,¹ who had been appointed Wazir on the 11th Zilqad/7th June 1663 A.D.,² died in Kashmir on the 27th Zilqad/23rd June only 17 days after holding the post,³ the emperor expressed his grief at the unhappy event and presented the mourning robe to the deceased's nephew Burhānuddīn who had recently come from Persia. Ja'far Khan was now summoned from Malwa to be installed as Wazir and Kajābat Khan was appointed to succeed him.⁴ After enjoying the scenery of the beautiful vally of Kashmir the emperor started for Lahore on 22nd Moharrum/16th August, 1663 A.D. He arrived there on Tuesday, the 7th Rabī I/29th September. On Monday, the 11th Rabī II/2nd November the emperor was weighed on the occasion of his 46th Solar birthday and a few fresh appointments were made on this auspicious occasion. Āqil Khan who was living in retirement at Lahore was reappointed a 'dohazari' mansabdar. Tarbiyat Khan was sent as an envoy to Persia. He carried with him the reply to Shah

1. He was born about 1593 A.D. in Persia. In the 7th regnal year of Shāhjahān he migrated to India and attached himself to Nawab Asaf Khan (Nur Jahan's brother). He spent his days in his company, and on the latter's death, in the 15th Julus, (R.Y. of Shāhjahān) he entered the royal service and received the rank of 500 zai 50 savar. In the 23rd Julus-e-Shāhjahānī he got the title of Fāzil Khan and in the 28th year received the rank of Seh hazari (3000). Aurangzeb after his succession to the throne promoted him to the rank of 4000 zai + 2000 savar and entrusted to him the duty of drafting the orders connected with the Diwan-e-kul during the absence of the wazir. At the age of seventy he was appointed as the Wazir, on 11th Zil Q. 1073 A.H./7th June, 1663 A.D.

2. M.A., p.46.

3. Ibid., p.47; A.S., III, p.388; M.O., Eng.Tr., I, p.552.

4. M.A., p.47; M.L., II, p.176.

abbās's letter with costly gifts worth seven lacs of rupees. Then on the 18th Rabī II/9th November the emperor started for Delhi. When he arrived at Panipat Jafar Khan had his audience on 29th Rabī II/20th November, 1663 A.D. Here he was honoured with the insignia of Wizarat and was presented a jewelled inkpot.¹

The appointment of Ja'far Khan to the post of the Wazir appears to have been an act of concession to an elder peer. His only qualifications were geniality of temperament, righteousness and affable manners. As Wazir he was so modest that he addressed every body as 'sir', and was incapable of displaying anger; nor did he like to listen coarse language in any form.² He was very fastidious for procedure and he followed it very carefully. He considered it his primary duty to draft the firmans and urgent letters. Then he read the papers of the Tan department, applications (arzi) and orders (parwanahs). Next he gave his attention to the papers of Khalsa department, or any naqdi or abstract memo etc., which were submitted to him. After disposing of these papers, he applied himself to the other matters.

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1. M.L., II, p.177; M.A., p.47; Waqī Alamsiri, p.43; I do not know on what basis Jadunath Sarkar gives the date of appointment as 30th December 1663 which is incorrect. See, History of Aurangzeb, III, p.65.
 2. M.U., Eng.Tr., II, p.723; Storia, II, p.156; Adding further Manucci says: "On one occasion when his horse stopped all of a sudden, he dismounted and took a seat in his palanquine, cloaking the feeling that caused this action by protesting that it was very hot".

When Shivaji on the advice of Mirza Raja Rai Singh started from his country to visit the Mughal court, the emperor sent an order drafted by Umdat-ul-Mulk Ja'far Khan on the 10th Shawwāl 1076 A.H., 9th Julius (5th April, 1666 A.D.) granting him royal favours.¹ On Saturday, 18th Zīlqad 1076 A.H./12th May 1666 A.D., the emperor was weighed on the occasion of his 50th lunar birthday. It was on this occasion that the Umdat-ul-Mulk introduced Shivaji and his son Sambha into the royal audience. Shivaji presented 1500 asharfis as nazar² and 6000 rupees as nisar³ to the emperor.⁴ In lieu thereof the emperor overlooking his offences, wanted to confer special favours on him and allow him to return to the Deccan. But Shivaji unfamiliar as he was with the royal etiquette retired to a corner and began to give vent to his dissatisfaction to Kunwar Ram Singh.⁵ Upon this Raja Jaswant Singh very respectfully addressing the emperor said, "He (Shivaji) is only a Bhūmia (land-holder) and yet he has

1. Letter quoted in Rajasthani Records, ed. by Jadunath Sarkar and Dr. Raghubir Singh, p.22.

2. Nazar: 'Present made to a superior'.

3. Nisar: Literally, sacrifice; 'money moved round the head of the Emperor and then scattered among the people to ensure God's blessings for his health or victory'.

4. A.H., p.55.

5. Ibid.

given expression to such a violent and discourteous conduct. Your Majesty has overlooked it. Verily it is Your Majesty's to do as pleaseth Your Majesty, though he should have been punished¹, but the Umdat-ul-Mulk Ja'far Khan, being a kind and amicable person was favourably disposed towards Shivaji. He laid his (Shivaji's) petition before the emperor, where-² upon his offences were pardoned and his life was spared. While Shivaji was at Agra, Nawab Ja'far Khan continued to be friendly to him and assured him and his Maratha friends³ of royal favours.

The Nawab had a soft corner for the Europeans also. When the English factors approached him for a hash-ul-hukm,⁴

1. - राजा जसवंत सिंह जी कहते कि "हीक उठोरा भोमियो आइने अतरो बेअदार्ह सखी करे । तीसों हजरत दर गुजर करे सो क्रियो हजरत रौ । तयों उसको सजा पहुचई चाहिये ।"

Rajasthan letter No. 17.

2. "और सेवा की अरज पातशाह जी सो नवाब जाफरखान करे तज्जुसौर माफ करई, जाँ बकशी पातशाह जी करी ।"

Rajasthan letter No. 18.

3. Parkaldas in a letter to Kalyāndas dated Tuesday 29th May, 1666 writes: "I hear that Shivaji paid some money to Jafar Khan to win his support, and else where too he has sent more or less".

Rajasthan letter No. 21.

4. hash-ul-hukm: Literally, 'according to order'. These words forming the initial formula of a document issued by an officer of state on Royal authority, and thence applied as the title of such a document.

granting them duty free import and export of articles at Surat port, the Nawāb pleaded their case. It was on his recommendation that the emperor granted the desired hash-ul-hukm¹ to them. A letter from Surat to Madras, dated 19th May, 1664 A.D. gives full details of the concession given to them, "The king has granted to all customs free for one whole yeare for all that shall bee either exported; and since we have received a letter from Gaffere Kaune (Ja'far Khan), the king's Diwan, which is called hash-ul-hukm or the king's special command, that acquaints us the king received our letter and petition of the accompt of the fight, read it, with so great content, and soe much satisfaction that he had those in his country that faced his enemy, that there upon he gave to all favour exprest of a yeares custome graits, and for our further encouragement, from the expiration of the yeare the half our customes for ever and are yet in expectation of greater honours"².

On the expiry of the period of aforesaid concession, the British factors renewed their request for its continuance. As before, they approached Ja'far Khan who promised his full support.³ Now their case was that as the duty on the Dutch goods had been reduced from 3½% to 2%, the same privilege should be extended to them. Their application with favourable

1. E.F.I. (1661-1664), pp.312-15.

2. Ibid.

3. E.F.I. (1665-1667), p.272.

remarks had been forwarded to the Wazir by the governor of Surat, Ghiyāsuddīn Khan.¹ Ja'far Khan placed the facts before the emperor who issued a firman on July 25, 1667 A.D. that in future the duty should be lowered from 3½% to 2% both on imports and exports, that no transit duty be levied on the English goods throughout the empire and that in the event of robbery being committed every effort should be made to recover the lost property which should be duly restored to the owners.² This reduced duty on British goods was applicable not only at the port of Surat, it was to be the same in Bengal, Agra and other places also. In addition, freedom from transit duty on goods carried to Surat via Burhanpūr and Ahmedabad was also granted to the English factors.

Regarding Ja'far Khan's relation with the French factors not much material is available to reconstruct the story. Yet there is a reference in East India Factory records³ about his kind attitude towards them. In July, 1666 A.D. two Frenchmen arrived at the court with a letter from the king of France to the Mughal emperor.³ The object of the letter was "to procure a grant so that his merchants may be admitted to live peaceably and settle factories of trade

1. E.F.I. (1665-1667), p.274.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p.158.

in his country". The two Frenchmen went to Umdat-ul-Mulk Ja'far Khan to be introduced into the emperor's audience. But they "had neither the dignity nor countenance". The Hazir asked them to show the presents which they had brought, because no letter, according to the royal etiquette could be put before the emperor without some gifts. Upon this the Frenchmen told Ja'far Khan that a duly accredited representative of the country would shortly be arriving with requisite gifts and presents for the emperor. But Ja'far Khan refused to comply with their request insisting that they could not but introduced into the royal audience without presents. He asked them to wait till the arrival of their ambassador. Not being in a position to stay any longer at the capital the Frenchmen left for Surat.¹ On their way they were plundered by bandits, who reduced them to a miserable plight and one of them named Beber was even wounded. They again returned to Agra and presented themselves before the Hazir seeking his help in getting an audience with the emperor. Hazir Ja'far Khan was touched with their diplorable condition. He not only consoled them but also pleaded their cause with the emperor. The latter granted them a hasb-ul-hukm whereby they were to be given the same commercial concessions as had been accorded to the English. They were allowed to establish a factory at Surat and in return to pay 3 per cent

1. E.F.I. (1665-1667), p.158.

as custom duty on the imported goods. The French factors obtained these concessions only after they had fully assured the Wazir that they would present goods of foreign-make worth Rs. 3000 to the emperor and worth Rs. 1000 to him and to other nobles also.¹

Thus, it is clear that the Wazir was a link between the emperor and the foreign merchants, that all commercial transactions were conducted through him, and that it was not so easy for either the English or the Dutch or the French to by-pass him.

When Abdullah Khan, the exiled king of Kāshgar, was coming to the Mughal court Ja'far Khan as the first minister went out on his master's behalf to receive him on Sunday 11th Shawwāl 1078 A.H./15th March, 1668 A.D.² Mounted on his horse he shook hands with the royal guest and escorted him upto the audience hall. On the 25th Shawwāl/29th March, when the emperor had descended from the throne and was standing near the fountain, Umdat-ul-mulk presented the Khan in the audience chamber. There was not a yard's distance between them. The Khan saluted the emperor and then he stood in front of the emperor near the fountain. The emperor presenting him the 'tuishun falcon' ordered Umdat-ul-mulk Ja'far Khan to

1. Ibid., p.281.

2. M.A., p.71; Storia, II, p.190.

entertain the royal guest with the elephant combat and to sit with him there.¹

During his six and a half a year of Wizarat, Ja'far Khan never led any military campaign but always remained at the court. He performed his official duties and participated in the social life there. On Friday, 17th Safar 1079 A.H/ 17th July 1668 A.D., Mohammad Āzam was betrothed² to Jahānzēb Bānū Begum, the daughter of Dārā Shikoh at the residence of Jahān Ārā Begum known as Begum Sāhibā. On this occasion Umdat-ul-mulk and other nobles presented to her 16000 rupees as the nuptial offering. A few months later on the 2nd Shawwāl 1079 A.H/22nd February 1669 A.D. on the occasion of coronation day celebrations the emperor rewarded Umdat-ul-mulk Ja'far Khan, his son Nāmdār Khan and many other nobles with robes, horses and elephants.³ Again, the 53rd Lunar birthday of the emperor which fell on Friday, the 18th Zīlqad 1079 A.H/9th April, 1669 A.D. was observed with usual pomp and festivities. His Majesty sat on the throne, but no weighing ceremony took place, as the practice had been stopped from the 11th regnal year. Singers and musicians remained excluded from the court. Prince Mohammad Āzam was given a robe and shield with jewelled knob and Mohammad Akbar

1. MA M.A., p.71; Storia, II, p.190.

2. The marriage was celebrated later on Monday the 27th Rajab 1078 A.H./21st December 1668 A.D.

3. M.A., p.74.

a robe. Umdat-ul-mulk Ja'far Khan and other courtiers were also rewarded with robes. Finally, on the day following the Id (2nd Shawwāl 1080 A.H./13th February 1670 A.D.) Umdat-ul-mulk was granted an increment of 1000 troopers and 1 ~~Crore~~¹ of dan as reward.

Perhaps to ward off the infirmity of old age the Wazir began to drink heavily. Very often the emperor warned him saying that the habit was harmful for his health, nor was it becoming for the Wazir in the empire of the faithful who was under a sacred obligation to set an example to the people. To this Ja'far Khan would reply that, "he was an old man, without strength in his hand or firmness in his feet, had little sight in his eyes, and was very poor. By drinking wine he got the sight for seeing, power of wielding the pen in the service of His Majesty, felt strength in his feet to run to court when His Majesty called him, and could imagine to have become rich".² He further added that "wine could make the poor rich, the blind to see, the fragile robust and the cripple stout".³ Manucci says that emperor Aurangzeb smiled at the fulminations of his Grand Wazir and that Ja'far Khan continued his old habit of drinking and so his health began to decline day by day and he fell ill.

1. M.A., p.97.

2. Storia, II, p.157.

3. Ibid.

During his illness the emperor visited his house to comfort him. Counting his last days on bed, he died on Friday, the 25th Zilhijj 1080 A.H/6th May 1670 A.D.¹

Aurangzeb was deeply grieved at the death of his devoted wazir and he visited the deceased minister's house to condole with his relations. He ordered that for three days 120 dishes of food should be sent to the bereaved family. Prince Mohammad Azam and Prince Mohammad Akbar were ordered to go to the houses of his sons Wāmdār Khan and Kāngār Khan to express their sorrow and sympathy. They were also asked to console their mother Farzāna Begum. Special robes were sent to each of his sons and a Tora for the widow. Subsequently, Prince Mohammad Akbar brought out the two brothers out of their mourning and escorted them to the emperor who honoured them with jewelled daggers having pearl ilaaqas (appendants) and many other favours. Mourning robes were also sent to Bakhshī-ul-mulk Asad Khan and other relatives.²

Umdat-ul-Mulk Ja'far Khan was distinguished for his generosity and right mindedness. One day Rūhullah Khan Mīr Bakhshī whose rank was inferior to that of the wazir, while presenting a petition to the emperor advanced too near

1. M.A., p.103; M.L., II, p.234; Storia, I, p.193n; M.U., Eng.fr., II, p.723; Waqai Alangiri, p.44; O.B.D., p.188.

2. Ibid.

to the throne and almost usurped the place meant for the Wazir.¹ The emperor did not notice it but the wazir did. Next day, when Ja'far Khan appeared at the court, he moved his one foot farther than was warranted by the regulations. Taking note of it, the emperor remarked that "it appears that you are ignorant of rules and regulations. Have you not gone beyond the place assigned to you?" Ja'far Khan soberly replied, "the wazir occupies the first place in the court and therefore in order to exhibit the difference between himself and Mir Bakhshi, I am compelled to move a step forward". Now the emperor realised it, but instead of reproving the Mir Bakhshi he offered apology to his erudite wazir saying that it would not recur again.² In fact, he enjoyed immense respect in the court. The emperor often deputed him to receive foreign princes and ambassadors on his behalf. For this assignment, his mature age and long experience, his good manners and mastery of Persian language eminently fitted him. In his character were united the graciousness of heart and nobility of behaviour. The famous poet Chandra Khan Brahman in his 'Munshaat' styles Ja'far Khan as Plato III,³ and certainly he was a man of innumerable qualities of head and heart.

1. Storia, II, p.443.

2. Ibid., p.444.

3. Munshaat-e-Brahman by Chandra Bhan Brahman, f.22.

But his political record or administrative skill did not equal the respect and honour he enjoyed. No measure of reform, no salutary regulations, no record of his keen-ness for improvement of the condition of the people stand to his credit. Verily he was a powerless Wazir of a powerful emperor.

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CHAPTER - IV

A _ S _ A _ D K _ H _ A _ N

¹
Nawab Asad Khan entitled Āsaf-ud-daulah Jundat-ul-Bulk, the last and the most favourite wazir of Emperor Aurangzeb, who adorned the high office for more than three decades descended from an illustrious family of Turkmāns. His original name was Mohammed Ibrāhīm and he was the son of Zulfiqār Khan Qarānlu² and from his mother side he was the grand-son of Sādiq Khan 'Mir Bakhshi'³. It is difficult to say exactly in what circumstances or when his father and grandfather left their home in search of livelihood and came to Persia, which in the heyday of its glory, offered refuge to tried adventures and fortune hunters. But it was sheer luck who brought his grand-father Zulfiqār Khan to the Persian court, where he was received with due honour by Shah Abbās I, who appointed him to the post of 'Beglar Begi' of Shīrwān⁴. But subsequently when on some suspicion Zulfiqār Khan was executed in 1600-1601 A.D., evil stars began to haunt his family. Like Itmād-ud-daulah, his son surnamed

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1. It was the title given by Shāhjahān in the 27th year of his reign. Storia, II, p.21.
 2. M.U., I, p.310; Eng.Tr., I, p.270; O.B.D., pp.79-80.
 3. Ibid.
 4. M.U., Eng.Tr., I, p.270.

¹
Khanlār migrated to India towards the end of Jahāngīr's reign. At this time the Mughal court was dominated by nobles of Persian extraction, and so it did not prove difficult for Khanlār to win the esteem favour of the emperor. Jahāngīr conferred upon him the title of 'Zulfigar Khan'² and thanks to the kindness of Shāhjahān, he was married to the daughter of Sādiq Khan brother-in-law of Yamīn-ud-daulah Asaf Khan.³ His rank was raised to 3000 zat and savar. His relationship with the ruling house fully ensured and safeguarded not only his interests but also those of his family. Towards the end of Shāhjahān's reign, being struck with paralysis, he retired from public life and settled at Patna to pass his remaining days away from the hustle and bustle of the Mughal court and the Capital. He lingered in his bed till 1659 A.D.,⁴ and when at length death closed his eyes he had the great satisfaction that his eldest son Mohammad Ibrāhīm entitled Asad Khan had the honour of⁵ holding the post of second Bakhshi in the Mughal Army.

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1. Asad Khan's father. For his life, see M.U., II, p.85.
 2. Tuzuk, Reg., I, p.275; O.B.D., p.80.
 3. He was the son of Itmād-ud-daulah, brother of Empress Nūr Jahan and brother-in-law of emperor Jahangir.
 4. M.A., p.27; M.U., Eng.Tr., I, p.270; O.B.D., p.80.
 5. Ibid.

Not much is known about the early life of Asad Khan. He was born in 1035 Hijri/1625 A.D. at a time when dark clouds were gathering on the political horizon of the Mughal empire. These were the years of unprecedented crisis in the court politics but by the time ~~x~~ he attained his youth, things had settled down to normalcy and a new era¹ had begun with the accession of Emperor Shāhjahān. In the absence of any recorded evidence it may be presumed that he must have received lessons in all those subjects which formed a part of the contemporary curriculum. As a result of his early education and careful upbringing, he, in his later life, was able to develop his subtle personality. Shah Nawāz Khan, the author of 'Maāsir-ul-Umarā' records that "from his early years thanks to his personal beauty and external accomplishments he was conspicuous amongst his contemporaries".¹ No wonder, he became a favourite of Emperor Shāhjahān who married him to a daughter of his father-in-law Asaf Khan, the wakil. In 1654 A.D. he received the title of Asad Khan,² and was appointed to the post of Akhtāh Begi (Master of horse) and soon afterwards he was elevated to the position of second

1. Maāsir-ul-Umarā.

از حواشی سن و لیان شباب بحسن صورت و تناسب ظاهری منظور مرام و عوالف
اعلی حضرت بوجه درهم سالان و اقتران امتیازی تمام داشت -

M.U. (Persian Text), I, p.311.

2. Storia, II, p.21.

Bakhshi, an office which he held upto the 13th year of ¹ Aurangzeb's reign.

It is related that he was a great favourite of Emperor Aurangzeb also. On 23rd May 1661 along with Saif Khan and Multafat Khan he moved to the out-skirts of the city of Delhi to accord welcome the Persian envoy Budāq Beg. He had the honour of conducting the royal guest to the emperor's presence.² Having served for long as a second Bakhshi, in the 5th year of the emperor's reign he was raised to the rank of 4000/2000 (1662-63 A.D.).³ But he was overshadowed by the dynamic and domineering personalities of the two prominent nobles Muazzam Khan and Jafar Khan. Thus he found no opportunity to play any significant role in contemporary politics, especially between 1662 A.D. and 1668 A.D. On Sunday, 11th Shawwal 1078 A.H./ 15th March 1668 A.D. he accompanied Umdat-ul-Mulk Ja'far Khan to receive 'Abdullah Khan', the exiled king of Kashgher.⁴

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1. Manucci writes that Aurangzeb after his accession to the throne wrote to his father asking for a gift of jewels, but Shahjahan (in place of that) sent him the loyal Acet Khan (Asad Khan) a person whom he strongly recommended, declaring that he might be more safely trusted than any other living being". (Ibid).
 2. M.A., p.35; M.U., Eng.Tr., I, p.270.
 3. Dr. Satish Chandra's date is wrong by a year or so (Parties and Politics at the Moghal Court, p.1). M.U. clearly states that in the 5th year of Emperor Aurangzeb's reign, his rank was raised to 4000/2000 horse - M.U., Eng.Tr., I, p.270.
 4. M.A.; p.71.

On this occasion, he had the privilege of escorting the royal guest on horseback upto the doors of the audience hall. A little later, in a similar way, he received Musain Pāshā, the Ex-governor of Basra. This time among those who accompanied him were Sadr-us-Suddūr Abid Khan,¹ Mir Tuzuk Akātāz Khan and Bakhshi-ul-Mulk Dānishmand Khan. Perhaps, because of his excellent knowledge of political etiquette two riding horses of swift speed were presented to him.² And on 2nd Zilhijj 1080 A.H/13th April 1670 A.D. along with Prince Mohammad Akbar and Bahramanand Khan, he went out to receive Nawāb Bāī, who had been summoned from Delhi. She was escorted to the imperial harem.³ The same year occurred the death of Umdat-ul-Mulk Ja'far Khan; but for a while the emperor was reluctant to nominate his successor. He only promoted Asad Khan from the post of the Second Bakhshi to that of Naib Wazir.⁴ On this occasion he received as gift a jewelled dagger and two quids of betel leaves besides other presents. Further, he was attached to Prince Muazzam as his Risālahdār and the astronomer Diyānat Khan was appointed as his Sālār. When Lashkar Khan died (February 1671), he was nominated as Mir Bakhshi also.⁵

1. M.A., p.86.

2. Ibid., p.97.

3. Ibid., p.102.

4. Akhbārāt, 25th Zil Hijja, 13th Julus; (R.Y.); M.L., II, p.235; M.A., p.103.

5. M.A., p.108.

he held the two posts till 1673 A.D. Evidently the heavy responsibility of civil and military duties proved too heavy for a single officer. Add to this the imperative necessity of reorganizing the army for meeting the Maratha menace. In these circumstances, Asad Khan resigned the post of Naib Wazir. Upon this, the emperor ordered Amanat Khan, the Diwan-e-Khalsa and Aifayat Khan, the Diwan-e-Tan to transact the business of the Diwan-e-Mizarat jointly and to affix their seals on state papers just below that of the Diwan-e-Ashraf.¹

In the south, the affairs were moving to a crisis because of the rapid rise of the Marathas to power under the leadership of Shivaji, and so the resources of the empire had to be diverted towards that front. On the north western frontier also, the situation was going out of control because of the tribal unrest. The failure of the Balkh campaign and the loss of Kandahar, had already affected the imperial prestige in that region. The relaxation of military pressure there emboldened the refractory elements and they raised their heads. The most troublesome among were the Yusuf Zais. Bhagu assumed their leadership and crowned Mohammad Shah as ruler.² He gave a religious colour to his rebellion by securing support of Mulla Chalak, who was held in much esteem by the Afghans. A large number

1. M.A., pp. 125-26; M.U., Eng.Tr., I, p. 271.

2. A.H., pp. 1039-57; M.A., p. 61.

of his fellow tribesmen rallied to his standard and crossed the Indus in 1667 A.D. and invaded Pakhlī. They seized the fort of Chachal and other Mughal outposts and began to plunder the imperial territory near Attock and Nilāb.

Aurangzeb decided to open the offensive against the trouble makers and wanted to crush them. Accordingly he ordered Kāmil Khan, the fauldar of Attock to collect all the Mughal officers and troops and march towards the tribal area. Likewise Amīr Khan, the Subahdar of Kabul was directed to send Shamsīr Khan to the disturbed area. Amīn Khan was sent with a large army from Delhi to assist the other commanders.¹

Reinforced by Abdul Rahīm Khan's troops which arrived under Murād Qulī from Peshawar, Amīn Khan marched towards ferry of Hārūm in October to cross the Indus there and enter the Yūsuf Zai country. But before he could do it, the Yūsuf Zais advanced further, crossed the river and delivered an attack upon the imperialists. After a bloody and fierce struggle the rebels were defeated. Amīn Khan now entered the Yūsuf Zais country and drove away the enemy from the territory east of river Indus. Since he did not have sufficient number of men and material, he prepared to wait for Shamsīr Khan. And no sooner did the latter arrive there, Kāmil Khan the other imperial generals resumed the campaign. They attacked the Yūsuf Zais in their own land, defeated

1. A.N., pp.1039-57; M.A., p.61.

and plundered them and ravaged and devastated their country. After presenting a united front to the imperialists, the Yūsuf Zais withdrew to the hills. But soon the conflagration spread to the other tribes also. The Akur Zāis and Mālīzāis of Sawād and Tīra flocked to the assistance of Yūsuf Zāis. They assembled at Mansūr and launched a vigorous attack upon the imperial soldiers, but they were defeated and dispersed.

Mohammad Amin Khan who had been sent from Delhi to assist the other two generals, arrived at the scene of action in August 1667 A.D. He crossed the Kābul river at Nārī and took over the supreme command from Shamsīr Khan. He tactfully handled the situation, suppressed the Afghan rising and after establishing peace he returned to the court in response to imperial summons. He left the place in the hands of Shamsīr Khan, with instructions to keep the tribes in check. Thus for the next five years, i.e. till 1672 A.D. no tribal rising took place.

During this interval the tribal leaders collected their men and munition and revived their activities in 1672 A.D. on the pretext of provocation caused to them by the indiscreet behaviour of the fauzdar of Jalālābād. The Afrīdīs rose into rebellion under their chieftain Akmal Khan. The latter proclaimed himself king, struck coins in his name and declared war against the Mughals. The news of the Afrīdī rising startled Mohammad Amin Khan the viceroy of Kabul, and

compelled him to leave Peshawar for Kabul without giving any weight to report that the Afrīdīs were blocking the Khybar Pass. Mohammad Amīn Khan advanced to Alī Masjid encamped there. The Afghans seized the opportunity open the attack from the heights by rolling down huge boulder upon the Mughal troops. Thereafter they descended from hills and attacked their enemy at close range. The imperial commander had to suffer severe reverses and losses. His son Mir Abdullah and his son-in-law Mirza Sultan lost their lives, while thousand of his troops were seized and made captive by the Afghans and sold as slaves. Finding his nerves shattered, he returned to Peshawar completely broken in physique as much as in spirits.

The success of Akmal Khan, over Mohammad Amīn Khan redoubled the enthusiasm of the Afghans to continue the struggle. A large number of tribal leaders including Khushhāl Khan the chief of the Bangash tribe unfurled the banner of revolt. This alliance between the two tribal leaders, made Aurangzeb anxious. Realising the gravity of the situation, he degraded Amīn Khan and ordered Fidaī the governor of Lahore to march towards Peshawar to guard against the enemy's offensive. Shortly after, he recalled Mahabat Khan from the Deccan and entrusted to him the responsibility of dealing with the Afghans. Upon his failure to effect any improvement in the situation, the emperor

sent Shujaat Khan and Jaswant Singh. In February 1674 Shujat Khan entered Karappa pass in the north-east of the Kabul river, to find himself arrayed against heavy odds. In face of a heavy downpour of rains and snow and guerilla tactics of warfare in the hilly tracts of Kabul, it was difficult for him to achieve success. He suffered terrible loss in men and money, and himself died fighting in the battlefield.¹

The death of Shujaat Khan and the failure of Raja Jaswant Singh against the Afghans and the disaster that befell the imperial army, brought home to the mind of the emperor, that his presence in that region was absolutely essential. So, huge preparations were made. The emperor started from the capital to quell the disaffection of the Afghans. He reached Hasan Abdal in June 1674 and stayed there for about one and half years. During this period new plans for campaign were prepared. Fida'i Khan, was appointed viceroy of Kabul, Aghar Khan was called from the Deccan and sent to clear the Khybar region. Not only this, the emperor also ordered Prince Akbar to hasten along with Asad Khan to Kabul by way of Kohat.²

Thus on Tuesday 24th Jamadi-us-Sani 1085 A.H/15th September 1674 Asad Khan was given a special robe, a sword

1. M.A., p.131; Storia, II, p.237.

2. F.A., f.69b; M.A., p.136.

and a horse and an elephant, and directed to proceed to Kabul.¹ Nothing has been recorded by contemporary and later historians with regard to Asad Khan's role in cop and suppressing the Afghan risings in the north-western frontier. It is certain that he was not a general and could hardly be of any assistance to his sovereign in t campaign against the Yusuf Zais. Further, his lack of military talents is borne out by the fact that he never commanded any expedition. Nor did he give any positive proof of his qualities as a soldier or general. But it may also be urged with equal emphasis that the emperor did not give him an opportunity to display his talents. Had he been given a chance like Fida'i Khan, Aghar Khan or Mukarram Khan, perhaps he too would have proved his worth. But he was destined to share the misfortune of his master in his failure : as to suppress either rebell of Akmal Khan or giving peace to the north western froi tier region. He returned with the emperor to the capit towards the end of 1675 A.D.

On 8th October 1676, he had the honour^{of} being ap ted the Nazir of the empire. The emperor gave him the of office, which he was to occupy i.e. a jewelled inkp worth Rs.50,000.² Since he was already fifty other elder

1. F.A., f.69b; M.A., p.136.

2. M.A., p.182; M.U., Eng.Tr., I, p.271; Waqā'i Alangi p.46; History of Aurangzeb, II, p.69; Moghal Kings and Nobility, p.235.

nobles were not satisfied with his appointment. But mere age was not the criteria for such promotion. Nor did the consideration of race or religion weigh with the emperor. It were his qualities of head and heart which counted. He was liberal and generous, besides possessing rich experience in civil and revenue departments. But this did not silence other aspirants. Mahabat Khan the outspoken governor of Kabul angrily protested to the emperor, saying that, "Your Majesty has appointed a suckling like Asad Khan as the Grand Wazir. The consequences of the premiership of such an unmanly fellow might have reached Your Majesty's ears".¹ It is not difficult to refute this allegation, from a man who throughout his whole life never achieved success on any front whatsoever. He only envied the superiority of Persians and looked at Asad Khan with contempt, thinking that he would not be able to shoulder the responsibilities of such a great office. In striking contrast to him, Asad Khan's cool temperament, subtle nature, and piercing intellect assured him of full support of his master and subordinates. Indeed, if we look at the problems, which confronted emperor Aurangzeb, it would appear that he needed the counsel of such a person who had the ripe experience in the two important branches of the government i.e. Dinani and Fauidari.

1. Letter quoted in History of Aurangzeb, II, p.69.

When he had looked after the affairs of Diwani for two years at the capital, Asad Khan had strengthened his position by marrying his son Mohammad Ismail (Itiq Khan) to the daughter of Amir-ul-Umara Shayista Khan. After having been honoured with the title of Umdat-ul-Mulk was ordered to go to the Deccan in September 1677 A.D. Here a different panorama was unfolding itself. The Mughal armies under Jai Singh, Prince Muazzam, Khan-e-Jahan Bahadur Kokaltash and Diler Khan were busy against the Marathas, Ali Adil Shah and Qutub Shah. The problem of Deccan was no more problem of recognition of the right of the independent states, it was an open contest between imperial power and the people of the Deccan, who were backed up by the local potentates. Jai Singh's pride had been humbled; Prince Muazzam was accused of incapacity Bahadur Khan was suspected to be in league with the Adil Shahis and had been censured for the reverses which the imperial army had suffered. As regards Diler Khan, he arrived in the Deccan in June 1676 and was second in command. He was an Afghan and made friends with Bahlol Khan, the patron of the Afghan faction at Bijapur. One of them complained to the emperor that Bahadur Khan had arrived at a secret understanding with the three Deccan powers and was averse to the Mughal success in that region. Not only this, Bahlol Khan even offered to conquer Himmatnagar and crush Shivaji provided he received adequate reinforcements and was guaranteed security of his position and

property. Diler Khan persuaded the emperor to accept the proposal. Consequently, Bahādur Khan was recalled in September 1677 and the charge of affairs of the Deccan was bestowed upon Diler Khan until the appointment of a new Subahdar. Since in the north-western frontiers, the Afghan rising had not yet been fully suppressed and the embers of discontentment and dissatisfaction against the imperial governors there still brewing, there was possibility of an Afghan rising of a similar type in the Deccan. Moreover, there was a lurking suspicion in the mind of the emperor that Diler Khan, in conjunction with Bahlol Khan might create trouble for the imperial government in that region. To guard against such an eventuality and to keep a vigilant eye over the activities of Diler Khan, the emperor sent Asad Khan, with a large army and suitable equipment. Upon his arrival in the Deccan, Asad Khan found Diler Khan fully loyal to the imperial cause. Thus after satisfying himself and leaving instructions for others, he left the Deccan for the north.

During the next few years we find generals coming more into limelight than administrators. The emperor's trouble which, in fact, began in 1679 A.D. only ended with

1. M.A., p.161, 170; M.U., Eng.Tr., I, p.271; History of Aurangzeb, IV, p.168.

his life. Problems baffled his imagination and he tried to concentrate all power into his own hands. He was not prepared to allow his Prime Minister (Wazir) to play a significant role in politics. Even so Asad Khan, intensely loyal as he was to his master, never liked to go against his wishes. He, thus began to perform his duties in a manner which instead of heightening the status of the office, lowered its prestige and dignity. For instance 1679 A.D. while the Rathor rebellion was in full swing instead of being asked to command an expedition against the Rathors or reshuffle the imperial economy, which had received a setback on account of the frequent rebellions in the north-west and the activities of the Marathas, Wazir was asked to put the 'Tika' on the forehead of Kunwar Ram Singh, the son of Raja Jai Singh.¹ By delegating this power to his Wazir the emperor committed an mistake. The Rajput nobles, especially the Kachwahās, who considered the practice of putting the 'Tika' on a forehead by the emperor as his special prerogative now onwards began to harbour suspicion against him. The delegation of this prerogative, though it apparently lowered the status of the Wazir, created a reverse impression on the minds of Rajputs princes. This step was unwarranted and uncalled for.

1. M.A., p.176.

On Sunday 4th April 1680 died Shivaji, leaving behind the Maratha Kingdom utterly divided and distracted. So long as he had lived bitter rivalries and jealousies amongst the Maratha nobles remained under surface but the disputed succession to the Maratha throne, intensified groupism and divided the court into two factions. In the end, Shambhaji crowned himself king after driving away Raja Ram and he reopened the struggle against the Mughals with much fervour, but his position was by no means unevitable. Without foreseeing its calamitous consequences, he took the indiscreet step of extending protection to Prince Mohammad Akbar, the fourth son of Aurangzeb, who had rebelled against his father and had been defeated and was being hotly pursued by the imperial troops. This provoked the ire of Aurangzeb, who marched towards the Deccan to chastise him. As the Rathor rebellion was still in full swing, he left Asad Khan and Prince 'Asim-ud-din' at Ajmer to keep watch over their activities. Asad Khan remained there from 1681 A.D. to 1684 A.D. and thereafter he came to Ahmadnagar¹ where he paid his respects to the emperor and remained nearer to him. The same year occurred the death of his nephew (sister's son) Bahram, the brother of Jafar Khan and the father of Bahramand Khan. A year later

1. M.A., p.241; M.U., Eng.Tr., I, pp.271-72.

i.e. in 1685 A.D., another great calamity befell him, when his mother died at Delhi on 22nd Muharrem 1097 A.H/ Wednesday 9th December, 1685 A.D. The emperor sent for Asad Khan who made his appearance in mourning robes. The feelings of grief on the part of the Wazir were assuaged to a large extent, when in 1686 A.D. Bijapur was conquered and occupied and a felicitious chronogram "Zib Shud Masnad-e-Wizarat" (1097 A.H/1686 A.D.)² was composed on the occasion, it betokened the emperor's regard for him. The same year he was permitted to sit with crossed legs on a cushion^h in the royal presence. Khwajah Wafa, the darogha of the 'Suk Saifi Khana' (Steward of the department Cosy-beds) brought to him a masnad, a gold embroidered pillow (Takia-gah) and a carpet (ornamented with gold embroidered figures) etc. In return Asad Khan gave to Khwajah Wafa, a robe and 1000 rupees as Inam³, which the emperor permitted him to retain.⁴

While the siege of Golkonda was continuing and Qalich Khan was again and again striking at the iron walls of the fort, he was hit on his shoulder blade by a bullet. No sooner did the emperor hear of it, he sent Asad Khan

1. Akhbarat, 22nd Muharrem, 29th Julius; M.A., p.270.

2. M.U., Eng. Tr., I, p.272; M.A., p.279.

3. Inam: A present or gift.

4. M.A., p.281.

to visit him.¹ After the death of Kalich Khan, the emperor pressed the siege of the fort vigorously, but to his utter surprise, he was told that Prince Shah Ālam was in league with Abul Hasan Qutb Shah, and that he was checkmating the imperial plans with regard to the conquest and occupation of the kingdom. But the fact of matter is that the prince was trying to induce the enemy to sue for peace through him, so that he may add another feather to cap as against his younger brother Mohammad Āzam, who had been given the credit of conquering the fort of Bijāpūr. But Āzam's partisans dinned into the emperor's ears the contents of Shah Ālam's correspondence with the enemy.² Firoz Jung intercepted some letters of the prince addressed to the Qutb Shah and handed them over to the emperor who made up his mind to imprison the suspected culprit and his family. Accordingly, he directed his Qazir to perform this duty. Shah Ālam's personal contingent was sent to the front on the pretext of repelling an unexpected attack and was directed to take up position round the prince's camp. On the morning of 21st February, 1657, in accordance with a pre-concerted plan, Shah Ālam with his four sons was invited to the emperor's tent for consultation. After a few minutes

1. M.A., p.289; History of Aurangzeb, IV, p.249.

2. F.A., pp.113a-b.

talks with him, they were asked by Asad Khan, the Wazir to step into the side room to listen to some secret instructions of the emperor.¹ According to Sāqī Mustad Khan, the prince went willy-nilly to the prayer-room, where he and his sons were stripped off their arms and politely told by Asad Khan that they should consider themselves prisoners.²

The imprisonment of Shah Ālam removed one of the obstacles in the way of the conquest of the fort of Golkonda. The emperor with the help of his Shīa Wazir, his Shīa pay-master general Rūhullah Khan, Saf Shikan Khan, the chief of the artillery, Salābat Khan and Ghairat Khan, pressed his military operation against the fort with greater vigour. Braving the difficulties presented by nature and man, the emperor occupied the fort on 21st September, 1687 A.D. Asad Khan's presence on the scene of warfare exercised a sober influence on the Persian nobles and prevented quarrel amongst them. It was due to him that his countrymen were able to retain and sustain their reputation for valour and devotion for the imperial cause. They could not be accused of

1. F.A., f.114a-15a; M.A., pp.293-95; M.L., II, pp.330-34; History of Aurangzeb, IV, pp.430-32.

2. M.A., p.295. Isardas Nāgar says:
 "All the property, stores, horses, elephants etc., of the prince were confiscated, and the clerks of the office were ordered not to use the title 'Shah' for the prince".
 (F.A., ff.115a-b).

of partiality for a Shīa kingdom.¹ The conquest of Golkonda brought another increase in the rank of Asad Khan. It was raised to 7000 zat and 7000 sawar (haft hazari zat wa sawar).²

The Deccani Kingdom had been conquered and occupied, but the pacification of the country was a difficult task. Prem Nayak the ruling Berad Chieftain, who commanded 12000 cavalry and 1000 infantrymen, exercised authority from his stronghold at Sagar. He refused to surrender this vast strip of territory to the Mughals. Likewise, Siddi Masaud controlled the area lying south of the Tungbhadra. In other parts too independent Hindu and Muslim chiefs reigned supreme. True, that these chiefs were compelled to abandon their possessions, but even then the Mughals could not breathe a sigh of relief. Even so, during the next three years military operations against the Marathas reduced Shambhaji to narrow straits. But his capture and execution instead of solving the Deccan problem rendered it even more complicated. Aurangzeb found himself in hot waters but fortunately for him, Asad Khan and his son Itiqad Khan shouldered the onerous responsibility.

1. Jadunath Sarkar unjustly accuses the Shīas for their half heartedness in the siege of Golkonda (History of Aurangzeb, IV, pp. 433-37); Asad Khan was sent with prince Kam Bakhsh to bring reinforcements. While doing so he even risked his life, because according to the author of M.A. "The men could not advance one inch owing to the shower of musket bullets, rockets, chadar and huqqa (bombs) without being blown up or wounded". M.A., p. 295.

2. M.U., Eng.Tr., I, p. 272.

In 1689 Asad Khan presented to the emperor his son's¹ despatch announcing the conquest of Raigarh. The emperor was so pleased to hear the news that he granted him a special robe and jewelled ligha adorned with heron's feather (par-e-kalang)² and on this occasion the band played joyous tunes. The courtiers too bowed before him and offered presents to him. And on 20th Safar 1101 A.H/ 23rd November 1689 Itiqād Khan himself waited upon the emperor. He was promoted to the rank of 3000 and was presented a robe, a horse, jewelled quiver, a bow, rupees 3000 in cash and honoured with the title of Zūlfikār Khan Bahādur.³

A year later on 19th Safar 1102 A.H/12th November 1690 A.D. Asad Khan was commissioned to chastise the Marathas on the other side of the river Krishna. The emperor himself marched from Koregaon, 16 kos from BījEpūr, to supervise the operations. Before his departure, Asad Khan was presented with an amulet set in diamonds containing a copy of the Quran enclosed in a case, a special robe and a horse worth 300 muhars. Asad Khan marched towards Nandialā³ and conquered the fort. There he received orders

1. Aurangzeb renamed it as "Uttangarh" F.A., f.154a.

2. F.A., f.154a; M.A., p.332.

3. Ibid.

4. M.A., p.338; M.U., Eng.Tr., I, p.272; History of Aurangzeb, V, p.40.

to hasten to his son's assistance, who was besieging the fort of Jinjī.¹ As he delayed in marching, prompt orders were issued to him to expedite his departure to the scene of operations. According to Saqī Mustad Khan, the emperor thereafter wrote another firman with his own hand and in the open court said to the Munshi, "Asad Khan shows his eagerness to see his son but now when the latter is hard-pressed, he is delaying and.....it is easy to boast but quite another matter to act".²

This sarcastic remark which the emperor made had a context behind it, which is very interesting. On some occasion, Asad Khan told his friends, "the emperor has not yet assigned to me any task; if he did it, he would be able to ^{second} see what a Turk can do".³ This was reported to the emperor who annoyed with his prevarication exclaimed in the presence of Fazil Khan and Qabil Khan, the Darogha of library, "Don't boast any more because, the pride of being a Turk is over".⁴ It was this remark, the emperor quoted in his firman.

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1. Zulfikār Khan, the Mughal Commander had been detached from the imperial court at Koregaon at the end of Nov. 1689. He marched by way of Raichpur, Karnāl, Mandiyāl, Kadapa and Garamkonda, and then descended into the Karnatak plain (about June 1690) fighting and capturing many forts on the way and reaching Kanjivaram in August and environs of Jinjī in the beginning of September 1690 A.D. (M.U., Eng.Tr., I, p.272; History of Ginjee and its Rulers, p.292; History of Aurangzeb, V, pp.68-69).
 2. M.A., pp.352-53; Raqāim Karāim, f.8b; History of Aurangzeb V, pp.74-75.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Raqāim Karāim. Hearing this from the emperor, both of them (Fazil Khan and Qabil Khan) recited it. M.A., p.353.

دیگر بخود مناد کہ ترکی تمام شد

But in fairness to Asad Khan it may be remarked that the emperor's sarcasm was uncalled for. The latter could not fathom the real cause of his Wazir's delay in marching to Jinjī. Asad had to overstay at Kaddappa because he had to organise the administration of the conquered region and restore peace and order there. Secondly, he had to wait for the arrival of Prince Kām Baksh. And finally, the Wazir, so circumspect and cautious as he was, had to complete his preparations before entering the hostile land. These considerations have escaped the attention of the official historian and those who have followed him.

On receipt of this pinching firman Asad Khan moved on. He met Prince Kām Baksh on 21st Muharrum 1103 A.H/¹ 4th October 1691 A.D. and the two marched towards Jinjī, where they reached on 16th December, 1691 A.D.² Ever since his arrival in early September 1690 Zūlfiqār Khan had been striving hard to devise means to reduce the fort, but his efforts had met with little success. Jinjī was not a single fort, it was a group of forts enclosed on three sides by steep hills which were difficult to be scaled. strong walls with formidable bastions mounted with guns gave it a commanding position. Thus its defences appeared to be impregnable. On the other hand, the Mughals were deficient in the art of siege Zūlfiqār did not command

1. M.A., p.344; History of Aurangzeb, V, p.75.

2. Akbharat, 5th Rabi-us-Sani, 35th Julius (R.Y); M.A., p.344; M.L., II, p.418; History of Aurangzeb, V, p.75.

adequate number of troops or heavy artillery. Add to this, the activity of light Maratha cavalry.

So the task which lay before Mughal commander was not easy. Therefore, after his arrival near the fort Zūlfiqār Khan, instead of opening the siege, sat down before it. For the moment his reputation as a general who had attained victory at Raigrah, seized Shambhājī's family and attained unbroken success at the Kuddappā and Arcot districts created much consternation among the garrison, but he could not compell the besieged to surrender the fort. He assessed the situation and requested the emperor to send 200 maunds of powder and 500 soldiers from Madras. Soon the demand increased to 500 maunds of powder and 500 grape shot, 500 soldiers and 30 gunners (September, 1690). He asked the English and the Dutch to supply him powder and gunners. But to add to his consternation in November 1690, the three Maratha chiefs such as Nīmājī Scindhia, Mānlojī Pandhare and Nāgojī Mane who had deserted the Mughals joined Rājā Rām with 2000 horsemen. They were assigned the charge of the defence at Chakra-Kulan. Three months later Rājā Rām himself arrived at Jinjī to send the efforts of his officers and to secure the assistance of the Petty Hindu princes of the eastern coast with a view to organising a confederacy against the Mughal armies, posted in Golkonda and Bījāpūr. But thanks to the discord and dissension amongst the Hindu chiefs his plan did not succeed. Only his first cousin the Raja of Tanjore helped him in defending the fort.

Zūlfiqār Khan had never expected that the Marathas would be able to stand against the superior military resources of the Mughals. Their roving bands delivered surprise night attacks, cut off the lines of communication, seized the convoy of provisions and reduced the Mughals to sorry plight. Famine stared then in their face. The desertion of the Deccani mansabdars, who had accompanied him, now left him almost isolated. Upon this he appealed to the emperor to send reinforcements, provisions and money etc. The latter quickly responded and deputed Lashkar Khan to take necessary steps to that end. The arrival of Syed Lashkar Khan gave much needed relief to Zūlfiqār Khan.¹ A little later, he summoned Alī Mardān Khan, faujdār of Kānchī. He strengthened his position by throwing supplies inside his camp and then started to lay hands on the kingdom of Tanjore and Trichnapalli, which is situated more than 60 kos from Jinjī. After levying contributions from the zamindars of the South Karnatak, he returned to his camp. He fought many battles with the Marathas and every time he defeated them and put to them to flight.² At the end of August he marched towards Tanjore and by December 1691 A.D. he conquered Trichnāpalli.

1. Dil., f.99b.

2. Ibid.

Such was the position of the Mughals at Jinjī when wazir Asad Khan and Prince Kam Bakhsh arrived there to relieve Zulfiqar Khan. Encamping at Saydūn, 60 kos from Jinjī, Asad Khan sent Rāo Dalpat with abundant provisions and treasures to Jinjī.¹ He ordered Rāo Gopal Singh Chandwār, Mālhojī Ghorpāre, Siddī Salīm Khan and Sāvāt Devi, to march towards the fort of Jinjī and extend necessary assistance to Zūlfiqār Khan. Passing through the hilly and rough tracts and dense jungles, they reached Kanchi where they met Alī Mardan Khan, the fauldar of the town. Rāo Dalpat marched in his company a stage further and encamped near the fort of Wāndīwashī, 12 kos from Jinjī. After a brief halt, Rāo Dalpat again resumed the journey. On the way, he received a letter from Zulfiqar Khan, which was delivered to him by Matlab Khan, informing him that he himself was to welcome him. The arrival of fresh reinforcements, money and provisions brought back life among the invaders. Shortly after, Zulfiqar Khan appointed Rāo Dalpat to command the right wing and himself rode out to reconnoitre the fort. When the enemy once more became active, Rāo Dalpat's division was sent to encounter them. Rāo Dalpat defeated them and put them to flight with heavy losses.² Still the situation remained fluid.

All the while the prince and the wazir lay encamped several miles away from the scene of action. But when the

1. Dil., f.103b.

2. Ibid., f.104a.

gravity of the situation was brought home to their minds, they moved from Saydun and arrived Kānchī. Zūlfiqār Khan and his associates hastened to welcome them. They arrived in their company near the fort of Jinjī.¹ Zūlfiqār Khan now renewed the siege in 1692 A.D. He pitched his camp opposite the Pondicherry gate of the fort, near a hillock named 'Ali Madad'.² Asad Khan and prince Kam Bakhsh, encamped three miles away from him, beyond the northern gate, on the road leading from Krishnagiri to Singhavaram³ hill. An enclosure was thrown round the prince's camp. It was guarded by Ismāil Khan and other local auxiliaries. His enclosure lay on the north-west of the fort, in the direction of the Karnātakgarh and opposite the fort of Jinjī. For purpose of safety each Mughal outpost was encircled with trenches and earth mounds. Despite all these precautions, the gate of Shaitan-darī could not be closed with the result that the garrison could move out freely and procure provisions whenever they liked. Kākar Khan held the outpost Vetvalahr (Anwal) from where the supplies reached the fort. Every night the Marathas very audaciously threw rockets into the prince's camp which compelled Zūlfiqār Khan to post some men there to guard it. One night a Maratha force, about

1. M.A., II, p.418; Dil., f.105a.

2. Bhimsen who was present there, says: "From that hillock the balls from the cannon reached the fort very well". Dil., f.105b.

3. But Bhim Sen mentions it as 'Sholingpuram'. (Dil., f.105a).

five thousand strong, sallied out of the north gate but was repulsed by the Mughal troops. But the consternation caused by this raid was so great that Zūlfiqār Khan shifted the prince's camp to a site by the side of his own. The two camps now were protected by the one and the same enclosure.

The place at the north gate, vacated by the prince was assigned to Syed Laskhar Khan. There after Zūlfiqār Khan decided to attack the Chandrayāndurg. He laid out trenches opposite the gate of the fort and bombarded the hill and the Pondichery gate but without any success.¹ In delivering this attack his soldiers had to face many hardships. Bhāmsen, the author of 'MusKha-e-Dilkusha' who was present on this occasion and who has given a eye witness account writes, "God knows what policy he adopted? Having placed the guns at the fort of the Chandrayāngarh hill, he fired the guns from both sides. The rain fell with excessive severity. Everyday we had to come and go over the hills. Grain was dear and the soldiers had to spend days and nights in the trenches amidst great hardship. Besides this, Asad Khan and Zūlfiqār Khan removed Rao Dalpat from the position from where he had been guarding the prince's camp and posted him to a trench where Mohammad Momin (Darogha of artillery) had constructed a courtyard, a strong balcony (البرك) in the centre of the hill. In the whole of the camp twenty four

1. Dil., ff.105b-106a.

tanks could be seen from the portico. In the rainy season the entire tract of land looked like a single tank".¹

After some time when Zūlfiqār Khan and Rāo Dalpat returned to the camp, and subsequently when they were proceeding towards their trenches, a large group of Marathas descended from the hill and attacked the outposts of Mohammad Momin. Zūlfiqār Khan and Rāo Dalpat immediately marched to his assistance. But they found it difficult either to move on horseback or foot. So they stopped where they were. Fortunately, however, the soldiers who were in the trenches took the enemy by surprise, slew them in a large numbers and pushed away the rest. Thus Rāo Dalpat and his men recovered their lost position and repaired the damaged outposts.²

At the end of the rainy season, the position of the Mughals became still more untenable because of the arrival of more than 30,000 Maratha barghis from western India. This huge army had been raised by Rām Chandra, the deputy of Rājā Ram in the Maharashtra. It was led by celebrated generals like Dhānājī Jādav and Santāji Ghorpāre and it was bubbling with enthusiasm.³ To counter this new threat, it was decided to withdraw from posts and concentrate at a single point,

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. M.L., II, p.415.

It is true that in the none of these campaigns Asad Khan directly participated, not because the emperor had deputed Zulfiqar Khan to conduct the campaign, although he was much junior to some of the officers associated with him on this occasion, but he had been explicitly instructed to play the part of generalissimo and therefore from the very beginning he cautiously watched the turn of events taking place on the front to which he had been posted. However, taking into consideration his unique position, we cannot hold him responsible for the failure of the campaign or for lack of enthusiasm. There were other reasons for the failure of the Mughals in presenting a common front or making a concerted effort against the Marathas. Pre-eminently it was due to lack of unity amongst the Mughal generals. One example may be cited when Zulfiqar Khan heard that Ismā'il Khān Māka had been surrounded by the enemies, he immediately sent word to Rāo Dālpāt asking him to march for his assistance but the Rāo replied that, "some body else should be sent to take charge of the trenches so that he may go to his aid"¹. In this way the indifferent attitude of Zulfiqar Khan and of the prince, joined to lack of unity among the Mughal generals occasioned the loss of the rich districts of Kaddappā and Kānjīvaran. Moreover, Zulfiqar Khan held no consultations either with his father

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1. Dil., f.107a.

Asad Khan or with prince Kām Bakhsh. Had he acted judiciously the country would have been saved from the hands of the Marathas.

The revival of the Maratha activity in the neighbouring region reduced the Mughals to a miserable plight. Instead of being aggressors, they had now been turned into defenders. The line of the source of supply of provisions was completely sealed and famine began to rage in the imperial camp. Even their communication with the base was completely cut off by the enemy.¹ News letters from the court stopped coming. Add to this, constant fear of surprise attacks and consequent loss of life and property. On the top of it all was the apprehension of the emperor's censure. No wonder that Zūlfiqār Khan, Asad Khan and prince Kām Bakhsh were overtaken with nervousness.

The imperial camp presented a tragic picture of strained reaction and conflicting objectives among the leading officers. Prince Kām Bakhsh was foolish and capricious. He was swayed by the counsels of his worthless and young favourites.² Asad Khan was astute and touchy. He felt much humiliated when the prince asked him to travel on horseback all the way from Kaddappa to Kanjīvaram. And

1. M.L., II, p.420.

2. Dil., f.107a; M.L., II, p.419; M.U., Eng.Tr., I, p.272.

the prince on his part was chagrined to find that the person appointed to assist and advise him was treating him as a suspect and keeping a vigilant eye on his movements and activities.

Therefore, to sabotage the plan of Zūlfiqār Khan he opened secret negotiations with Raja Ram who welcomed the dissensions in the royal camp with a sense of malicious satisfaction. But the secret leaked out and Zūlfiqār Khan tightened his vigilance. He instructed Rāo Dalpat to keep guard on the prince's camp and hired spies to furnish him relevant information with regard to his surreptitious manoeuvrings. Further, when Asad Khan reported to the emperor about the prince's behaviour and conduct, he was directed to be much careful and cautious. Kām Bakhsh was forbidden to go out for riding from the camp or to admit or send anybody from his camp without the permission of the ¹Wazir. The new restrictions proved irksome to the prince, though it was given out that they had been taken to safeguard the security of his person. Kām Bakhsh in sheer frustration made a bid to escape from virtual captivity but his attempt ²failed. His surveillance was tightened still further.

As if the sporadic night attacks of Santājī Ghorpare and Dhanājī Jadav were not enough to distract the mind of

1. M.A., pp.356-57; M.L., 419; Dil., f.107a; M.U., Eng.Tr., I, p.272.

2. Ibid.

Throughout the night, Zūlfiqār stayed in his trench ready to strike a blow and seize the prince. In the absence of any further information, it was quite natural for him to feel anxious. Having waited for a few hours, he summoned all high nobles for consultation and advice.¹ The following morning a meeting was held in the camp of Asad Khan. The nobles with one voice urged him to guard the prince more rigorously, saying, "What face shall we show to the emperor if we cannot set the prince right?" The evil should be nipped in the bud. Let it not occur again. It would not be proper to abandon the trenches and to concentrate the entire army in the rear, round his and the prince's camp". But even this task was not an easy. Zūlfiqār Khan was compelled to nail his big guns and abandon them. Thereafter fighting through enemy's ranks at the close of the day he reached Asad Khan's camp.

While Asad Khan and Zūlfiqār Khan were taking measures to guard the imperial camp from the attacks of the enemy, the foolish prince prompted by the advice of the silly courtiers continued to hatch plots against them.² They now suggested to him to arrest the two generals at the time of their next visit to him and then grasp supreme

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., M.L., II, p.420.

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., M.L., II, p.420.

power. But the news of this plot leaked out. Fed up with constant fighting and intrigues of the prince, Zūlfiqār Khan, who had reached his father's camp at night, held consultations with him and they decided to arrest the prince. Accordingly, they rode forthwith to Kām Bakhsh's camp. Arriving before the audience ¹hall they unceremoniously entered the canvas enclosure, seated on their elephants and knocked down the screens. The other nobles remained standing as silent spectators, for they were well aware of the prince's treacherous role. The servants of the prince foolishly discharged bullets and arrows at Asad Khan and his son and raised much hue and cry. There was confusion everywhere.

Asad Khan threw away his mask and appeared in true colours. Till now he had waited and watched the activities of the prince and had done nothing to bring him to his senses. Defeat at the hands of the Marathas and constant failure to stem the tide of their raids, together with the difficulties which the imperial soldiers were experiencing compelled him to resort to this alternative. Indeed, there was no other way out. Moreover, he had received the emperor's order to send the prince to the court with Mukarram Khan.²

1. Ibid.

2. Dil., f.111b; M.A., p.359; M.L., II, p.420; History of Gajee and its Rulers., p.311.

Thus he was doing nothing unwarranted or illegal. His overwhelming influence, quick movements and intelligence took prince Kām Bakhsh by surprise. The latter lost heart and overcame with the sense of utter helplessness, he came out of his harem by the main gate. He had hardly advanced a few steps when Asad Khan's musketeers seized him by his arms and led him bare-footed to the Hasir. Rāo Dalpat who was sitting on an elephant could not bear the humiliation to which, his master's son was being subjected. He promptly pushed his elephant forward and with great agility lifted the prince up on his haudah and sat behind him as his guard. He brought him to Asad Khan's presence.¹ Unable to control his anger, the aged minister scolded him saying, "The rumours you have heard are false. Our emperor is safe. Why have you done so? You have disgraced yourself and involved me and covered my grey hairs with disgrace."²

Taking advantage of the confusion caused by the arrest of the Prince Kām Bakhsh, the Maratha free-booters sallied out and delivered a few surprise attacks upon the imperial camp.³ Considering it unwise to leave the prince

1. Dil., f.108 a.

2. Ibid.

3. Khwāfī Khan says:

درین حالت که ماده فساد آشوب لشکر پادشاهی آماده گردیده بود ستاجی نالبار
بالسیت و پنج هزار سوار یک تان جنگی رسیده -
M.L., II, p.420.

in his own camp, Asad Khan brought him to that of his own and treated him with great courtesy. He saluted him and served dishes with his own hands. Syed Laskar Khān was appointed with his soldiers to guard him. The ladies of the prince's harem were also brought and were lodged in a separate tent.¹

At daybreak Zūlfiqār Khan summoned all the officers of the army, great and small, to explain to them the prince's treacherous role vis-a-vis his own position. He assured them about his safe custody and won them over to his side by lavish distribution of gold and presents. In this manner Asad Khan and his son were able to effect unity and harmony amongst the generals and the soldiers.

With this episode ended the fear of internal hostility and divided counsels. A great obstacle had been removed. But the trouble was not yet over. Shortly after, news arrived that Santājī Ghorpare who scored victory over Āli Mardān Khan, the fauldar of Kanjīvaram, had not only ravaged and plundered the regions through which he passed but that he had also

1. Dil., f.108a; M.A., pp.353-59; Storia, II, p.316; Khwafi Khan has not given the details, see M.L., II, p.420; Prof. Sarkar mentions that, the wagīr called prince Kam Bakhsh a dancing girl's son; but this sentence is not mentioned in 'Bakhsh-e-Dilkusha' of Bhimsen who was an eye witness to the whole affair. Had Asad Khan said so, he would have certainly mentioned it.

established his sway over it and was marching towards Jinjī to strike a final blow at the imperialists. Asad Khan and his son now found themselves in a very precarious and perplexing situation. But they did not lose courage and began to form plans to repel the Maratha threat. After Santāji Ghorpāre had arrived at Jinjī, for several days there occurred irregular skirmishes between the opposite parties. The Marathas missed no opportunity of raiding the imperial camp and delivering attacks on the foraging parties. Bhimsen, an eye witness of these events writes, "All the elephants, horses, camels and material that had been with Asad Khan were plundered by the enemy. Santa arrived at the fort of Jinjī in pride and boastfulness and waged war hotly. The enemy exceeded 20,000 while the imperialist had only a small force with them and many of them were engaged in guarding either Asad Khan's camp and equipage or that of the prince. The prince's servants were hostile and they never left their camps to assist their brethern. Mān Singh son of Rūp Singh Rathore and other imperial officers concealed themselves in their tents on the pretext of illness. Zūlfiqār Khan, Rāo Dalpat, Sarfarās Khan Deccani, Fath Ullah Khan Tūrānī, Rāo Kālū (Kānhoji) Maratha and a few other mansabdars with only 2000 horsemen came to offer battle to the enemy".¹

1. Dil., f.108h.

Despite their slender resources the imperialists won every battle which they fought against the Marathas. The enemy suffered defeat after defeat whenever it came to clash with imperialists. But these victories proved to be futile, because with the onset of rains the imperial army found itself surrounded by the Maratha bargis. Famine began to damp the spirits of the Mughal soldiers. Grain became scarce. It was not available at any price. So Zulfiqar Khan had to march with his division to procure food and fodder from Wāndīwāsh, 24 miles north-east of Jinjī. He arrived there at night. His Tūrānī soldiers under the cover of darkness fell upon the helpless banjaras and carried off whatever they could. It was difficult to control them. In the morning of 5th June 1693 Zūlfiqār collected unplundered grain and set out on his return march. Hardly had he covered some distance than Santājī Ghorpāre with 20,000 men blocked his passage at Desūr, 10 miles south of Wāndīwāsh and surrounded his entire party. Zulfiqar Khan put up stiff resistance and succeeded in taking shelter in the fort of Desūr where he remained encamped for two days. The Marathas now brought a larger army to deliver a more telling attack on him. Bhīm San records, "They fired so many muskets that the soldiers and banjaras of our army were completely overpowered. The enemy aimed its bullets at the elephants on which the imperial commanders were mounted. Many bullets hit the elephants of Khan Bahādur,

but Rāo Dalpat and his Bundela soldiers boldly advanced to clear the way. I, who was standing behind the Rāo in his ~~handah~~ seized the shield and held it before the Rāo for his protection. Although 'Shrī Bhagwān' is the protector of everyone, two bullets successively struck the shield near my shoulder. We then reached a rice-field, many of the oxen and camels of the convoy got struck up in mud; horses moved with difficulty. Our musketeers ran short of powder and our artillery ran short of munitions".¹

Rāo Dalpat's men on account of mud and unevenness of the road on the right side, fell apart from the main army. Only 80 troopers remained with him.² This gave a fine opportunity to the enemy and they sent their matchlockmen to the top of a hillock from where they began to shoot at the imperialists reducing them to a miserable plight. The Rāo now halted for a while to extricate the bullucks and camels from the mud, while the rest of the army marched ahead. The Rāo risked his life and continued to repel the attacks. Fortunately for him, at this critical moment arrived Sarfaraz Khan Deccanī with five or six thousand troops and assisted the Rāo in driving away the enemy. The Marathas reappeared and opened their fire again but they finally withdrew. Undoubtedly on this

1. Dil., f.109a.

2. Ibid., f.109b.

occasion Rao and his Bundela soldiers showed remarkable¹ courage and bravery by rescuing Zūlfiqār's division.

But the provisions and fodder brought by Zūlfiqār Khan and Rao Dalpat proved insufficient for the thousand soldiers and animals inside the Mughals camp. Their condition became so deplorable that every night the Mughal soldiers in large numbers would go to the Maratha camp where the provisions were plentiful. They would bring cooked bread and grain and return to their quarters by day break. Nor did the Marathas prevent any enemy soldier from doing it. Every day from the dawn to dusk the Marathas would appear before the imperial camp making demonstrations² and then withdrawing.

In the midst of these impelling conditions, it was but natural for Asad Khan to think of abandoning the campaign breaking up the camp and withdrawing to Islāmpurī. With inadequate resources, starving troops and scarcity of munitions it was impossible to reduce the fort of Jinjī. All of his efforts and those of his son had proved to be fruitless. At length, to save himself from being censured by the emperor Asad Khan made secret overtures of peace to Rājā Rām. Jadunath Sarkar's statement that he even offered

1. Dil., f.109b.

2. Ibid., f.110a.

to pay a heavy bribe to him on condition of being allowed to retreat to Wāndīwāsh casts a slur on the honesty of the Wazir Asad Khan. But it is not corroborated by any historian contemporary or later. Bhimsen does not refer to it. Khwafī Khan does not record it and the court historian Saqī Mustad Khan is silent about it. Thus it would be uncharitable to presume that Asad Khan bribed Rājā Rām. On the contrary, there is ample evidence on record to show that the state affairs in the Maratha camp were far from satisfactory.¹ The Maratha court was divided into two groups. Though Rājā Rām's generals and ministers pressed him to continue the war, plunder the Mughal camp which was starving, exploit the situation in his favour and establish his sway before the arrival of fresh troops from the headquarters, but he and his band of loyal supporters were averse to this plan. They had shown weary of the prolonged struggle and needed respite. They were keen to arrive at an amicable settlement with the enemy.²

No wonder that Asad Khan and his son Zulfīqār Khan were able to influence Rājā Rām and they succeeded in persuading him to agree to an armistice on the condition that he would allow the imperial troops to withdraw to Wāndīwāsh. In return, the Wazir promised to recommend to the emperor

1. The New History of the Marathas, by G.S. Sardesai, Bombay 1946, vol. I, p.332.

2. Ibid.

that he should conclude peace with the Maratha king. After this, both the father and son became busy with planning and arranging the withdrawal of the imperial troops. But Rāo Dalpat did not like this. He urged Zūlfiqār Khan not to withdraw, and offered to present to him his gold and silver worth 40,000 to meet the expenses of the army. He wanted to save the imperial prestige and honour of the Mazir. While the Khan was still giving thought to his

proposal, one day his artillery men loaded their baggage, left the camp and sent him word that as they were dying of hunger, they are going to Wāndiwāsh. It was difficult to fight the Marathas without a heavy park of artillery; so it was decided to raise the siege and withdraw. Commenting on the tragic situation Bhānisen remarks, "There was no opportunity for heroism, no space for charging, no possibility of slaying and no legs to run away."¹

After waiting in vain for imperial orders Asad Khan and Zūlfiqār Khan withdrew to Wāndiwāsh. They left Jinjī with the prince on noon of 22nd or 23rd January, 1693. He had to face many hardships on the way due to the scarcity of food and fodder. Most of the horses and camels and transport animals perished. Most of the soldiers had burnt their baggage and taken to their heels without caring for

1. Dil., f.110b.

their relatives or friends. The nobles and officers abandoned the stores which were plundered by the Maratha soldiers. Thus bereft of his following Asad Khan arrived at Wāndīwāsh on January 26, 1693 A.D.¹

It brought immense relief to the Wazir when it was reported to him that Qasim Khan, the newly appointed fauidar of Kānjīvaram was coming with abundant stores and large reinforcements.² The fauidar also brought letters from the court with the news that the emperor was alive and well. There was great rejoicing in the imperial camp. Music was played, drums were beaten, alms were distributed and arrangements were made for dancing and merry-making. While these celebrations were still on, orders were received from the emperor that Asad Khan and prince Kam Bakhsh should return to court and that Zūlfiqār Khan should stay where he was.³ When Asad Khan arrived at Musratābād Sagar, he received an other order to stop there and send the prince Kam Bakhsh alone to the emperor at Gālgala.⁴

Without ascertaining the truth and holding enquiry into prince's conduct during the Jinjī campaign, the emperor extracted from Asad Khan a huge sum of money to compensate for the loss of the prince's stores and artillery which had

1. Dil., f.110b.

2. Ibid., 111a.

3. Ibid., 111b.

4. Ibid., 112a.

been abandoned at Jinjī. To add insult to injury, two mahals of the wasir's jagir were attached for recovering this amount.¹ But subsequently when the emperor heard the other version and had been convinced of the bona fides of aged wasir he summoned him to his presence. Asad Khan arrived at the court on 21st Jamadī I² 1105 A.H./Monday 8th January, 1694 A.D. according to the author of 'Maāsir-e-Ālamsirī', when he stepped at the spot from where greetings were offered to the emperor, Multafat Khan the 'Darogha-e-Khawasan' who was standing nearby whispered "forgiveness has sweetness which vengeance has not". The emperor replied, "You have recalled this verse at the right moment". Looking kindly at his old minister, he ordered him to kiss his feet. Then he raised his head and treated him with favour.³

During the next four years Asad Khan remained at court at Islāmpurī. His son Zūlfiqār Khan remained busy in conducting the siege operation at Jinjī. When in the year 1697 A.D. he fell ill and became so weak as to be unable to sign his name,⁴ the work of the civil departments coming to a stand-still. Upon this the emperor directed Ināyat Ullah Khan to sign the papers on his behalf. By December he recovered his health and the same month he had the greatest

1. Dil., f.112a.

2. M.A., p.364; M.U., Eng.Tr., I, p.273.

3. Ibid.

4. M.A., pp.390-91.

pleasure of his life when he placed before His Majesty Zūlfiqār Khan's despatch announcing that the imperial forces had succeeded in reducing the fort of Jinjī.¹ In reward for his excellent administrative work, Asad Khan's rank was raised by 1000 zat and sawar to haft hazari (7000 zat and 7000 sawar). In 1699-1700 A.D. when the emperor left Islāmpurī to renew the struggle against the Marathas, he appointed Asad Khan to guard the imperial family.²

On 4th Rabi-us-Sani 1113 A.H./28th August 1701 A.D. in accordance with the royal order Asad Khan came to see the emperor.³ It seems that the latter had purposely called him to discuss the siege of Khelna and to apprise him of his future plans. During the progress of the siege the emperor again summoned him and conferred upon him the title of 'Amir-ul-Umara', gave him a jewelled dagger, 4000 ashrafis and ordered him to command the Mughal troops besieging Khelna 6th Shaban 1113 A.H./26th December, 1701 A.D.⁴

Asad Khan's vanguard under Fathullah and Hamī-uddīn crossed the defile before sunrise, captured the hillocks facing the fort from where arrows could be shot into the

1. 'In the name of Zūlfiqār Khan Nusrat Jung, Ginjee was renamed as Nusratgarh'. (History of Ginjee and its Rulers, p.347).

2. M.A., p.408; M.U., Eng.Tr., I, p.273; History of Aurangzeb, V, p.160.

3. Dil., f.136a; M.A., p.441; History of Aurangzeb, V., p.179; Akhbarat, 4th Rabi-us-Sani, 45th Julius (R.Y.).

4. M.A., p.450; M.L., II, p.492; Dil., f.136a; Waqa-i-Alangirī, p.46; The Army of the Indian Moghals, p.289; Akhbarat 6th Shaban, 45th Julius (R.Y.)

fort of Khelna. Guns were mounted on these hillocks and the houses of the garrison were put to fire. The siege dragged on for five months. The Wazir shared the sufferings and miseries of the imperial officers and soldiers. He fell ill in February 1702. The emperor ordered that until he regained his health, he should be allowed entrance into the audience hall from the inner side of 'the hall of grievances' (Diwan-e-Mazālin) and to sit in railing (Kathara) at a distance of one cubit (Zira) from the steps of the royal chamber.¹

Hardly had he recovered his health than he heard the news of the death of his son-in-law Bahramānd Khan.² His nerves were shattered and he had now no more stamina to bear the strain of a prolonged campaign. The emperor ordered Kam Bakhsh to go to console him and bring him to the court. Upon his arrival the emperor "soothed his wounded heart ~~an~~ with consolatory words" and presented him with special food and jewelled sarpiḥ.³ While on his return march from Khelna in June 1702, one day, after crossing drain the Wazir could not find a single dry spot on which he could pitch his camp. He, therefore, set up a small raoti, but at night it rained so heavily that the raoti twice fell over his head. For the

1. M.A., p.460; M.U., Eng.Tr., I, p.274.

2. M.A., p.461.

3. Ibid.

rest of the night his servants stood holding the canvas sheet, tied at four corners with ropes and thus saved the man whose health was failing. By this time Asad Khan had grown too old to bear the strain of such arduous campaign, in the hilly tracts and deep ravines of the Konkan. But he dared not defy the wishes of the emperor who prized him most. And if at the ^{end} ~~fag~~ of his life the emperor had any person in whom he had fullest confidence, it was Asad Khan. During the next two years the old Wazir remained in his constant attendance.

When the imperial camp was in Puna in December 1703,¹ it was a sheer chance that the Wazir for the first time in his life fell a prey to misunderstanding. Ināyet Ullah Khan Nawab of Khāṣa and Tān² pitched his camp on the highest tract of land. Consequently, he had to pitch his quarters on a low land. After some time his eunuch Vasant sent a man to Ināyet Ullah to ask him "to get out of the place, so that the Nawab's tent may be pitched here". The Khan replied, "Very well, please wait till I have found some place to take up my quarters". But the eunuch uttered unpleasant words. The Khan, without creating any more fuss, shifted his camp to some other place. But somehow this matter was reported by Ikhlāskesh to the emperor, who immediately

1. M.A., p.475.

2. Akhbarat, 11th Muharram, 47th Julus (R.Y); M.A., pp. 475-77.

ordered Hamīduddīn Khan Bahādur to go and tell Amīr-ul-Umarā Asad Khan that "It was not proper. You should go to your former place or some other spot. The man who had set up his tent first should remain there"¹. The Khan conveyed the order to Amīr-ul-Umarā who because of his feeble health delayed its compliance. But, next day when the Amīr-ul-Umarā came to His Majesty at the time of audience court, the emperor ordered Ehtām Khan to take the Amīr-ul-Umarā to Ināyet Ullah Khan and make him beg pardon for what had occurred. Asad Khan carried out the instructions. It so happened that when the Amīr-ul-Umarā Asad Khan called on Ināyet Ullah Khan,² the latter was in his bathroom, so Amīr-ul-Umarā sat down in his Diwan-e-Khana in which there was no carpet. The Khan quickly came out. The Amīr-ul-Umarā stood up and took him to his own tent. He presented him one 'than'³ of cloth and pacified him. He was so generous and kind-hearted that in the later days of his life also never

1. Akhbarat, 11th Muharram, 47th Julius (R.Y); M.A., pp. 475-77.

2. Saqī Mustaf Khan who also reached there, writes: "Amir Khan sent me to convey the message to Ināyet Ullah Khan that such an order has been issued, but it is advisable that you should quickly petition the emperor to postpone the visit of Amīr-ul-Umarā. My going at mid-day and the visit of Amīr-ul-Umarā to the Khan's house happened at the same time. My message remained undelivered". M.A., p.476.

3. Ibid., p.477.

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wanted to annoy anyone.

Very little is known about the last three years of his career. Perhaps he remained with his master in this critical period of his life and shared his disappointments and failure. However, in his last will emperor Aurangzeb mentioned that "There is not, nor will there (ever) be any wazir better than Asad Khan".² And really even after the death of emperor Aurangzeb his sons Prince Mohammad Azam and Muazzam Shah allowed him to hold the office that he had held for years together without any break.

ASAD KHAN AND WILLIAM MORRIS'S EMBASSY TO
THE COURT OF EMPEROR AURANGZEB

Piracy in Indian waters was the major problem which agitated the mind of the Mughal emperor as much as that of

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1. When Aurangzeb fell ill his youngest son Kam Bakhsh wrote to the wazir Asad Khan to hand over the treasure to him (Kam Bakhsh); the wazir replied, "May god preserve His Majesty's life. If it happened or otherwise and he die, I am constrained to make over the treasure, the property, and the whole of the money to that one of the emperor's four sons who succeeds in ascending the throne and in crowning himself, and to him I shall render an account everything". Storia, IV, p.241.
 2. Letter quoted in History of Aurangzeb, V., p.262. Aurangzeb in an other letter to his son, writes: "Although I shall leave behind me a very competent wazir who has come to the front in my reign and whom I have protected, yet what good will it do, as the four pillars of the empire, viz., my four sons, will never leave that poor man to himself to do his work" (Ahkam, No.11).

the agents of the East India Company. The English pirates known as 'Interlopers' plundered with equanimity cargo boats of their countrymen as well as those of Indian merchants, causing tremendous loss to both. The latter made incessant complaints to the imperial officers, but they found themselves helpless to do anything because they had no naval force. And though the East India Company had a number of guns and other means, its officers were handicapped by the fact that they had no instructions from the principals in England to deal with the 'Interlopers'. Thus they found themselves in a very awkward situation, because the Mughal officers could not distinguish between the genuine English traders and pirates who hailed from England. They held the local English officers responsible for the nefarious activities of their countrymen.

In the last quarter of the 17th century the Mughal emperor was much pre-occupied with his internal difficulties and therefore was not in a position even to think out a solution of the problem. His first and foremost concern was to liquidate the independence of the surviving states of Bījāpūr and Golkonda and to wipe off the Maratha disaffection. All his resources were concentrated upon the execution of his military and political plans. This indifference on his part was responsible for the increasing cases of piracy on the eastern and the western coast. The majority of sufferers were merchants of Surat. Unfortunately,

however, its monopoly of trade security was threatened. Moreover, the 'Interlopers' proved to be a source of great danger to the English settlements in India. Though the majority of these pirates were English men who were indifferent to the interests of their countrymen much less of Indian merchants. In these circumstances the Mughal officers, who received constant complaints from Indian merchants about the highhandedness of the pirates had no other alternative, but that of taking arbitrary steps and of holding the East India Company responsible for the mischief. But the Company did not accept this charge. It disowned the pirates and expressed its inability to deal with them. It was however anxious to see that piracy was suppressed. But the emperor had no means to accomplish the same. As regards the Company, it had only means of self defence in guns and gunners. But this force was not sufficient for any other purpose. In fact, the Company's ships were not so adequately equipped as to be utilized for the suppression of piracy. On the western coasts they had no depot where they could keep their arms and ammunitions. Their only business was to carry the cargoes or receive them at Surat or Bombay and transport the goods in the shortest possible time to the destination. Nor they had any specific instructions from London to chase the pirates and destroy them. On the contrary, they were asked to avoid them. In short, both the Mughals and the English expected from each other that either of them would take

the initiative in the matter. In contrast to the English, it was very difficult for the Mughal emperor to turn his attention from the internal problems to the external one with which he was only indirectly concerned.

It is related that in September 1695 a notorious pirate named Henry Every captured two cargo boats. One of them Rath Mohammadi was of considerable value; it belonged to Abdul Ghafur who had suffered a similar loss a few years back. While the other ship, Ganje Sawai belonged to the emperor himself. It was the largest ship in the port of Surat. It was commanded by Captain Mohammad Ibrahim. It was returning from her usual voyage to Mecca where it had transported the emperor's yearly presents and pilgrims.¹ It had 1200 persons on board. It was seized by the pirates between Bombay and Daman. The pirates treated with barbaric indignity lady passengers of the highest rank.² Several of them threw themselves into the sea or slew themselves with daggers³ to preserve their chastity. Every bit of silver and jewels was seized and Ganje Sawai ~~was~~ was abandoned to find its way to Surat. The ship was reported to have had treasures worth 52,000,00 of rupees and silver and gold, and

1. M.L., II, p.421.

2. Ibid., p.422.

3. Ibid.

the produce of the sale of Indian goods at Mecca and Jeddah.¹
The pirate's crew are said to have received the prize money amounting to £1000.

When the report of the seizure and plunder of the Ganje Sawai reached Surat, there was an outburst of excitement and anger amongst the Muslims. The local English merchants and officials were held responsible for this heinous outrage. The Mughal governor Itmad Khan was compelled to post guard over the Company's factory and warehouse to protect the English factors from the hands of infuriated mob. As the English were suspected of having a hand in the aforesaid incident, President Annesley and his colleagues were arrested and the European trade in the port of Surat was completely suspended.² Upon this Annesley and Sir John Gayer (at Bombay) lodged a protest and demanded that the English factors be released. But the emperor rejected their demands and demanded that the English, Dutch and the French should scour the seas in pursuit of the pirates and provide regular escort to pilgrim ships going to Mecca. Till these demands were satisfied European trade was ordered to remain suspended and the prisoners to remain under custody. Apprehending a great loss, Annesley accepted the demands and agreed to.

1. In the words of Khwāfī Khan:

مبلغ پنجاه دو لک روپیہ نقد ز سرخ دریال کہ لبر فروختن جنس ہندوستان
در منہ وجہ بہ بندر سورت می آوردند -

2. M.L., II, p.422.

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provide escort to the pilgrim ships between Surat and Jeddah. As a result of it, the port of Surat was reopened to the English trade and the prisoners were set free. And for sometime, no incident of this type occurred.

But shortly after the Company's servant found it difficult to abide by the conditions imposed by the emperor. Their own sailors began to play foul. The crew of one of the ships turned pirates and they killed their captain. This matter was so serious that Gayer and Annesley sent strongly worded appeals to the Governor and Committee of the Company at London to take adequate measures to suppress piracy and safeguard their lives. They also pointed to the danger of reprisals and loss of trade. The authorities at Fort St. George also wrote to the Court of Directors about the activities of the pirates near Calicut. They reported that pirates came from New York and that the majority of them were English. They drew attention to the injury done by them to the Indian merchants and its inevitable reaction upon the local authorities against the English. The officers of the Company in London gave the consideration to their complaints, concluded peace with France and appealed to the British Government to protect their agents from pirates. They proposed to the Government that three men of war should be sent to St. Mary's and Cape Comorin, whence they should sail along the coast of Malabar, Bombay and Surat, visit all the ports and seek information about the

pirats and suppress their activities and then they should return to England.

But before these men of war could appear in Indian waters and deal with there effectively, the pirates, once more became active. After the Ganie Sawai affairs was over, friendly relations were established between the English and Itmad Khan the Governor of Surat. Itmad Khan died in May 1697 and was succeeded by the corrupt, vindictive Amanat Khan. Perhaps, in concert with the new governor, captain William Kidd 'The Grand Pirate', with a view to undermine the position of the English factor, robbed a ship called Quedah on its way from Bengal to Surat. It is related that the vessel had on the board a cargo valued at £30000 of which a considerable portion belonged to Mukhlis Khan, an important noble of the court. A few months later, one of the best ships belonging to Husain Hamidan, armed with 50 guns and manned with 300 men was seized off, St.¹John by three pirates on her voyage to Jeddah. The treasures, goods and horses on the board of the ship valued 18,50,000 rupees. It is said that each man of the crew received £800. These two occurrences compelled the new governor Amanat Khan to issue orders that "No one should be permitted to leave the town, that no provisions should be taken to the English Ships, and that all the seaborne traffic should be stopped". Amanat

1. On the Coromandal Coast.

Khan also forbade attack on the English factory and promised to forward local complaints to the emperor. As regards the Muslims who had suffered tremendous loss, he drew up a separate petition to the effect that "ye infidella had robbed and killed thu true believers and they would forbear all public worship in their mustack till the king would order them satisfaction".

Shortly after the receipt of the petition, the emperor ordered Asad Khan, the wazir to issue a 'parwana'¹ to the governor of Surat. "In the document Aurangzeb emphasised the losses inflicted on the Indian merchants by the pirates; pointed to the ineffectiveness of the English ships in affording protection and ordered the governor of Surat to exercise pressure upon the English, Dutch and the French to make them pay compensation to the emperor's subjects. He declared that "unless written guarantees were not given that the pirates would stop their activities the English, the Dutch and the French would not be allowed to reside and trade in his dominions"². Acting upon the emperor's order the governor of Surat gave an ultimatum to the factors of the three nations demanding compensation

1. PARWANA: An order; a grant or a letter under royal seal; a letter of authority from an official to his subordinate.

2. See, "Norris Embassy to Aurangzeb", p.33.

for the losses sustained by the Indian merchants and asking that they should give a clear undertaking to clear the seas and provide sufficient protection to the pilgrim ships. The Indian merchants were forbidden to have any dealings with the Europeans and guards were posted over the factories. The Dutch and the Frenchmen were quick to come to terms with the Mughal authorities. They paid compensation for the loss and signed guarantees for safe navigation between the gulf of Mokha and the Persian Gulf. Amānat Khan now demanded that the English should also give a similar undertaking for the southern Indian seas, from the Coromandal coast and Bengal to Java and Sumatra. Upon this President Annesley and his Council asked for time to obtain instructions from Sir John Gayer at Bombay. On being apprised of the seriousness of the situation Gayer arrived at Surat and advised Annesley neither to make the payment to the governor nor give any guarantee for the safety of the Southern seas. He told him to assure the local authorities that the English had furnished convoy for two years and would be willing to do so for another year and that of all the European nations England was the only to send her men of war to suppress piracy. He told him that he was quite ready to discuss the matter with the local authorities. But the fact of the matter is that Mr. Gayer avoided meeting personally the governor Amānat Khan who from the very core of his heart disliked the English. The reluctance and the delay on the parts of English factors to give an undertaking enraged Amānat Khan who immediately despatched several hundred soldiers to blockade them

at Surat, threatening to put them to death. All the persons connected with the factory, such as brokers and the Indian servants were arrested and publicly whipped and imprisoned. These drastic measures and the firm attitude of the Governor compelled President Annesley to discuss the matter at a general council which decided to give guarantee similarly to that which had been given by the Dutch and the French. After this the emperor demanded that the European's should compensate Husain Hamidan and the other merchants for the losses they had suffered. But the Mughal governor explained to him that the European companies at Surat could not be asked to pay compensation to the Indian merchants because the pirates were "men of all nations" and they did not acknowledge the authority of any sovereign. Aurangzeb was satisfied and temporarily removed the ban on English Company's trade. But the new edict did not improve the position of English trade at Surat. It had almost come to an end. It was at this critical moment of Company's fortune that the President Annesley was replaced by Stephen Colt on 13th May 1698.

The new President had also to face the same problems of piracy and compensation. Husain Hamidan and other Indian merchants continued to demand compensation. Mr. Stephen Colt bribed the Mughal officers and successfully persuaded them to relax the ban and help him in settling the claims of the Indian merchants. When these ^{secret} transactions between the local

Mughal officers and the President of the English Company had been brought to the notice of Husain Hamidan, he began to regard the London Company as the biggest pirate and he pressed his demands further. The new governor of Surat Diyanat Khan renewed the question of claims and compensation. Upon this, Sir John Gayer rebutted the charge of piracy against the English, appealed to the emperor and the Governor not to believe in the allegations without holding a proper inquiry. Consequently, Aurangzeb ordered Diyanat Khan to use his authority and prevent any disturbance to the Company's trade at Surat and also to see that Husain Hamidan's claims are met. As to the second part of the order, it could not be implemented because President Colt denied the responsibility of English for such occurrences. He emphatically told the Governor that it was impossible for him to meet the demand without consulting the authorities at London. The doubtful attitude of the President compelled the Mughal Governor to imprison the John Gayer and some other employees of the London Company. Thereafter a strong representation was made by the Governor to the emperor that despite the repeated orders, the Company had not paid debts.

As a matter of fact, the possibility for any settlement seemed remote. The situation was further complicated when an English ship supposed to belong to London Company seized Abdul Ghafur's ships one of which was sailing from Mokha and the other three were carrying considerable sums

of money. Add to it, the complaints of the Imām of Mokha that he had not yet received compensation for the losses of goods and money in Hussain Hamidan's ship. On the top of it all, was changed attitude of the English, the Portuguese and the Dutch who were helping the Marathas with men, money and ammunition, and thus foiling the efforts of the Mughal general Sīdī Yāqūt to capture the coastal forts of the enemy.¹

This stiffened Aurangzeb's attitude towards the Europeans. Their recent activities compelled him to recall Asad Khan, the Wazir from Islāmpurī to the camp. In August, 1701 he held consultations with him on many issues. The details of this meeting have not been recorded but it can be presumed that he must have discussed with him the line of policy to be pursued against the Europeans and the Marathas. For, in early December 1701 the Emperor issued a proclamation through the Wazir Asad Khan that all the settlements of the English should be seized and their trade should be stopped. Accordingly, Diyanat Khan seized some of the Company's factors at Surat and forbade supply of provisions to them. He also confiscated goods amounting to over Rs. 1,40,000. These were given to Abdul Ghafūr as a part of compensation due. But the claims of Hussain Hamidan had yet to be satisfied. In February 1702 Prince Sultan Mohammad

1. M.L., II, p.423.

Azīm-us-Shān, the governor of Bengal, attacked the Company's settlement of Patna, Rājmaḥal and Kāsim Bazar. Hisennere too the goods of the English factors were seized and their trade was stopped. All these troubles which the English factors had to face could have been avoided had they come to an amicable settlement through the Wazir. They could have asked for remuneration for policing the Indian ocean, for making a concerted action against the pirates but they did not. On the other hand, they made little efforts to establish friendly relations with the Mughals by sending support to them against the Marathas who were being backed up by the Portuguese the Dutch and the French.

Conditions began to change after 1701 A.D. The old London Company was replaced by the new East India Company in accordance with the Royal Charter of September 1698. Before the inception of the new Company, it was decided to send an ambassador to the Mughal court for promoting friendly commercial relations between the two countries, Sir William Morris was deputed for this purpose. Shortly after his arrival in India, Sir William opened negotiations with Asad Khan and requested him to inform the emperor of his arrival. He also requested him to give instructions to the fauidars through whose provinces he would pass on his way to the court, for safe conduct for himself, his retinue and for the presents which he was bringing for the emperor. While

doing so, he adopted the diplomatic procedure as obtained in other countries. But Mohammad Ayed pointed out to him that he had committed a grave mistake by sending such a letter to the Wazir through an ordinary peon and that the letter would not be accepted. He advised him to send another message through someone of a higher status, but adequately attended and provided with suitable presents for the Wazir. But the envoy rejected the suggestions and after consulting John Pitt, he sent an information of his arrival to the emperor through the local news writer.¹ Thus he failed to secure a Parwana from the Wazir. He tried other means, but he failed in his efforts. He then turned to Imam Quli Beg, a resident of the court, to obtain for him the Wazir's hasbulhukm and dastak² and to bring it to Masulipatam as soon as possible. No sooner had Asad Khan received suitable presents from Imam Quli Beg on behalf of the British envoy, then he assured him that he would inform the emperor of latter's arrival and of his desire to meet him. Imam Quli on his own behalf, assured Sir William that after he had met the emperor he would be escorted back safely to Masulipatam. The emperor ordered Asad Khan to arrange for Norris's safe conduct to the camp and Imam Quli was commissioned to take hasbulhukm and dastak to Masulipatam.

1. Norris Embassy to Aurangzeb, p.172.

2. Dastak: A pass or permit.

But owing to the continuance of war conditions, the local officers could not make proper arrangements for Sir William's safe conduct. Consequently, he decided to sail for Surat and from there to go to the Mughal camp. Norris's decision alarmed the local Mughal officers. They began to fear that they might be charged with negligence and disobedience. Therefore, they opened correspondence with Sir William assuring him of their services and flattering him for his discretion. But the ambassador was not the man to be taken in by sweet words. He protested and reported their conduct to the wazir, Asad Khan and his son Zulfikar Khan.

Asad Khan promptly responded to the communication he had received from Sir William and he tried to persuade him to change his mind and not to travel by sea to Surat and from there by land to the imperial court. He pointed out the impropriety of the step he was contemplating by saying, "dear brother give ear to me and come to land yet my word to ye King may not prove lye". In other words, the wazir thought that his prestige was at stake. He explained to the English envoy that it was not his fault, but it was that of local officers who had failed to carry out the imperial instructions. And thus by playing their

1. Norris Embassy to Aurangzeb, p.182.

game, he should not "lower himself and make his enemies rejoice". The Wazir closed his letter with the warning that if the ambassador persisted in his resolve, he might risk the displeasure of the emperor who might not grant him the necessary daatak for the journey from Surat to the Court. Further the Wazir sought to impress upon Mr. Pitt that as the ambassador had only recently arrived in India and was unfamiliar with the custom and etiquette of this land it would not be advisable for him to change the original plan.

William Norris acknowledged Asad Khan's letter expressing his appreciation for his friendship and kindness. But he explained that he had many obstacles in covering the journey by land. He had already sent his baggage and equipment by ship and while he himself just going to board the ship when he received last despatch. However, with the exceptional courtesy of a seasoned diplomat Sir William wrote back to say "Your highness will be more fully satisfied of the necessity I lay under of going to Surat where I have the happiness to see you, which words cannot express how much I desire. The delays and disappointments I have met with here have been more irksome because they kept me so long from the most noble victorian and great Asad Chawn whose friendship I shall esteem dearer than my life".

Sir William boarded the Soumers at Masulipatm and reached Surat where he was accorded a great reception by the

officers of the new company. During his stay for few weeks at Surat was given different types of suggestions about his audience with the emperor. He was told to visit Asad Khan, but that he should not expect a return visit because the emperor never permitted any of his ministers or ¹Umara to have any conversation with the European or other distinguished strangers without his permission. Pereira pointed out to him, on the authority of an Arminian that the Dutch envoy whilst in emperor's camp had not only visited the Nazir and other important ministers but had refused the invitation of one amir to visit him because he had not obtained the prior permission for the same. Further, he told him that as far as he could remember the whole expense of the Dutch envoy in carrying on the negotiations amounted to rupees two lacs. In the end, he advised the English envoy to negotiate only with that minister who is appointed for the purpose and that he must strictly limit his visits as to maintain his dignified position.

Sir William left Surat on 24th January 1701 on his way to the imperial camp. After facing many hardships he reached Brahmपुरi. He informed Asad Khan of his arrival. The Wazir sent a messenger intimating his great pleasure at the news and informing him that he was arranging a better

1. Umara: Plural of amir.

and more convenient camp for the ambassador on the other side of the river. During his three weeks stay at the court Sir William tried to win over some of the Mughal officers quite close to the emperor so that he could attain his object. He also strove hard to take into confidence some of the eunuchs to elicit information about the emperor and his servants. But all this could hardly facilitate attainment of his objective. In the end without seeing Asad Khan he saw the emperor on Monday 28th April 1701, but he failed to create desired impression on his mind.

Without going into other causes of Sir William's failure in his mission, it may be pointed out that he fell a victim to wrong advice in so far as to abstain from making friends with the great Wazir. Indeed it was the game of some of the factors like Thomas Pitt who were closely connected with the old company to see that he did not gain his object. The latter had successfully persuaded Asad Khan to safeguard the interest of old Company. Likewise there were persons like Yār Alī Beg and Rūh Ullah Khān at the imperial court who prevailed upon envoy to by-pass the Wazir and they led him to think that his direct contact with the emperor would produce the desired result. This places Sir William in direct contrast with Sir Thomas Roe. The latter was a great diplomat. Though in the beginning he had faced the opposition of Asaf Khan, eventually he succeeded in

canciliating him and his sister Mūr Jahān. Sir William on the other hand committed the fatal blunder in ignoring Asad Khan and his son who were held in great esteem by the emperor. Nor did he possess the foresight and judgment of offering the suitable presents and thereby attach them to his cause. Had he maintained cordial attitude towards the wazir, he would have secured the requisite firman for the benefit of the new Company. Thus even after heavily bribing the Mughal officers at all levels and winning over the most important of them, it was not possible for the foreigners to get things done in their interest. The wazir's personality and status carried decisive weight in the administrative framework. Without his acquiescence no final decision could be taken on any matter and without his approval no order could be issued.

C_O_N_C_L_U_S_I_O_N

The foregoing survey of the lives of Wazir in the second half of the seventeenth century amply reflects the shape of the institution of Wizārat which received the final touch at the hands of the Mughal Emperor Akbar and which excepting a brief period, remained unchanged during the reign of Aurangzeb. The importance of Wizārat was very fully realised by Shāhjahān who allowed the institution of Wikalat to fall into insignificance. After the death of Āsaf Khan, he revived the tradition of appointing a Wazir, who could bear and share the administrative burden. With the overall expansion of the empire, the problems had considerably multiplied and it was difficult task to hold the canopy. In moments of crises the incumbent of this high office was called upon to share the responsibility and relieve the Emperor of his anxieties. Like Sadullah Khan the best Wazir of Shāhjahān, the Wazirs of Aurangzeb too stood up to his expectations; they were alive to their duties and were fortunate enough to bask under the sunshine of royal favour.

Whatever might have been the role of Mīr Jumlaḥ in the kingdom of Golkonda after he came into contact with Prince Aurangzeb in the Deccan, it did not take much time

to realise that his future benefactor was not in any way inferior to him. It is therefore, not surprising that his personal ambitions never came into clash with those of his master. Each was indispensable to the other. Before and after the war of succession Muazzam Khan remained fully loyal to him. But after his accession to the throne Aurangzeb found himself in most critical position. His suspicious mind and the necessity to crush Shāh Shuja impelled him to keep Muazzam Khan far away in the east. Thus, the latter has to pass the rest of his life in perpetual conflict which was pre-eminently military. Though he continued to enjoy the status and the emoluments of Hazir, he could neither influence nor control the politics. Nor could he give proof of his financial acumen. His legal and formal duties were performed by his deputy and other officers at the capital. The same holds true of his successors. Jafar Khan remained in the office for a short while. Though he had the competence to make some contribution to the department of Tikarāh, perhaps because of his growing age he could not do anything. Asad Khan's talents were mostly used in the Deccan. Looking from this angle, it becomes clear that the Emperor attached too much importance to the political problems in which he was deeply engrossed.

Though we get detailed account of the military campaigns in which the Hazir participated so actively but the records of the financial activity, which was their principal domain is comparatively meagre. This may be

due also to the absence of a historian like Abul Fazi. Moreover from the very beginning Aurangzeb had to be on his guard against the tendency of the Wazir to assert his position over that of the sovereign. The emperor was keen to reign as well as rule. He wanted to see his influence felt in the distant provinces of the empire. It was he who issued the minutest orders. He kept his eye on every detail. He wanted to check with a strong hand the fissiparous tendencies which had been gaining momentum in practically all parts of Hindustan. In short, the immediate problem was that of the protection of the integrity and existence of the empire and the task bristled with difficulties. Though the emperor had not the vision of his illustrious predecessor Akbar, he was gifted with ample amount of courage and determination. Like Akbar he was desirous of taking all credit to himself. Precisely for these reasons he did not allow his Wazir to aggrandize himself and act independently. Nor did his Wazir at any time even in the most critical juncture dared to question the authority of his master. With the mighty and all powerful emperor over him the Wazir preferred to shelve his personal ambition and lend full support to him.

Jadunath Sarkar, in his work on Aurangzeb has stressed the religious intolerance and his hatred against the Shias. But a close study of the history of his reign unfold a different story. The emperor was wise enough to confine

his religious feelings to himself. They were not to influence his state of affairs. Had it not been so he would have not conferred the high office of Wizarat on the Persians who were Shias. Muazzam Khān, Fāzil Khān, Jafar Khān, and Asad Khān, the most prominent and intelligent and influential Wazirs of Aurangzeb were Shias. Compared to some of the Turānī nobles, they were more loyal and devoted to the emperor. In short, while appointing his Wazir, Aurangzeb was guided more by practical considerations than his religious outlook. Thus very much like his predecessors Aurangzeb also did not allow his religion to militate against the interests of the empire. This may sound paradoxical to some but in the light of the known and accepted historical facts it was difficult to give credence to the traditional view. It is patent that only the most experienced and competent persons who had served either as Mīr Bakshī or had risen from one post to another were appointed as Wazirs irrespective of their religious affiliations. As the Persians were past masters in the art of administration of finance, they were freely patronised and ennobled. Aurangzeb's own mother was a Shia and no historian has recorded that he hated her. Nūr Jahān was a Shia and he passed several years of his life as a prince under her fostering care.

Another important aspect which emerges from the study of the institution of Wizarat in this period is the unflinching

loyalty of the Wazir towards his master and his empire. Being the two wheels of the same machine which controlled the diverse races of Hindustan, the Mughal emperor and his Wazir depended upon each other for the fulfillment of the ambitions they cherished in their hearts. Both worked within the same framework and they could not afford to fall apart. This is something exceptionally commendable because we seldom come across such fidelity in the history of the neighbouring countries.

But this was only the brighter side of the shield. On the other hand, we notice that on account of the excessive centralisation of power into the hands of the emperor, his Wazir could not make any contribution to the growth of the department of Wizarat nor could he introduce any change in the revenue administration. Times had changed, reforms were overdue but the department of Wizarat was allowed to remain the same as it was in the days of Akbar. Obviously this explains the cause of the economic unrest in the period under review. Had the talents of the Wazir being utilised in putting the department on sound footing the empire would have been saved from the economic disaster, which threatened its very existence. For such a task the presence of the Wazir at the Centre was necessary, specially when the means of communications were slow and primitive and it was not so easy for the officers at Āgrā or Dehlī to get necessary instructions in time.

Yet in another direction also we notice a slight gap. The Wazira of emperor Aurangzeb because of their military pre-occupation could not find time to turn their mind towards cultural pursuits. Like the Wazira of the previous period they could neither patronise men of letters nor could they ever make an effort to promote any aspect of medieval culture. Though by themselves they were steeped in learning and were highly sensitive to their environment, no piece of literary work, no monument of outstanding merit, not a single piece of art stands to their credit which could create an impression that they continued the cultural traditions of their predecessors. Muazzam Khān was a millionaire and yet his cultural contribution is nil. Fāzil Khān and Jafar Khān were old hence completely devoid of aesthetic sense. Asad Khān had money¹ but he preferred to maintain a large harem than to spend his wealth on men of erudition. We can not blame them for their inaesthetic sense. Perhaps in the existing conditions, no fruitful work was possible. With the death of magnificent Shāhjahān the era of fine art was over. In the face of internal or external problems, soldiers, warriors and statesmen found more pleasure in the music created by the

1. Sir William Norris, the British ambassador to Mughal empire, mentions: "He has 30 wives and 800 other women with him and has change of 3 or 4 every night each, I think might be spared considering his age who is 90 years old".

clash of swords than in the compositions of the poets and the songs of the musicians. The emperor and his Wazir were all alike. Seated on saddled horses, girdled with two swords they moved from one square to another of the political chess board, defeating and subjugating one rival after another until they had conquered all. The Wazirs of Aurangzeb were small satellites who revolved round the magnificent personality of the emperor. They could neither rise above their environment nor could they impress it with their individuality. They were merely a part of a machine which rolled on continuously with the single aim namely that of conquest and more conquest.

B_I_B_L_I_O_G_R_A_P_H_Y

(A.- ASSESSMENT OF THE PERSIAN SOURCES)

Ain-e-Akbari by Abul Fazl

The Ain-e-Akbari forms the third part of the Akbar Namah. It is an unrivalled source of our knowledge for the political institutions of Akbar's reign. Blochmann rightly observes that "in the Ain-e-Akbari we have a picture of Akbar's government in its several departments, and of its relations to the different ranks and mixed races of his subjects....."

Tuzuk-e-Jahangiri by Jahangir.

It is a fortunate accident that Emperor Jahangir left behind him a record of the greater part of his reign from his own pen. The account of the 18th and 19th regnal years has been recorded by Motamad Khan, because of the growing illness of the emperor. It forms the prime authority for the study of his reign and his personality. From the administrative point of view, the work is invaluable not only as royal regulations reproduced in full, there is a fairly full and accurate record of appointments, promotions and dismissals. Occasionally we come across thumb-nail sketches of the high ranking nobles and officers. With the exception of a few incidents the emperor has given a detailed account of his thoughts and actions.

Iqbal Nāmah-e-Jahāngīrī by Motamad Khan.

Mohammad Sharif Motamad Khan the author of the 'Iqbal Nāmah-e-Jahāngīrī' held the post of Bakhshi or pay-master in the reign of Jahangir. Being closely associated with the administrative machinery of the empire he writes with the authority of an eye-witness. His work is useful for the history of the last four years of Jahangir's reign about which the 'Tuzuk-e-Jahangir's is silent. It has no special significance for the earlier period as it is merely a repetition of the 'Tuzuk'.

Padshāh Nāmah by Mirzā Amīn al Qazwīnī.

Mirzā Amīn al Qazwīnī is the first official historian of Shahjahan's reign. He continued to hold the post of court historian till he had completed the record of the first ten years of Shahjahan's reign. Thus, the work is important for the imperial regulations and the incidents of this period.

Bādshāh Nāmah by Abdul Hamīd Lahorī.

It is the official history of the first twenty years (1627-47) of Shahjahan's reign Lahori begins his work after the style of Abul Fazl, but later on, he gives up the attempt. The account of first ten years is on the whole a repetition of Qazwini's work, with a few additions. Its most valuable contribution is the account of second decade of Shahjahan's reign. He has furnished important information about the early career of Jafar Khan and Asad Khan.

Padshah Nāmah by Mohammad Waris.

Abdul Hamid Lahori was prevented from continuing the work because of his old age; and so it was entrusted to one of his pupils, Mohammad Waris. He has recorded the history of the third cycle of the reign of Shahjahan.

Amal-e-Saleh by Mohammad Saleh Kambū.

It is a detailed history of Emperor Shahjahan from his birth to his death. The author was employed in the Imperial Records Department, as such he had access to first hand sources. In style and literary flare he surpasses Abdul Hamid Lahori. He gives us a list of the high officers, poets and scholars of the period.

Ālamgīr Nāmah by Mirza Mohammad Kāzim.

It is the official history of the first decade of the reign of Aurangzeb. Kāzim compiled this work on the Royal command and it was revised by the Emperor himself. It provides us with information about the promotions and appointments of the officers made during this period.

Futūhāt-e-Ālamgīrī by Isardas Nāgar.

It is a history of Aurangzeb's reign from his rise to power to the 34th year by Isardas Nāgar, a resident of Patan in Gujrat. It is valuable for the war of succession and for the careers of his wazirs.

Masir-e-Ālamgīrī by Saqī Mustad Khan.

It is a history of the reign of Aurangzeb which the author completed in 1710-11. The history of the first ten

years is an abridgment of Mohammad Kazim's *Ālangīr Nāmāh*; the rest of the narrative till the death of the emperor in 1707 is the author's own contribution. The author had been attached to the imperial court for forty years, and was an eye-witness of many of the transactions he has recorded.

Muntakhab-ul-Lubāb by Khwāfi Khān

The author joined the Mughal service as 'waqianavis' under Emperor Shahjahan and was present in the battle of Samugarh. Later on, he was brought up in the service of Aurangzeb. He gives us information about the appointments and activities of the wazirs of the period. Being associated with the government, his record is of much importance, as "he frequently speaks in his own person reporting what he had himself seen or heard".

Nuskha-e-Dilkusha by Bhīm Sēn Kayestha.

It is a history mainly of the military transactions in the Deccan during Aurangzeb's reign. Bhīm Sēn was a writer (clerk) in the Bundela contingent of Rāo Dalpat, a general in the Mughal army of the Deccan. Thus he was in a position to secure correct information about contemporary events. He was present in the imperial army which laid siege to Jinji, so his account of the role of Asad Khan forms a valuable and indispensable record which has been judiciously used in writing the present thesis.

Zafar Nāmāh-e-Ālangīrī by Āqil Khān Kāzī.

It is also known as Aurang Nāmāh, Waqiat-e-Ālangīrī

or Hālāt-e-Ālamgīrī. The author's real name was Mīr Alī Askari; 'Aqil Khan' was the title bestowed upon him by Emperor Aurangzeb and 'Razi' was his poetical surname. He was appointed the governor of Delhi which office he retained till his death in 1108 A.H/1696 A.D. It is a history of the first five years of Aurangzeb's reign. The author has written from his personal knowledge and has given a vivid description of the war of succession and Muazzam Khan's campaign against Shuja.

Aurang Nāmāh (Poem) by Haqīrī:

It is a history of war of succession in verse written by Haqīrī, a Rozbihānī follower of Muazzam Khan. It was completed in 1661 and is of much historical importance. Haqiri has elaborately and graphically described Muazzam Khan's campaign against the fugitive Shuja from the battle of Khajwa till the prince's escape to the Arakan. As the writer was a protagonist of Muazzam Khan he writes of the latter's activities in a spirit of partizanship.

Fathiyā-e-Ibriyā by Shihābuddīn Tālīsh:

The author's original name was Ibn Mohammad Ahmad, and he was the 'waqianawis' (news-writer) under Muazzam Khan. As he had been in attendance upon the latter throughout the whole campaign of Kuch-Bihar and Assam, he after the death of Muazzam Khan, decided to write truthful account of it which he completed in 1073 A.H/1663 A.D. Being an eye-witness,

his account of Muazzam Khan's activities in that region is very valuable.

Tārīkh-e-Shah Shujai by Mīr Mohammad Masūm:

The author, Mīr Mohammad Masūm, was an old servant of Shuja. He has mainly described the war of succession; and he abruptly ends his narrative on 18th April 1660. It throws light on the military-skill of Muazzam Khan.

Hadīqat-us-Salātīn by Nizāmuddīn Ahmad:

It is a history of the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah of Golkonda to the end of his 16th regnal year, 1050 A.H/ 1640 A.D. It is indispensable for Muazzam Khan's early life and career in Golkonda before he entered Mughal service.

Irshād-ul-Wuzarā by Sadruddīn Mohammad:

It contains Short biographical notices of Muslim wazirs. The work consists of twelve sections (Makalah), the last chapter deals with the wazirs of the Mughal empire. The author's father, Zabardast Khan was the Subahdar of Oudh under Aurangzeb, so his account of the wazirs of Aurangzeb's reign is of much importance.

Farhang-e-Kardani by Jagat Rai Shujai:

Jagat Rai Shujai completed his work, Farhang-e-Kardani, in 1690. It deals with the various duties and the functions of officers of the Mughal empire, and the system of land revenue. Being contemporary to Emperor Aurangzeb the author's account is of very significance;

and it supply us information with regard to the multifarious duties of the wazir and his position in the Mughal empire.

Hidayet-ul-Qawaid by Hidayatullah Bihari:

The work was compiled in 1126 A.H/1714 A.D. It gives directions as to how the different officials of the Mughal government should conduct themselves, what functions they were expected to discharge, what precautions they should take and what records they should keep. It is an important source of information for the duties and functions of the wazir.

Letters of Aurangzeb:

Aurangzeb's letters are collected under several titles such as 'Adab-e-Alamgiri', 'Faiyyazul-Qawanin', 'Kalimat-e-Taibat', 'Raqa'im-e-Karaim', 'Ahkam-e-Alamgiri' and 'Ruqqat-e-Alamgiri'. Some of them provide us the information with regard to Muazzam Khan's conflict with Abdullah Qutb Shah and his defection to the Mughal court. Most of these letters contain the orders and administrative regulations. The letters which have been addressed to his wazirs throw light on their position and personalities.

Akhbarat-e-Darbar-e-Mualla:

These are the 'waqai' papers or diaries maintained at the court. Herein are found daily entries of all the important events. As such these 'Akhbarat' form a very valuable source of information for the reign. They are

collected in two series: (i) Royal Asiatic Society London collection and (ii) Jaipur State Archives Series. They provide us the information with regard to wazir's role at the court.

Maasir-ul-Umara by Shahnawaz Khan:

It is a well known biographical dictionary of the nobles of the Mughal empire. It is based on the authoritative historical works and letters, and serves as a reference book for the study of Mughal Umara or nobles.

This brief survey of the Persian authorities shows that they contain only incidental references to the wazirs of that time. These references have been pieced together to provide a reasonable assessment of their life and activities; and of their achievements and failures.

(B - LIST OF VARIOUS SOURCES)

P_E_R_S_I_A_N S_O_U_R_C_E_S

Aurangzeb:

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